THOUGHTS
OF
CICERO,
ON THE
Following SUBJECTS, *viz.*

I. RELIGION.
II. MAN.
III. CONSCIENCE.
IV. The PASSIONS.
V. WISDOM.
VI. PROBITY.
VII. ELOQUENCE.
VIII. FRIENDSHIP.
IX. OLD AGE.
X. DEATH.
XI. SCIPIO's DREAM.
XII. MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS.

First publiſhed in LATIN and FRENCH
BY THE
Abbe' d'OLIVET;

And now Tranſlated into ENGLISH, with NOTES.

LONDON,
Printed for J. NEWBERY, at the *Bible* and *Sun*,
and R. GRIFFITHS, at the *Dunciad*,
in St. *Paul*'s Church-yard.
MDCCLI.

BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE
TO THE
ENGLISH Tranſlation.

WHERE there is, in the nature of a work, a manifeſt utility, even the want of a preface might be excuſed; or, at leaſt, the ſhortneſs of one ought to paſs for a mark of juſt reſpect to the reader. A Book calculated to inſpire virtuous and manly ſentiments, muſt be a ſeaſonable preſent to youth, and not unacceptable to the public in general: and that ſuch is the tendency of

the following collection of Cicero's *thoughts, cannot be denied.*

The world is ſufficiently acquainted with the Abbé d'Olivet's *ability to make a proper choice: and, indeed, his tranſlation is as much a maſter-piece in the* French *language, as the original is in the* Latin. *What his reaſons were for this undertaking, appear from his preface. There too may be ſeen a very plain and obvious demand for an* Engliſh *tranſlation.*

Here our female readers will meet with precepts of the moſt exalted piety, benevolence, and virtue, recommended to them by the name of an Author, of whom there

there are few ladies who have not heard enough to raiſe their curioſity to be acquainted with his ſentiments.

We ſhall ſay nothing of our tranſlation, which is ſubmitted to the judgment of the public, but that all imaginable care has been taken to make it a good one.

THE

ABBE' *d'OLIVET*'s

PREFACE.

I CAN never forget what happened to me once, as I was engaged in a party for a walk, about fifteen miles from *London*. Being obliged, by bad weather, to take ſhelter in the firſt houſe that preſented itſelf, I was agreeably ſurprized to find it inhabited by a *Frenchman*, whom I had known in my youth, and who, after various adventures, had procured himſelf this retreat, where he made a livelihood by boarding children, to whom he taught the *French* language. I had the curioſity to learn what was the method followed in this ſort of

ſchools, which are common enough in *England*. I found that they read *Quintus Curtius*, with *Vaugelas*'s tranſlation, and that by the help of the *Latin*, the rudiments of which the children muſt previouſly be acquainted with, the maſter endeavoured to make them underſtand the *French*; which ſerved at once to exerciſe them in both languages. In the midſt of our converſation, the father of one of the boarders joined us. Some words, which in the way of diſcourſe he directed to me, gave me occaſion to tell him, that I ſhould be glad to hear his ſon explain a page or two, at dipping into the book. And where ſhould the book open, but juſt at the battle of *Arbella?* But, far the boy's explanation had not proceeded, before the *Engliſh* gentleman, the father, interrupted it, by reflections that gave riſe to this little collection. After all, ſays he, What reaſon is there that my

ſon

ſon ſhould have his head filled with all theſe wars? I have no thoughts of making him a general. But was that his deſtination, are theſe books fit to teach him his Art? Why not have ſome other tranſlation, that ſhould contain uſeful maxims, and principles proper to form a man of honour?

Nothing could be more judicious than this reflection: And from that inſtant, I formed a reſolution to ſet about ſuch a work, but know not how I came to delay ſo long the execution of a deſign, ſo agreeable to me on more than one account. Firſt, it could not be indifferent to me, conſidered as a member of our academy, to contribute to the ſpreading our language through foreign nations. Another motive, ſtill more engaging, was, that a work of this nature, if tolerably executed, might become the moſt important of all reading to young people,

ple, and the propereſt to inſpire them with a taſte for virtue, without which, it is impoſſible for a man to be happy in himſelf, or uſeful to ſociety.

Some tranſlation then was to be thought of, for attaining the double end I propoſed to myſelf; and there was no room to heſitate upon the choice of the original. Where could I have found the beauties of the *Latin* tongue, and the moſt refined morals, better united than in *Cicero?* But as moſt of his works include ſeveral things, which either exceed the comprehenſion of children, or are not all alike uſeful, I thought it would be beſt to make a choice out of them, and confine myſelf almoſt wholly to collect detached thoughts. And indeed, children are hardly capable of taking in the whole chain of a long argument. Neither is it my opinion, that ſentences delivered in a laconic way, are fit for them. A thought, unleſs

unleſs explained, and put in a certain light, appears obſcure to them: Or, granting that perſpicuity ſhould accompany ſuch a conciſe method, there is too much room to fear, that what we call ſentences, would paſs too quickly to fix their deſultory imaginations. For this reaſon alone, was there no other, I ſhould have preferred *Cicero* to *Seneca*. But beſides, there was a much finer harveſt to be reaped in one than the other: For as the cardinal *du Perron* very juſtly obſerves, *there is more in two pages of Cicero*, who thinks a great deal, and whoſe ſentiments always move forward, *than in ten pages of* Seneca, who eternally dwells on a thought, and treats the ſame thing over and over again.

It may be objected, that *Cicero* loſes infinitely, by being thus retailed in ſcraps. Since the ſuperiority of his merit, and what raiſes him, perhaps,

above

above all who ever wrote before, or ſince, is not only an uninterrupted ſeries of true, ſolid, and ſhining thoughts; nor the ſecret only of expreſſing thoſe thoughts with graces peculiar to himſelf: but it is chiefly the art of marſhalling, connecting, and forming them into one chain. To this I anſwer, that the point here is to make *Cicero* ſubſervient to our profit, without being ſolicitous about his reputation as a writer, which will ſubſiſt independent of any liberty we may take with him.

I ſhould, however, do him wrong, with thoſe who know no more of him than by what they will ſee here, if I neglected to acquaint them, that this volume, ſo far from comprehending all that he has ſaid worthy of notice, contains only a very ſmall part thereof. It was my buſineſs to proportion the work to the wants of children. *Quintilian* compares their underſtandings to veſſels, into which no liquor

liquor can be poured, but drop by drop. Whence little reading is neceſſary for this age, but that little ſhould be well choſen, and frequently repeated.

I have taken very little out of the *Offices*, becauſe they ought to be read, and ſeriouſly conſidered, from one end to the other. To give them in remnants, would be inexcuſable. They are all connected together, all equally beautiful and neceſſary. One principle infers another, and has often occaſion for a third to prove itſelf, in order to make us ſenſible, that morality compoſes only one entire Body; whoſe parts are ſo coherent, ſo inſeparable, that, on examining well the nature of our duties, and that of the human heart, if one is not an honeſt man in every thing, it follows that he is ſo in nothing.

I own, however, that *Cicero*'s ſyſtem of morals, though it may be looked

looked on as an abſtract of the moſt ſolid and judicious ſentiments of the heathens, wants nevertheleſs to be ſometimes corrected, and at other times ſupported, by the morality of the goſpel. Where human reaſon ſeems to leave us in a ſort of uncertainty, there divine revelation ſteps in to our aſſiſtance. This is what a judicious maſter will make his pupils ſenſible of. When, for example, *Cicero* uſes the expreſſion of *Gods:* A word thrown in, will make them perceive that this plural offends, not againſt religion only, but common ſenſe too. When they ſhall ſee the judgment that mere heathens have paſſed on pleaſures, the paſſions, riches, real good, and real evil, it will be well to join to their admirable maxims, the great motives which a chriſtian has before his eyes. When they come to read the dream of *Scipio*, how naturally will the occaſion offer to explain

plain to them, what the chriſtian faith teaches of another life?

To form a chriſtian then, it will be neceſſary to ſupplement often, and much, to *Cicero*'s ethicks. Theſe very morals, however, at the ſame time that they contribute to form the man of honour, diſpoſe likewiſe a child to receive, and preſerve in his heart, the precepts of religion. You cannot too often repeat to him, that he has a ſoul, and a conſcience; that there is a law of nature, whence reſult indiſpenſable duties; and that, independently of all revealed religion, if he wants Probity, he becomes in the eyes of all who make uſe of their reaſon, an object of horror and contempt. Certainly, the virtues of a *Socrates* cannot alone ſuffice us; but let us begin with having them. Every edifice built without this foundation, will not be a laſting one. Whereas it is rare for religion to loſe its ground,

in

in a man ſincerely virtuous; and rarer yet, for it not to recover its rights, ſooner or later, ſhould they happen to be loſt.

Though, once more, my deſign was to be ſerviceable to ſuch foreigners, as, by the help of the *Latin*, ſtudy the *French*; it appears to me, that my labour might even be of ſome ſervice in our own ſchools, where *Latin* is ſtudied by the help of the *French* *. I do not mean our colleges; they are governed by able heads, who know better than me, which method is beſt. I ſpeak of thoſe little ſchools, which daily multiply round *Paris*, as well as in the country. Inſtead of reading treatiſes in them, which require an acquaitance with the diſputes of the

* This holds equally good of an *Engliſh* tranſlation, deſigned for the uſe of our ſchools; by the help of which, both the *Latin* and *French* language may be learned at once; and ſuch an edition, in the three languages, is ſold by the proprietors of this tranſlation.

Athenian

Athenian portico and lyceum *, that are little known in our days; would it not be as advantageous for the ſtudent, and no leſs convenient for the maſter, to keep to inſtructive paſſages, and ſuch as are accommodated to every capacity, either by the help of a tranſlation alone, or a few ſhort remarks? This would be to teach things as well as words; to cultivate reaſon and memory at the ſame time; and to make inſtruction at once uſeful, and eaſy. For the great principles of morality have this peculiar property, that, being naturally impreſſed, or at leaſt traced out, on the hearts of all mankind; when they are pointed out to a child, he thinks he diſcerns only what he knew before: and thus he

* *Zeno* had the appellation *Stoic* given him from στοὰ, a *portico*, the place where he taught his diſciples; who, from him, were called *Stoics*. The *Lyceum* was a place on the banks of the river *Iliſſus*, where *Ariſtotle* uſed to walk, as he taught his philoſophy; whence he and his followers had the name of *Peripatetics*, from περιπατεῖν, *to walk*.

becomes

becomes his own beſt interpreter, as finding an excellent commentary in his own heart.

But let us not confine ourſelves to the times of ſtudy in our public ſchools. During the breaking-up ſeaſon, it is common for children to follow their parents into the country; and it is there that a work of this ſort might be of ſignal ſervice. What duty can a father hold more ſacred, what obligation more indiſpenſable, than that of inſtructing his own child himſelf? Beſides, where is there a more ſenſible, more lively, or more attracting pleaſure, when the bowels of the parent are, what they ought always to be preſumed? I am fond to figure to myſelf a man engroſſed by the public throughout the year, excepting for a while in autumn, when reſtored to himſelf, and removed at a diſtance from the noiſe and impertinence of the world; I am fond,

fond, I ſay, to figure to myſelf ſuch a man in the boſom of his family, with a *Cicero* in his hand, reading ſome remarkable paſſage of antiquity, and taking a pleaſure to reaſon upon it, more, as it were, by chance, than in the form of advice. It is thus the precious ſeed penetrates into the yet tender ſoul; whence, in due time, ſhall ſpring up the honeſt and great man, the good magiſtrate, and the virtuous patriot. All the leſſons of a tutor, however learned and diligent, are of little avail, compared with what a father properly inculcates; becauſe a child knows, and knows it ſo as not to be miſtaken, that his father's only aim is to endeavour to make him happy, and deſerving to be ſo.

I conclude with a paſſage, that has often preſented itſelf to my memory, but which I will not tranſlate, for fear of offending the age we live in. It is well known, what the morals of the

the *Romans* were become in the times that *Cicero* wrote. It is well known, what were the conſequences of an ill diſtributed opulence, an unbounded luxury, too general an impunity, but eſpecially a contempt of all order and decency; which never gains footing, till the duties of morality are quite forgot; and which puts, as it were, the laſt hand to the depravation of manners. I will not ſay, that we are come to ſuch a length. All I ſhall obſerve is, that whatever meaſures are taken, in order to prevent the like degeneracy, ſhould neither proceed from a panic terror, nor a premature zeal. But, however that may be, here follows the *Latin* quotation, that I meant to ſpeak of. [*Leſs ſcrupulous than the* French *tranſlator, we give here, in lieu of the* Latin, *the* Engliſh *tranſlation.*]

"What greater, what better ſer-
"vice, can we do the common-
"wealth,

" wealth, than preſenting it with any
" thing towards the inſtruction and
" tutorage of youth? Eſpecially whilſt
" the manners, and the times, are
" at ſuch a paſs of degeneracy
" and diſſoluteneſs, that no leſs than
" the united endeavours of all *who*
" *love their Country*, is neceſſary to
" reſtrain, and keep our youth with-
" in bounds".

CICERO, de Div. II, 2.

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THOUGHTS

THOUGHTS OF *CICERO.*

I.

On RELIGION.

WHEN* we view the heavens, and contemplate the celeſtial bodies, can any thing be plainer, or appear with clearer evidence, than that there is a deity of moſt conſummate wiſdom, by whom they are governed?

He that entertains any doubt of this, may, in my opinion, with equal reaſon, doubt of the exiſtence of the ſun. For,

* De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. cap. 2.

wherein is the one more evident than the other? Had not mankind been thoroughly convinced of the truth of this opinion, it could never have acquired ſo firm a footing, never have been able to make its way through ſo many ages and generations, nor to have gained new confirmation by length of time: For we ſee, that all other vain and fictitious notions are at length quite exploded. Who now believes there ever was an Hippocentaur *, or Chimera †? Or where is the old wife ſo ſtupidly ſilly, as to dread the infernal monſters ‖, that were believed to exiſt heretofore? For time, which effaces all feigned hypotheſes, eſtabliſhes and confirms the judgments of nature. Hence it is, that the veneration paid the divine beings, and the ſacred rites

* Hippocentaur is a fabulous animal, half man, half horſe. The *Theſſalians* are ſaid to have been the inventors of the art of breaking horſes; and being the firſt that were ſeen on horſeback, they appeared to make but one body with the horſes; which gave riſe to the fable of the Hippocentaur.

† Chimera, according to the poets, was a monſter, that had the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a dragon. *Bellerophon*, mounted upon Pegaſus, defeated the Chimera. For the different explanations of this, conſult the authors who have treated of ancient fables.

‖ Such as Cerberus, the Parcæ or ſiſter-fates, the Eumenides or furies, &c.

of

of religion, both with us, and among other nations, daily gain ground and improve.

'Tis* an excellent ſuppoſition of *Ariſtotle*, that if there were men who had always lived under ground, in ſplendid and magnificent apartments, ornamented with pictures and ſtatues, and well furniſhed with whatever abounds with thoſe who are commonly eſteemed happy; and that without ever making their appearance on the ſurface of our globe, theſe men had, by fame or inſtruction, been informed that there was a deity, and divine powers: Then, that after ſome time, a chaſm of the earth ſhould open, and make way for them to leave their buried habitations, and mount up to the world which we inhabit: When the earth, the ſea, and the heavens, ruſhed upon their ſight; when they obſerved the extent of the clouds, and felt the force of the winds; when they had caſt their eyes on the ſun, viewed its magnitude and ſplendor, and had been told of its great influence, and how, by diffuſing light through the heavens, it cauſes day:

† De Nat. Deor. II. 37, 38.

When, on night's overſhadowing the earth, they beheld the firmament beſpangled with ſtars; when they had been made acquainted with the ſtill varying phaſes of the moon, both in its increaſe and wane; alſo with the riſing and ſetting of all theſe heavenly bodies, and their ſtated and unvaried revolutions from all eternity: Certainly, on ſuch a proſpect, they would be convinced that there were gods, and that the great things they had ſeen were their works.

Thus far *Ariſtotle.* Let us now make another ſuppoſition, and imagine ſuch a darkneſs as prevailed once at an eruption of mount *Ætna*, when, for the ſpace of two days, the adjacent countries were ſo benighted, that it was impoſſible for one man to diſtinguiſh another; ſo that on the third day, when the ſun appeared with his uſual ſplendor, they ſeemed riſen, as it were, from the dead. But ſhould it happen, that, after being enveloped in eternal darkneſs, the light ſuddenly broke out upon us with full glare, how amazing would the proſpect of the heavens appear! The daily returns of the ſame objects to our

our view, render them familiar to us; nor are men inclined to admire or ſearch into the cauſes of what they are always converſant with: As if the novelty, rather than the greatneſs and excellence of things, ought to excite us to inveſtigate their cauſes.

Does he merit the name of MAN, who, after having viewed the ſtated and invariable motions of the heavens, the regular arrangements and diſpoſition of the ſtars, and the nice connection and harmony which reign throughout the univerſe, ſhall notwithſtanding maintain, that all this is the effect of blind chance, and not the work of reaſon; though the wiſdom, by which they are conducted, far exceeds the power of the human underſtanding to comprehend? When we ſee a ſphere, a curious dial, or any other piece of machinery moving artificially; 'tis never queſtioned that they are the effects of deſign: And can we then contemplate that mighty power, whereby the heavens perform their revolutions with ſuch amazing velocity, whence ariſe the regular viciſſitudes of the ſeaſons, ſo admirably contrived for pro-

moting the happineſs and preſervation of the whole ſyſtem; and yet doubt that the world is directed, I will not ſay ſimply by intelligence, but by conſummate and moſt divine wiſdom? Hence then with the ſubtilties of ſophiſtry; for here we have ocular demonſtration of the beauty of thoſe things we attribute to divine providence.

When* we behold the bright appearance of the heavens, and conſider the great, the amazing, velocity of their revolution; the viciſſitudes of day and night; the ſucceſſive change of the ſeaſons, ſo aptly calculated for ripening the fruits of the earth, and preſerving a juſt temperature in all bodies; the ſun which preſides over, and regulates all theſe phænomena; then the moon, whoſe augmentation and diminution of light ſeems ſo well adapted to mark out our calendar†; the five planets likewiſe revolving through the twelve ſigns of the Zodiack, and all of them with the

* Tuſcul. I. 28, 29.

† By the *Faſti*, we muſt underſtand the days of the month in general. For working-days were, by the *Romans*, called *Faſti dies*, and holidays *Nefaſti*.

greateſt

greateſt regularity performing their reſpective revolutions, though with different motions; to this add the nightly proſpect of the firmament, ſtudded and ornamented with ſtars; then the terreſtrial globe, raiſed above the ſea, and fixed in the centre of the univerſe*; which in two regions †, diſtinct from each other, is habitable and cultivated: One of theſe is that we inhabit, ſituated towards the north pole, whence

* It is evident from the expreſſions here uſed, that *Cicero* followed the *Ptolemaic* ſyſtem of the world; which places the earth in the centre of the univerſe, and makes the heavenly bodies to revolve round it: But this opinion is now given up as erroneous, all the phænomena being accounted for in a much more ſimple and rational way, by ſuppoſing the ſun to occupy the centre, and all the planets to revolve round him, *viz.* our earth once a year, and at the ſame time to turn once every day round its own axis.

† The earth is divided, both by Ancients and Moderns, into five Regions or Zones; that in the middle of the earth was called the *Torrid Zone*, as being directly under the ſun, and therefore ſuppoſed by the Ancients to be uninhabitable for heat; the two Zones under the Poles were called *Frigid*, becauſe not habitable for cold; and the two remaining Zones, lying between the two Frigid Zones and the Torrid Zones, were called *Temperate*, on account of the clemency of their air: And tho' this opinion of the Ancients, both with regard to the Torrid and Frigid Zones, has long ſince been found to be erroneous; yet it cannot be denied, but the Inhabitants of the Temperate Zones live much more comfortably than thoſe of the other three do.

The bluſt'ring north-wind brings the gelid
ſnows:

The other lies towards the ſouth, and is called by the *Greeks* Ἀντίχθων: Whilſt the remaining parts, by reaſon of the exceſſive heats and colds which prevail there, are entirely waſte and depopulated: But here, in our happier ſituation, all in due ſeaſon,

The ſky grows clear, the trees their foliage
ſhoot,
The joyous vines luxuriant branches ſpread,
The boughs ſway down beneath their fruit-
ful load,
The fertile ſoil a copious harveſt yields;
All nature blooms; up ſpring refreſhing
ſtreams,
And the gay herbage crowns th' enamel'd
fields:

When we conſider again the multitude of cattle; deſigned, ſome for our nouriſhment, and others to ſupply us with cloathing; one part for the convenience of carriage, another for the purpoſes of agriculture;

culture; again, when we reflect on man himſelf, formed to contemplate the heavens, and pay his devotion to the divine beings; and laſtly, when we obſerve, how the whole earth, and the wide extenſive ſeas, are ſubſervient to his accommodation:

When we conſider all theſe, and the other innumerable objects of the univerſe, can we entertain a doubt, but that, if they were created, as is the opinion of *Plato*, there preſides over them ſome efficient cauſe; or if, as *Ariſtotle* holds, they exiſted from all eternity, that there is a being, who directs and ſuperintends the mighty fabrick?

Is it not aſtoniſhing*, that ever there was a man† who could perſuade himſelf, that the beautiful, and every way compleat ſyſtem of the world could be produced by the fortuitous concourſe of certain ſolid and indiviſible bodies, neceſſarily moved by the force of their natural gravity! He that can bring himſelf to think

* De Nat. Deor. II. 37. † He means *Epicurus*, the chief of a well known ſect of philoſophers.

in this train, may with equal reaſon believe, that if a very large number of types, (whether of gold or any other material) repreſenting the letters of the alphabet*, be thrown any where on the ground, they would form the annals of *Ennius*, ſo as to make them legible. Whereas I very much doubt, whether the power of chance could reach even ſo far as to produce one ſingle verſe. How then can theſe men affirm, that corpuſcles without colour, without any of that quality† which the *Greeks* call ποιότητα, *i. e.* plaſtic, or compoſing faculty, and without intelligence, ſhould, by only floating about at random, accidentally concur to the formation of the world; nay, of an infinite number of worlds, continually to ſupply the place of periſhing ones? But if this concourſe of

* Some have imagined that this paſſage of *Cicero* gave the firſt hint towards inventing the art of printing. In the original, it is *unius & viginti formæ literarum*, i. e. types of the one and twenty letters, which was the number contained in their Alphabet.

† Colour, heat, and ſuch other qualities, according to the *Epicureans*, belong only to compound bodies. Their atoms have naturally no other property but their ſize, weight, and what neceſſarily reſults from their configuration, ſmoothneſs, or roughneſs.

atoms

atoms can make a world, why does it never form a portico, a temple, a houſe, or city; which are certainly much eaſier to be effected?

Another* invincible argument, to prove the exiſtence of ſuperior beings, is, that there is no nation ſo barbarous, no man ſo ſavage, whoſe mind is not imbued with this perſuaſion. It muſt be confeſſed, indeed, that many people entertain very unworthy ideas concerning the gods; which is owing to their bad morals, and the prejudices of education; but all unite in acknowledging a divine and ſupreme nature. Neither is this perſuaſion the reſult of any conference, or concert of mankind; nor does it derive its authority from the power of cuſtom, or the ſanction of laws. Now, the common conſent of mankind is, in every caſe, to be eſteemed a law of nature.

Should† you aſk me to define what God is, I would adopt the procedure of

* Tuſcul. I. 13. † De Nat. Deor. I. 22.

Simonides,

Simonides, who, when the ſame taſk was impoſed on him by *Hiero*, king of *Syracuſe*, deſired one day to conſider of it; next day, the ſame queſtion being again put to him, he requeſted two days more; then four, and ſo on for a conſiderable time, doubling always his demand. At laſt, when the king with ſurprize aſked the reaſon of this, he replied, *that the more he meditated on it, the more incomprehenſible it appeared to him.* For I ſuppoſe that *Simonides* (who was not only an excellent poet, but otherwiſe a man of extenſive knowledge and wiſdom) was bewildered in a variety of opinions, each more ſubtile, and abſtracted, than the other; and being uncertain which of them came neareſt to truth, he deſpaired of finding it*.

Now† we can entertain no other idea of God, ſo far as his nature is comprehenſible by us, than that of a pure and free intelligence, or ſpirit, entirely diſtinct from

* None but Jews and Chriſtians can form a juſt idea of the divine being: For the ancient philoſophers, unapprized of the true ſyſtem of the creation, and believing the eternity of matter, could not but draw falſe inferences from ſo falſe a principle.

† Tuſcul. I. 27.

all

all corruptible matter, perceiving and moving all things, and poſſeſſed of ſelf-motion from eternity *.

From † the conſideration of the powers of the human mind, 'tis reaſonable, and we ought, to infer, that there muſt exiſt a divine mind, far ſurpaſſing the activity of ours. For as *Socrates* ſays in *Xenophon*, *Whence hath man derived his ſpiritual nature?* As to the conſtituent parts of the body, the humours, the heat diffuſed through it, the ſolids, and the breath we reſpire; 'tis eaſy tracing each of them to their reſpective elements: Thus one proceeds from water, another from fire, a third from earth, and a fourth from air. But what far excels all bodily accompliſhments, our reaſon I mean, or in other words our underſtanding, judgment, thought, prudence, where have we found it? From what ſource is it derived?

* Several moderns have maintained, that the notion of *pure ſpirit* was not to be found in the writings of the ancients. I would be glad to aſk them, if to expreſs that notion, they themſelves have terms leſs equivocal, or more deciſive and clear than thoſe we ſee here?

† De Nat. Deor. II. 6, 7.

That

That* there exiſts an excellent, perfect, and eternal being, worthy of the moſt exalted reſpect and admiration of mankind, the beauty of the univerſe, and the harmony of the heavenly bodies, compel us to confeſs. Wherefore, as religion, which is intimately connected with the knowledge of nature, ought to be propagated, ſo every root of ſuperſtition ſhould be extirpated. Turn you to which hand you will, the follies of ſuperſtition are ſure to ſtrike your obſervation; whether you liſten to a diviner, or attend to an omen; whether you ſacrifice, or obſerve the flight of a bird; whether you meet a *Chaldean*†, or ſoothſayer; nay, does it but thunder or lighten, is ſomething thunder-ſtruck, or ſhould any monſtrous production, or extraordinary accident occur. Now, as incidents of this kind muſt, in the courſe of things, frequently happen, the ſuper-

* De Divinat. II. 72.

† A *Chaldean*, among the *Romans*, was the ſame with what the *French* call a *Bohemian*, and we a *Gipſey*; that is to ſay, a fortune-teller.

ſtitious

ſtitious perſon is thereby alarmed, and never enjoys one unruffled hour.

To * worſhip the gods, is our indiſpenſable duty; and that worſhip is beſt performed, moſt pure and perfect, and moſt deſerves the name of piety, when it is offered with true ſincerity and purity of mind: For not only the philoſophers, but likewiſe our anceſtors, have carefully diſtinguiſhed between religion and ſuperſtition.

Let † this therefore be a fundamental principle in all ſocieties, that the Gods are the ſupreme lords and governors of all things, that all events are directed by their influence and wiſdom, and that they are kind and benevolent to mankind; likewiſe that they know what every perſon really is, obſerve his actions whether good or bad, diſcern whether our profeſſions of religion are ſincere, and from the heart or not, and are ſure to make a difference between good men and the wicked.

Now who can diſpute the utility of theſe ſentiments, when he ſhall reflect, how

* De Nat. Deor. II. 28.

† De Legib. II. 7.

many

many caſes of the greateſt importance are decided by oaths; how much the ſacred rites, performed in making treaties, tend to aſſure peace and tranquillity; alſo what numbers the fear of divine puniſhment has reclaimed from a vicious courſe of life; and how ſacred* the ſocial rights muſt be, in a ſociety, where a firm perſuaſion obtains of the immediate intervention of the immortal Gods, both as witneſſes and judges of their actions?

It† is with piety, as with other virtues; it cannot conſiſt in diſſimulation: Without piety, neither ſanctity of manners, nor religion, can in any wiſe be ſupported; and if theſe are deſtroyed, what dreadful confuſion and diſorder muſt enſue! And indeed, 'tis a queſtion with me, whether, without piety towards the Gods, the mutual confidence and ſociety of mankind, or that moſt excellent of all virtues, juſtice, could ſubſiſt.

* Other tranſlators may ſeize occaſions to praiſe and point out the delicacy of a thought, or the happineſs and elegance of an expreſſion. Let me, on juſter grounds, admire here the manner in which a Heathen lays down to us that important doctrine of the omni-preſence of God, the ſearcher of hearts.

† De Nat. Deor. I, 2.

II.

On MAN.

*MAN**, whom we may define to be an animal endowed with forecaſt, ſagacity, wit, penetration, memory, judgment, and prudence, holds, by the ſingular favour of the ſupreme being, a very diſtinguiſhed rank in the creation. For he, of all the different ſpecies and kinds of animals, is the only partaker of reaſon and thought.

'Tis† a matter of the greateſt importance, for the human ſoul to comprehend its own nature: And doubtleſs, this is the meaning of *Apollo*'s‡ precept, enjoining every one to know himſelf; for I can't

* De Legib. I. 7. † Tuſcul. I. 22.

‡ *Pliny*, l. 1. c. 32. informs us, that in the temple at *Delphos*, they read three precepts of *Chilon*, one of the ſeven wiſemen; the firſt of which was that here mentioned; the ſecond was, *that we ought to deſire nothing with too great eagerneſs*; the third, *that it is a misfortune to be in debt, or engaged in law-ſuits.*

think

think it directs us to know the different parts of our body, or its ſtature and form. Our bodies do not conſtitute our being; nor when I diſcourſe with you, is it to your body I addreſs myſelf. Wherefore, when the oracle ſays, "Know yourſelf," it certainly intends, know your ſoul. For in fact, the body is no more than the veſſel, or receptacle, of the ſoul; and the actions of the latter only, can properly be called the actions of the man. In fine, was not the knowledge of the ſoul an excellent accompliſhment, it could not have paſſed for an apophthegm of ſuch acuteneſs, as to have been attributed to a deity.

This* precept, "Know yourſelf," was not ſolely intended to obviate the pride of mankind; but likewiſe that we might underſtand our own worth.

Whoever† knows himſelf, muſt be conſcious that he is poſſeſſed of a divine principle; he will look upon his rational part as the reſemblance of ſome divinity conſecrated within him; and will always be

* Ad Q. Fratrem, III. 6. † De Legib. I. 22.

careful,

careful, that his ſentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be worthy of this ineſtimable divine preſent. A ſerious and thorough examination of all his powers will inform him, what ſignal advantages he has received from nature, and with what infinite helps he is furniſhed for the attainment of wiſdom: for, from his firſt entrance into the world, he has faint conceptions* of all things delineated, as it were, in his mind; by the enlightening aſſiſtance of which, and the guidance of wiſdom, he may become a good, and conſequently a happy man.

What can be conceived more truly happy, than the ſtate of that man, who having attained to an exact knowledge of virtue, throws off all indulgence to body and ſenſe, tramples upon pleaſure, as a thing unbecoming the dignity of his nature; is not

* *Cicero*, here, ſeems to take it for granted, that our ideas, which have any regard to the law of nature, are innate, or ſuch as we come into the world with. But Mr. *Locke* clearly evinces, that we have no ideas beſides thoſe we receive by the ſenſes, and thoſe which the mind forms by its own operation on the former. So that if a man was born without any external ſenſe at all, he could form no idea, not even of reflexion; becauſe the mind would have no ſubject to ground its reflexions on.

terrified

terrified at the approach of affliction, or even of death itſelf; who maintains a benevolent intercourſe with his friends, and in that number includes the whole race of mankind, as being united together by one common nature; in ſhort, who preſerves an unfeigned piety and reverence towards the Gods, and exerts the utmoſt force of his rational powers to diſtinguiſh good from evil, juſt as we ſtrain our eyes in order to view an object with the greater attention?

When this man ſhall have ſurveyed the heavens, the earth, and the ſeas; ſtudied the nature of all things, and informed himſelf whence they were generated, to what ſtate they return, the time and manner of their diſſolution, and what parts of them are mortal and periſhing, and what divine and eternal; when he ſhall have attained, in a great meaſure, the knowledge of that being, who ſuperintends and governs them; and ſhall look upon himſelf, not as confined within the walls of any one city, or as the member of any particular community, but as a citizen of the univerſe, conſidered as one ſtate: On ſuch a grand repreſentation

tion of things as this, and on ſuch a proſpect and knowledge of nature; how well, O heavens! would ſuch a one underſtand the precept of Pythian *Apollo*, by knowing himſelf! How low would he eſteem, how thoroughly would he contemn and deſpiſe, thoſe things, which by vulgar minds are held in the higheſt eſtimation!

All theſe acquirements he would ſecure and guard, as with a fence, by the ſcience of diſtinguiſhing truth from falſhood, and the art of reaſoning, that teaches him to know what conſequences follow from premiſes, and how far one propoſition claſhes with another. When ſuch a perſon was convinced that nature deſigned him for ſociety, he would not reſt contented with theſe ſubtile diſquiſitions, but would put in practice that comprehenſive eloquence, which is neceſſary for governing nations, enacting laws, puniſhing malefactors, defending the honeſt part of mankind, and publiſhing the praiſes of great men; he would likewiſe uſe his perſuaſive eloquence, to recommend ſalutary maxims to his country-men; to rouſe them to the practice of virtue, and turn them from wickedneſs;

to comfort the afflicted; and in fine, by his writings, to immortalize the wiſe conſultations and noble actions of the prudent and brave, and to publiſh the ſhame and infamy of wicked men.

So many, and ſo excellent, are the things that will be found in man, by thoſe who deſire to know themſelves; of all which, however, wiſdom is the parent and director.

The * origin of human ſouls, is not to be met with in any terreſtrial matter; there is in them no mixture, or compoſition of parts; nothing that participates of earth, or conſiſts of water, air, or fire. There is no quality in theſe ſubſtances, that has the leaſt reſemblance to the powers of memory, intelligence, and reflection; or that is able to recollect the paſt, provide againſt the future, or comprehend what is preſent. Theſe are all emanations from the divinity. Nor can they poſſibly be derived to man, from any other ſource, beſides God himſelf. Whence we may conclude, that the nature and powers of the human ſoul, are of a

* Fragm. de Conſol.

ſingular

ſingular kind, and entirely diſtinct from theſe common and well known ſubſtances. It likewiſe follows, that a being endowed with perception, underſtanding, free-will, and a principle of life, is certainly of celeſtial and divine origin, and conſequently immortal.

It * would be no difficult matter to account for the formation of our blood, choler, phlegm, bones, nerves, veins; and in a word, to point out whence, and after what manner, all the conſtituent parts of the whole body were produced. Was there nothing in the ſoul but a bare vital principle, we might ſuppoſe that human life was ſuſtained in the ſame manner as vegetables; for theſe alſo are ſaid to live. Beſides, was the ſoul of man poſſeſſed of no other faculties, than a mere inſtinct of appetite and averſion, this would be common to it with brutes.

A diſtinguiſhing power of the human ſoul is memory, and that almoſt infinite, being capable of containing incidents in-

* Tuſcul. I. 24, and 25.

numerable:

numerable*; inſomuch that *Plato* will have it to be the recollection of what paſſed in a former life. For in that treatiſe of his, intitul'd *Menon*†, *Socrates* is introduced interrogating a child concerning the geometrical dimenſions of a ſquare. The child anſwers in a manner agreeable to his age; and yet the queſtions are put in ſo eaſy a way, that he goes on anſwering one thing after another, till he comes to the ſame concluſion as if he had learned geometry. Whence *Socrates* infers, that to learn is only to recollect. This he explains with greater accuracy, in the diſcourſe he held the very day on which he ſuffered death‡: for he there maintains, that a quite illiterate perſon, by giving proper anſwers to the queſtions put to him, makes it evident, that he did not learn thoſe things at that time, but only recalled

* Inſtances of an extraordinary memory are every where to be met with in hiſtory. *Cyrus* knew every ſoldier in his army by name. *Cyneas*, ambaſſador to the *Romans* from king *Pyrrhus*, in one day learnt the names of his ſpectators ſo well, that the next he ſaluted the whole ſenate and populace aſſembled, each by his name. See *Seneca*, Controverſ. lib. 1.

† *Plato* has given the title *Menon* to one of his dialogues.

‡ *Plato* gives an account of this diſcourſe in another dialogue called *Phedon*.

them

them to his remembrance. Nor is it poſſible, that the ideas of ſo many, and ſo vaſt, objects, ſhould in our very infancy be implanted and ſtamped, as it were, on our minds, and thence called *innate*, had not the ſoul been poſſeſſed of the knowledge of things before its entrance into the body*. Beſides, if, as *Plato* every where maintains, nothing has a real exiſtence that has a commencement of being, or that comes to a diſſolution; becauſe true exiſtence is peculiar to what is always the ſame, and ſuch are our ideas; in this caſe the ſoul having no real exiſtence after its union with the body, could not have attained ſuch an extenſive knowledge; and therefore muſt have brought this valuable acquiſition along with it. Whence the wonder ceaſes, how it comes to be ac-

* This great man ſeems to have loſt himſelf, in the viſionary notion of the pre-exiſtence of the human ſoul; which, with *Plato*, he endeavours to prove from its innate ideas; but we have remarked before, that Mr. *Locke* has clearly proved, that there are no ſuch ideas, and conſequently the pre-exiſtence of the ſoul muſt fall of courſe. And here we cannot but admire, how ſimple, how natural, how beautiful, Mr. *Locke*'s account of the origin of our knowledge is, when ſet in contraſt with this wild notion of the Platoniſts! See above, *page* 19.

quainted with ſuch a diverſity of things. The ſoul, indeed, does not perceive all its ideas immediately upon entering ſo ſtrange and diſordered an habitation; it takes ſome time to recollect and recover itſelf, and then it regains them by reminiſcence. So that learning is nothing but recollection.

The nature and origin of this power within us, I ſuppoſe, may be inveſtigated. It is neither the effect of the heart, the blood, the brain, nor of a concourſe of atoms. Whether the ſoul conſiſts of air or fire, I cannot tell: nor am I aſhamed, as many are, to confeſs myſelf ignorant, when I really am ſo. And indeed, if it were allowable to affirm any thing, where poſitive evidence is wanting, I could ſwear, that the ſoul is ſomething divine, whether it be made up of fire or of air. For I would aſk, is it poſſible to imagine how ſo vaſt a memory could grow, or be any wiſe produced, either out of the earth, or in this groſs and cloudy atmoſphere? Tho' its eſſence be above our reach, yet its qualities are diſcoverable by us; or if this be denied, its capacity is certainly conſpicu-

ous.

ous. What? Shall we ſuppoſe that the human mind is like a common veſſel of capacity, into which the various notices, which we conſign to our memory, are poured, as it were, to be preſerved? This would be a glaring abſurdity: for what bottom or figure can we conceive of the ſoul; or how very large muſt its capacity be? Shall we then imagine the ſoul to be like wax, and that memory is nothing but the traces or ſignatures of things upon it? But what traces do words, or even things themſelves, leave behind them? And beſides, what an immenſe volume muſt it be, that is capable of receiving the impreſſions of ſo many different objects?

What then is that other power, or faculty, which inveſtigates the ſecrets of nature; and is called thought, or invention? Can you imagine it to be the effect of the happieſt temperament of an earthly, frail, and periſhing matter? Can this be the origin of his mind, who firſt impoſed names on all things; which, by *Pythagoras*, was eſteemed a work of the greateſt wiſdom? Or of his, who gathered the ſcattered in-

dividuals of mankind, and united them in ſociety? Can this be ſaid of him, who taught how to expreſs, by the characters* of a few letters, the almoſt infinitely different ſounds of the voice? Or of that man, who marked out the courſes, progreſſions, and order of the planets? All theſe were men of an excellent genius: but they were ſtill greater and more beneficial to mankind, who diſcovered the arts of agriculture, architecture, and making cloth; who refined human life, and invented new methods of defence againſt wild beaſts: by ſuch men as theſe, being civilized and poliſhed, mankind left the mere neceſſary arts of life for thoſe of taſte and elegance. For in order to charm the ear, harmony, or the duly-tempered variety and pitch of ſounds, was invented. Then followed aſtronomy, or the ſtudy of the ſtars, as well thoſe called fixed, becauſe ſeen always in the ſame ſituation, as the planets or wandering ſtars, which are only ſuch in name, and not in fact. The man, therefore, who could fully compre-

* The art of writing was invented in *Phœnicia*, according to *Lucan*, III. 220.

hend

hend their revolutions and various motions, gave a full proof that his mind was of a ſimilar nature to that of him who formed theſe heavenly bodies.

As to the ſenſes*, thoſe interpreters and meſſengers of things, they are admirably contrived for all the neceſſary occaſions of life, and placed in the head, as in a caſtle. Thus the eyes are poſted as centinels above all the reſt; that by obſerving a very great number of objects, they may anſwer the end they were deſigned for. Then the ears, as being intended to perceive ſound, which naturally aſcends, were placed erect in the upper parts of the body. The noſtrils too have a ſimilar ſituation, becauſe all ſcent likewiſe aſcends; but are with good reaſon placed near the mouth, as by their means we judge of the good or bad qualities of what we eat and drink. In the next place our taſte, being deſigned to give us a reliſh of the different kinds of food, has its ſituation in that part of the mouth, where nature has open'd a way for the paſſage of our meat and drink.

* De Nat. Deor. II. 56, 57, & 58.

But then the ſenſe of feeling is equally diffuſed over the whole body, that neither blows, or the too near approach of heat or cold, might eſcape our notice. And as in building, a ſkilful architect removes from under the maſter's noſe, and conceals out of his ſight, all the ſinks of the houſe deſigned for the carrying off every thing that is apt to give diſguſt; ſo nature has removed at a diſtance from our ſenſes the like parts in the human body.

Now what artificer but nature, whoſe penetration and ſkill nothing can exceed, could have ſhown ſo much deſign and dexterity in forming the ſenſes? In the firſt place, ſhe has inveſted the eyes with a covering of very delicate and thin membranes; and theſe ſhe has formed tranſparent, that objects might be ſeen through them, and likewiſe firm, to preſerve the eyes in their proper ſituation: But then ſhe has made the eyes themſelves ſlippery and moveable, that they might turn away from every diſagreeable object, and eaſily direct their view wherever they pleaſed. Add to this, that the point of the eye, called the pupil, is ſo exceeding

ing ſmall, that it may with great eaſe eſcape whatever is hurtful. Then the eyelids, thoſe coverings of the eyes, are of an exquiſite ſoftneſs, leſt they ſhould injure the ſight; and nicely formed for opening and ſhutting the eyes, to prevent any thing from falling into them: Now nature has taken care that this might be done with incredible quickneſs every other inſtant. They are likewiſe fortified, as it were, with a paliſade of hair; that the eyes, when open, might thereby be ſecured from any thing falling into them; and in time of ſleep, when there is no occaſion to uſe them, they might lie wrapt up, as it were, in bed-cloths. Beſides all this, they are commodiouſly ſituate in a covert, and are guarded on every ſide with prominent parts. For above them are placed the eyebrows; which are covered with hair, and ſerve to defend them from the ſweat deſcending from the head and face. The cheeks on the other hand, riſing into gentle hillocks, guard them from beneath. And finally, the noſe is placed, as it were a wall, between the two.

As to the organ of hearing, it is always open, that being a ſenſe neceſſary to us even in ſleep; for when it is impreſſed with the ſenſation of ſound, we are even rouſed from ſleep. Its paſſage is winding, to prevent things from falling into it; which would happen if it was ſimple and ſtraight. Nature has alſo provided a viſcous matter, that if any inſect ſhould endeavour to get into the ear, they might be caught and entangled in it, as it were with bird-lime. The outer part of the ear, called the auricle, is prominent; as being formed for covering and protecting the immediate organ, and that ſounds might not diſſipate and be loſt before they reach it. Its entrance conſiſts of hard, and, as it were, horny ſubſtances, with a great many ſinuoſities and windings; becauſe hereby the impreſſed ſound is much increaſed. Hence it is, that we uſe ſhell or horn to play on ſtringed-inſtruments; and experience ſhews that ſounds returned from cloſe and ſinuous places are greatly augmented.

In like manner the noſtrils, which for neceſſary purpoſes ſtand always open, have

their apertures narrow, that nothing hurtful may get through them; and are always bedewed with moiſture, for repelling duſt and many other things. The taſte is admirably well ſecured; for being placed in the mouth, it is finely ſituate both for its own preſervation, and the uſe it was deſigned for.

In ſhort, all the ſenſes of mankind are much ſuperior to thoſe of other animals*. For firſt the eyes, in thoſe arts of which they are properly judges, as painting, engraving, ſculpture, and the motion and geſture of bodies, diſcern many things with greater penetration. The human eyes judge likewiſe of the beauty, the order, and, if the expreſſion may be allowed, the comelineſs and decency of colours and figures. Beſides this, things of much

* As the truth of this aſſertion, with regard to the external organs of ſenſe, may be juſtly called in queſtion; this ſuperiority of mankind muſt be derived from another ſource. To what then ſhall we aſcribe it, if not to the internal, the ſpiritual, the divine part of man? 'Tis the ſoul gives him this preheminence over the reſt of the animal world. Hence it is, he derives this nicety of taſte, this diſcerning faculty, this *internal ſenſe* of beauty and harmony, as Mr. *Hutcheſon*, in his excellent treatiſe on *beauty and virtue*, chuſes to call it. The works of this ingenious writer deſerve to be read, not only by ſtudents, but by all who lay claim to taſte, and true delicacy of ſentiment.

greater importance fall under their notice; they diſcern the virtues and imperfections of others; and can diſtinguiſh the paſſionate from the mild and good-natured perſon; the joyful from thoſe oppreſſed with grief; the man of true courage from the daſtardly coward, and the bold and daring from thoſe of a timorous diſpoſition*. Nor is the nice judgment of the ear leſs admirable; for by its means we diſtinguiſh the almoſt infinite variety of ſounds, whether of the voice, or of muſical inſtruments; perceive their intervals and difference; and remark their various kinds, as the high and low, the ſmooth and harſh, the grave and acute, the flexible and ſtiff ſound; which can only be apprehended by the human ear. Our other ſenſes of ſmelling, taſting, and feeling, are likewiſe poſſeſſed of very acute diſcernments; for the gratification and indulgence of which, more arts have been invented than I could wiſh. 'Tis abun-

* The art of phyſiognomy is here pointed at; which judges of the diſpoſition of the mind from the features and external lineaments of the body.

dantly

dantly manifeſt, to what an extravagant pitch the compoſition of perfumes, the ſeaſoning of meats, and other refinements of ſenſuality, have been carried.

As* to hands, with which nature has furniſhed mankind; how commodious, how ſubſervient, are they to many different arts! By reaſon of their fine articulations and joints, the fingers with the greateſt eaſe move every way, and may be cloſed and opened at pleaſure. So that by their aid, the hands are formed for painting, carving, engraving, and playing on muſical inſtruments, whether of the ſtringed or wind kind. But theſe are only the elegant arts; thoſe of neceſſary uſe in life, are agriculture, architecture, the art of making cloth, of preparing proper habits for the body, and working in braſs and iron. Hence it appears, that as invention is the peculiar property of the mind, and perception of the ſenſes; ſo all the accommodations of life are obtained by the ap-

* De Nat. Deor. II. 60.

plication

plication of the hands of proper workmen: to this we are indebted for our houſes, cloaths, and means of ſafety; alſo, that we have cities, walls, habitations, and temples, is owing to the ſame cauſe.

By human labour, or, what is the ſame thing, the application of the hands, plenty and variety of food is likewiſe procured: For 'tis to manual culture, that much of the fruits of the earth, whether ſuch as ſerves for preſent uſe, or what is pickled to be preſerved for ſome time, is owing. Land and water-animals, with fowl, make alſo part of our food; but then they muſt either be taken, or nouriſhed and brought up by us. We break four-footed beaſts, to anſwer the purpoſes of carriage, and by their ſtrength and ſwiftneſs make up what is wanting in ours. We put burdens on ſome animals, and the yoke on others. The exceeding acute ſenſes of the elephant, and the ſagacity of dogs, are by us turned to our own advantage. We extract iron out of the bowels of the earth, becauſe neceſſary for the purpoſes

of

of agriculture; and however deeply concealed the veins of copper, ſilver and gold may be, we find them out, as being fit, not only for uſe, but likewiſe for ornament. Again, by felling trees, whether thoſe we plant, or ſuch as grow in the foreſt, we make them ſerve either for fuel to warm us and dreſs our food, or for building houſes to cover and defend us from the ſeverities of heat and cold. Another great uſe they ſerve for, is the building ſhips; by the navigating of which, all the neceſſaries of life are imported from every part of the globe: For we alone, by our knowledge of maritime affairs, are able to give laws to thoſe moſt violent productions of nature the ſea and winds; and in fact, we have the enjoyment and uſe of moſt things the ſea produces. Man likewiſe is abſolute lord of all the conveniencies the earth affords. We enjoy the mountains and the champain country; the rivers and lakes are ours; 'tis we that ſow all kinds of corn, and plant trees; we add new fertility to lands, by overflowing them with water; the chain-

chaining up rivers, and directing or altering their courſes, is our work. In a word, by the labour of our hands, we endeavour to introduce another face of things, and another nature, as it were, into the world.

III.

On CONSCIENCE.

I * prefer the teſtimony of my conſcience, to what all mankind may ſay of me.

Whatever † is done without oſtentation, and without the people's being witneſſes of it, is, in my opinion, moſt praiſe-worthy: Not that the public eye ſhould be entirely avoided, for good actions deſire to be placed in the light; but notwithſtanding this, the greateſt theatre for virtue is conſcience.

That ‖ power of the mind, which incites to good actions, and diſſuades from evil ones, is not only more ancient than the origin of nations, but is coeval with that God, who beholds and governs both heaven and earth: For 'tis impoſſible that

* Ad Attic. XII. 28. † Tuſcul. II. 26.
‖ De Legib. II. 4.

the

the divine mind ſhould exiſt without reaſon; and divine reaſon muſt neceſſarily be poſſeſſed of a power to determine what is virtuous, and what vicious. Nor, becauſe it was no where written, that one man ſhould maintain the paſs of a bridge againſt the enemy's whole army, and that he ſhould order the bridge behind him to be cut down, are we therefore to imagine, that the valiant *Cocles* * did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the nature and dictates of true bravery. Again, though, in the reign of *Tarquin*, there was no written law concerning adultery; it does not therefore follow, that *Sextus Tarquinius* did not offend againſt this eternal law, when he committed a rape on *Lucretia*, *Tricipitinus*'s daughter: For even then he had the light of reaſon, deduced from the nature of things, that incites to good actions and diſſuades from evil; and which has the force of a law, not from the time it was written, but from the firſt moment it began to exiſt. Now

* The detail of this affair may be ſeen in *Livy*, l. 2. c. 10. *Horatius Cocles* had the *agnomen Cocles* given him, becauſe he had only one eye, the other being loſt in the engagement.

its

its exiſtence muſt be equal to that of the divine mind.

Right* reaſon, or that which is agreeable to nature, invariable, eternal, and with which all mankind are impreſſed, is in every reſpect a true law. It expreſsly commands our duty, and ſtrictly forbids all treachery: 'Tis only on the virtuous, however, it has this good effect, for on the vicious it makes no impreſſion. Nothing can ſuperſede† this law, nothing retrench it, or make it void. It is neither in the power of the ſenate or people to diſpenſe with it. It requires no comment, it wants no interpreter. This law differs nothing at *Rome* from what it is at *Athens*, nor is it any other at preſent from what it will be hereafter; it is an eternal and immutable law, that is univerſally binding over all nations and at all times. Hence it is, that God becomes, as it were, the common inſtructor and governor of man-

* Fragm. lib. III. de Rep.

† *Obrogare* ſignifies, to make a new law directly contrary to a former one; *derogare*, to repeal ſome clauſe or part of it only; and *abrogare*, to repeal or make void the whole, without excepting any part.

kind.

kind. It was He who compoſed, examined, and promulged it. Whoever therefore acts contrary to this law, oppoſes his own intereſt, and ſpurns at the true dignity of man; and by this very means, will be ſure to ſuffer the greateſt of all puniſhments, though he ſhould eſcape what commonly goes under that name.

The* puniſhments they undergo are not ſo much thoſe inflicted by courts of juſtice, (which formerly were not in being, nor are, at preſent, in many places; and even where eſtabliſhed, are frequently biaſſed and partial) as what they ſuffer from conſcience. The Furies purſue and torment them, not with their burning torches, as the poets feign, but by remorſe, and the tortures ariſing from guilt.

I† would not have you credit, what you ſee ſo often repreſented in the drama; that thoſe who have been guilty of any impiety or wickedneſs, are continually purſued and terrified by the Furies with their

* De Legib. I. 14. † Pro S. Roſcio Am. cap. 14.

burn-

burning torches. 'Tis guilt, and the conſternation thence ariſing, that torments every wicked man, diſturbs his reſt, and even drives him mad: His own evil thoughts, and conſcious heart, fill him with terror. Theſe are the conſtant, the domeſtic Furies of the wicked.

Was* it the fear of puniſhment, and not the nature of the thing itſelf, that ought to reſtrain mankind from wickedneſs; what, I would, aſk, could give villains the leaſt uneaſineſs, abſtracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none of them was ever ſo audaciouſly impudent, but endeavoured to juſtify what he had done by ſome law of nature, denied the fact, or elſe pretended a juſt ſorrow for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to theſe laws, with how profound reſpect ought good men to treat them?

If either puniſhment, or the fear of it, was what deterred from a vicious courſe of life, and not the turpitude of the thing itſelf; then none could be guilty of injuſtice,

* De Legib. I. 14.

the

the greateſt offenders ought rather to be called imprudent than wicked.

On the other hand, if we are determined to the practice of goodneſs, not by its own intrinſic excellence, but out of a view to ſome private advantage, we are cunning and not good men. What will not the man do in the dark, who fears nothing but a witneſs and judge? Or, ſhould he meet a ſingle man in a quite deſert place, with a large ſum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himſelf from being robbed; how would he behave? In ſuch a caſe, the man whom we have repreſented to be honeſt from principle, and the nature of the thing itſelf, would converſe with, aſſiſt, and ſhow him the way: But as to the man who does nothing for the ſake of another, and meaſures every thing by the advantage it brings him; it is obvious, I ſuppoſe, how ſuch a one would act. Now ſhould he deny that he would kill the man, or rob him of his treaſure, his reaſon for this cannot be, that he apprehends there is any natural turpitude in ſuch actions; but only becauſe

he

he is afraid of a diſcovery, and the bad conſequences that would thence enſue. A ſentiment this, of which, I ſhall not ſay that men of learning, but even clowns themſelves, have reaſon to be aſhamed!

We * muſt be fully perſuaded, if our progreſs in philoſophy be any wiſe conſiderable, that we ought not to be guilty of avarice, injuſtice, ſenſuality, and intemperance, even allowing that we could conceal it both from Gods and men. To this purpoſe *Plato* brings in the ſtory of *Gyges*, who having gone down into a fiſſure of the earth, occaſioned by violent rains, obſerved, if we can give any credit to fables, a brazen horſe with doors in its ſides: Upon opening theſe, he diſcovered the body of a dead man of extraordinary ſize, with a gold-ring on his finger: this he pulled off, and having put it upon his own, went to rejoin his companions; for he was one of the king of *Lydia*'s ſhepherds. By turning the ſtone of this ring towards the palm of his hand, he became inviſible to

* Offic. III. 9.

others,

others, yet ſaw every thing diſtinctly himſelf; and by turning the ring to its proper place, he became viſible again. Wherefore, embracing the opportunity the ring afforded him, he lay with the queen; by whoſe aſſiſtance he killed the king, his ſovereign, and diſpatched all who he thought would oppoſe him: nor in perpetrating theſe villanies, could he be ſeen by any one. Thus, by the help of his ring, he in a ſhort time commenced king of *Lydia*. Now though this very ring was in the poſſeſſion of a wiſe man, he would think himſelf no more authoriſed to commit a bad action, than if he was without it: For good men conſider only the intrinſic excellence and beauty of an action, and not whether it can be concealed.

IV.

On the PASSIONS.

ZENO* defines all paſſion to be a *commotion of the ſoul, oppoſite to right reaſon, and contrary to nature.* Others, in fewer words, that it is *an exceſſive appetite,* or ſuch as exceeds the bounds preſcribed by nature. Now, according to theſe men†, there are two kinds of good, and as many of evil, whence ariſe ſo many paſſions‖. Thoſe ariſing from good, are joy and deſire; the former reſulting from a good in poſſeſſion, and the latter from that in expectation. The paſſions ſuppoſed to ſpring from evil, are ſorrow and fear; ſorrow regards preſent evil; and fear that which is to come: For whatever excites fear

* Tuſcul. IV. 6. † The Stoics.

‖ Virgil, Æneid VI. 733, gives the ſame diviſion of the paſſions in four words:

Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; dolent gaudentque.
Hence their fear, deſire, joy and ſorrow ſpring.

when

when in proſpect, naturally raiſes ſorrow when preſent.

All * the paſſions, according to the Stoics †, ſpring from our judgment and opinion of things. Hence they give a more preciſe and determinate definition of them, in order to make it appear, not only how exceeding blameable they are in themſelves, but likewiſe how entirely ſubject to our will. Sorrow then is the opinion of a preſent evil, on account of which it ſeems juſt that the mind ſhould be contracted, as it were, and depreſſed; joy, the opinion of a preſent good, for which 'tis reaſonable our ſpirits ſhould be elated; fear, the opinion of an impending evil, that appears intolerable; and deſire, the opinion of a future good, the preſence and fruition of which ſeems to promiſe great advantage.

I obſerved above, that the paſſions are owing to our ſentiments and opinion of things: And to theſe, according to the

* Tuſcul. IV. 7.

† The Earl of *Shaftſbury* agrees with them, in this reſpect. "Here therefore, ſays he, ariſes work and employment for us "*within: to regulate* FANCY, *and rectify* OPINION, &c." See *Miſcel.* 4. chap. 1.

Stoics,

Stoics, the effects of paſſion muſt likewiſe be attributed; as, the biting anguiſh which proceeds from grief; the retreat, as it were, and flight of the ſoul, occaſioned by fear; the exceſſive vivacity of joy; and the unbridled luſt of deſire.

Now the opinion, which we have ſuppoſed to be included in all the above definitions, is by them called a weak aſſent, or perſuaſion of the mind.

Certainly * then the reaſoning of the Peripatetics, who affirm that our minds are neceſſarily ſubject to paſſions, and yet preſcribe certain limits to them which they ought not to exceed, muſt be trifling and ridiculous †. I would aſk any one who ſets bounds to vice, whether to act contrary to the dictates of reaſon, does not deſerve

* Tuſcul. IV. 17.

† It is a famous queſtion in our ſchools even at preſent, whether the paſſions be natural and ſerviceable to mankind. But would men explain themſelves, and define what paſſion is, they will find that the thing won't ſo much as bear a queſtion. However, be this as it will, thoſe who have recourſe to what *Muret* has writ on this ſubject, in his Commentary on *Ariſtotle*'s *Ethics*, will at leaſt be charmed with his eloquence, tho' they ſhould not be convinced by his arguments. The reader may likewiſe conſult the ingenious Mr. *Hutcheſon*'s treatiſe on the paſſions.

that name? Now does not reaſon abundantly evince, that what you eagerly covet, or are proud to have acquired, is not a ſubſtantial good; that what you ſuccumb under the weight of, or become, in a manner, ſtupified leſt it overtake you, is not a real evil; and laſtly, that all exceſs, whether of joy or grief, is the genuine effect of prejudice and error? If then this wrong judgment of things is corrected by time, even with regard to perſons of ſmall diſcernment; ſo that notwithſtanding the object remains the ſame, yet their ſentiments concerning it are very different from what they formerly were; it follows, that men of prudence muſt be wholly free from its influence.

Whoever* therefore endeavours to ſet bounds to vice, acts like one who ſhould imagine, that a perſon who had thrown himſelf from the precipice of *Leucas*†

* Tuſcul. IV. 18.

† Near to *Leucas*, a town of *Epire*, there was a very high rock, the point of which hung over the ſea. We learn from *Ovid*'s heroic epiſtles, in the laſt verſe of *Sappho*'s letter to *Phaon*, that the leap of *Leucas* was the laſt reſource of unfortunate lovers, whence it was called the *Lover's-Leap*.

could

could ſtop his career when he pleaſed: For as that is impoſſible to be effected, ſo neither can the mind, when ruffled with paſſion, reſtrain itſelf, or ſtop where it pleaſes.

All things that are pernicious in their progreſs, muſt be evil in their birth. Now grief, and every other paſſion, if carried to an immoderate height, have undoubtedly very miſchievous conſequences; and therefore, from their very riſe, muſt be tainted with a great part of the lurking miſchief. For no ſooner is the government of reaſon thrown off, than they ruſh forward of their own accord; weakneſs takes a pleaſure to indulge itſelf; and having, if the expreſſion may be allowed, imperceptibly launched out into the main ocean, can find no place where to ſtop.

Hence, in fact, there is no difference between the approving of moderate paſſions, and the approbation of moderate injuſtice, moderate cowardice, or moderate intemperance: For he that preſcribes limits to corrupt affections, admits them in part. A conduct this, which, beſides its intrinſic deformity, is the more intolerable, becauſe they are always in a

precarious ſituation; vice being like heavy bodies, which, once ſet a going, fall down the precipice with impetuous motion, ſo that it is impoſſible to ſtop them.

To * cure a man of love, he ſhould above all things be made ſenſible how great a madneſs it is. Now of all the paſſions of the ſoul, it is unqueſtionably the moſt outrageous: For ſhould we impute to it neither debaucheries, intrigues, adulteries, or inceſts, all which are crimes of the firſt magnitude; beſides theſe, I ſay, the exceſſive diſorder of the mind in love is a deformity of itſelf. Not to inſiſt then on the above exceſſes of its madneſs, what levity appears in its ordinary and moſt innocent effects!

The † quarrels, jealouſies, and brawls of love,
Its truce, its war, or peace, uncertain prove:
As juſtly ſearch for reaſon in a fool,
As try ſuch whimſies to confine to rule.

* Tuſcul. IV. 35. † Terent. Eunuch. Act. I. Sc. 1.

Who

Who then can help being ſtartled at the natural deformity of ſuch an inconſtant and fickle temper of mind? What we wanted to demonſtrate is, that all the paſſions are voluntary, and entirely dependent upon opinion and judgment. For example, was the paſſion of love natural to mankind, they would always be in love, and that too with the ſame object *; nor ſhould we find love cured by ſhame in one, reflexion in another, ſatiety in a third.

Shall † I eſteem the man to be free, who is the ſlave of a woman, that impoſes laws on him, commands, forbids, and regulates his conduct at pleaſure; who neither can refuſe what ſhe requeſts, nor dares diſobey her orders? If ſhe aſks any thing, it muſt be given; does ſhe call, he muſt anſwer: when ſhut out, he muſt

* *Plutarch* makes the difference between love and friendſhip to conſiſt in this, that if people of honour are once friends, they will always be ſo; becauſe the mutual eſteem that gave riſe to this relation, and ſerves to ſupport it, can, in ſuch perſons, receive no diminution. But love, on the contrary, is the effect of principles that do not always appear in the ſame point of view, and which depends entirely on opinion. Whence it is, that love is reckoned a paſſion; but friendſhip ranked among the virtues.

† Parad. V. 2.

quietly be gone; in a word, if ſhe threatens him, he muſt of courſe be filled with terror. Such a man, let his birth and family be ever ſo illuſtrious, deſerves, in my opinion, not ſimply the appellation of ſlave, but that of the moſt ſervile of all ſlaves.

They * who are ſaid to be naturally inclined to anger, compaſſion, envy, and the like, are perſons who conſtitutionally, if the expreſſion may be allowed, labour under a diſeaſe of the ſoul; but not an incurable one, as appears from what is related of *Socrates*. *Zopyrus*, a phyſiognomiſt, who profeſſed to know every one's natural diſpoſition by their appearance, having in a public company laid a great many vices to his charge, was laughed at by thoſe preſent, becauſe they knew that *Socrates* was guilty of none of them. *Socrates*, however, ſaved his credit, by declaring he was naturally addicted † to

* Tuſcul. IV. 37.

† Inſtead of *ſigna*, able critics have propoſed to read *inſita*, or ſome term of the like import. *Cicero*, in his treatiſe concerning fate, chap. 5. joins the following example to that of *Socrates*. It is related of *Stilpo*, ſays he, a philoſopher of *Megara*, even by his all

all theſe vices; but that, by the aid of reaſon, he had ſubdued them. Wherefore, as a man in the higheſt health may appear ſickly, and be really more inclined by nature to one diſeaſe than another; in like manner, the mind may be more addicted to one vice than another.

As* we conſiſt of ſoul and body, to what cauſe can it be owing, that the art of reſtoring and preſerving the health of the latter is cultivated with ſuch care, and its uſefulneſs ſo much valued, as to be attributed to the invention of the immortal Gods? Whereas the art of curing the diſeaſes of the mind, was neither ſo much ſought after before its diſcovery, nor ſo carefully improved, when known; it is leſs acceptable to many, and by the greater part of the world is ſuſpected and hated. Is it becauſe the mind judges of bodily

own friends, that he was naturally a drunkard, and incontinent. Now this they write, not out of reproach, but rather in praiſe of him: For his corrupt nature was ſo thoroughly ſubdued and kept under by philoſophy, that none ever ſaw him over-taken with drink, or obſerved the leaſt trace of unclean deſire in his behaviour.

* Tuſcul. III. 1.

pain and diſeaſes, while the body remains entirely inſenſible of thoſe of the mind: ſo that the mind paſſes no judgment concerning its own ſtate, till after the judging faculty is diſordered?

There * is this difference between our ſouls and bodies, that the latter may be ſeized with diſtempers in their moſt flouriſhing ſtate, but the former cannot. The diſeaſes of the body, indeed, may happen without any fault of ours, but not ſo of the mind; for every indiſpoſition and diſorder of this laſt, is occaſioned by a diſregard of reaſon; and therefore can only take place in the human ſpecies: for brutes, however they may have ſomething analogous, are not ſubject to paſſions.

Let † us now conſider, what excellent remedies philoſophy has provided againſt the diſeaſes of our minds: for certainly ſuch there are; nor has nature been ſo malevolent and unfriendly to mankind, as to produce ſuch a variety of things con-

* Tuſcul. IV. 14.

† Tuſcul. IV. 27.

ducive

ducive to the health of the body, and nothing at all for that of the ſoul. No, in this reſpect ſhe has been ſtill more favourable; for whatever contributes to the health of the ſoul is found within itſelf, whereas the remedies for the body muſt be prepared from without. Now the greater the excellence and dignity of human ſouls, the larger ſhare of attention they require. Hence reaſon, if duly improved, diſcovers what is beſt; but if neglected, is loſt in a labyrinth of errors.

It * remains then, that you keep a conſtant guard over yourſelf. Though I can't ſay but the propriety of the expreſſion may be queſtioned, as if we were made up of two perſons, the one to command, the other to obey. The obſervation, however, is entirely juſt; for the mind is divided into two parts, the one endowed with reaſon, and the other not. When, therefore, we are commanded to keep a guard over ourſelves, the meaning is, that reaſon ſhould reſtrain the blind propenſities of our nature. The ſouls of moſt men carry

* Tuſcul. II. 20, 21.

about with them ſome alloy, ſomething naturally mean, languid and enervate: and did this conſtitute the whole of our nature, man would be the moſt deſpicable creature in the world. But he has likewiſe reaſon, the miſtreſs, the queen, of all his other powers; which, by her own natural force, ſtill makes advances in improvement, till ſhe arrives at perfect* virtue. 'Tis the duty, therefore, of every man to be careful, that ſhe effectually governs that part of the ſoul, which ought to be under her direction.

* *Cicero*, in numberleſs places, defines virtue to be, *A conformity to right reaſon.* And in Tuſcul. IV. chap. 15. he ſays expreſsly, *ipſa virtus breviſſime* recta ratio *dici poteſt.*

V.

On WISDOM.

WHAT * ſo deſirable as wiſdom? What more excellent in itſelf, ſo uſeful to man, or better deſerving his purſuit? Hence they who are poſſeſſed with an earneſt deſire to acquire it, are called *Philoſophers*; for *Philoſophy*, in the preciſe meaning of the word, ſignifies the love of wiſdom. Now wiſdom, as defined by the ancient ſages, is the knowledge † of things

* Offic. II. 2.

† By things divine and human is underſtood all things, without excepting any. Thus the perfect Sage is one who knows every thing. There is a neceſſity for admitting this principle of the Stoics, with the conſequences they draw from it; as that none but fools could be guilty of vice; that thoſe could not commit the leaſt miſtake, who ſaw clearly whence they went, and whither they were going; that in ſuch a caſe, they could offend neither in reſpect of morality or policy; and ſo of the reſt. But, in fact, this ſage of the Stoics never exiſted except in idea. However, be this as it will, nothing but an abſolute impoſſibility of attaining perfection in virtue, ſhould hinder us from aſpiring to it. Let us here follow the prudent advice of *Horace*,

Non poſſis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus,
Non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi.
What though you cannot hope for eagle's eyes,
Will you a lenient, ſtrength'ning ſalve deſpiſe?

Francis's Hor.

divine and human, with their efficient cauſes. Whoever deſpiſes this ſtudy, I know not what he can think worthy of his approbation: for whether an agreeable amuſement, or freedom from care, be the object of his deſires; what is comparable to thoſe ſtudies, which are always taken up in ſearching after the means of attaining a good and happy life? Or, is he deſirous of learning the principles of virtue and true courage; here, or no where, is to be found the art of acquiring them? They who affirm that there is no art in things of the greateſt moment, while nothing, however ſmall and trifling, is performed without its aid, are guilty of the groſſeſt error, and muſt be men of no conſideration. Now if there be any ſcience of virtue, where ſhall it be learned, if not in the ſchool of philoſophy?

Sight *, ſays *Plato*, though the acuteſt of all our ſenſes, is too dull to preſent us with a view of wiſdom. With what ardent deſires after her would ſhe inflame us, could ſhe become viſible?

* De Finib. II. 16.

Nature

Nature *, from the firſt origin of things, has endowed every ſpecies of animals with an inſtinct of ſelf-preſervation, by which they not only avoid what would be deſtructive of their being, or any wiſe injurious to them; but likewiſe make proviſion of the neceſſaries of life, as food, a place of retreat, and the like. Another inſtinct, common to all animals, is the deſire of copulation for the propagation of their kind, and the care they take of their offspring. But between a man and a brute, there is this difference; that the latter, being directed entirely by ſenſe, is wholly attached to the preſent, and very little ſenſible either of what is paſt, or of futurity. Man, on the contrary, comprehends the whole courſe of his life, and prepares all things neceſſary for his future ſubſiſtence: And this he is enabled to do, as being partaker of reaſon, by which he ſees the cauſes and conſequences of things, notes their riſe and progreſs, compares things of a like nature, and connects the future with the preſent.

* Offic. I. 4.

The

The deſire of truth, and the power of inveſtigating it, are, in a ſpecial manner, peculiar to man. Hence it is, that when freed from the neceſſary employments and cares of life, we are extremely deſirous to ſee, hear, or learn ſomething; and look upon the knowledge of abſtruſe things, or ſuch as raiſe admiration *, to be a neceſſary ingredient of a happy life.

So † deeply are mankind impreſſed with the love of knowledge and learning, that by this very propenſity of their nature, they would doubtleſs be engaged in the purſuit of them, though there was no advantage annexed to the attainment. Do we not ſee, that even chaſtiſements are not ſufficient to reſtrain children from con-

* It is evident, that the *admiration* here mentioned, is that ariſing from ignorance, which makes us deſire or fear things with which we would be no wiſe affected, if we knew their true value. *Horace* has the ſame thought in the beginning of one of his epiſtles, which he has expreſſed almoſt in the ſame terms:

Nil admirari prope res eſt una, Numici,
Solaque, quæ poſſit facere & ſervare beatum.

Not to admire, is of all means the beſt,
The only means, to make, and keep us bleſt.

Francis's Hor.

† De Finib. V. 18.

ſidering

ſidering and enquiring into things; that though you beat them, they will perſiſt in making further enquiry? Nay, how overjoyed they are with their little acquirements of knowledge? How delighted to communicate them to others; and how charmed with the ſight of any ſolemnity, the public games, and ſhows of the like nature; inſomuch, that on this account they will endure both hunger and thirſt? Beſides, do we not obſerve, that thoſe who take pleaſure in the liberal arts and ſciences, are regardleſs of their health and domeſtic affairs; endure the greateſt hardſhips for the ſake of acquiring their beloved knowledge; and think themſelves abundantly recompenſed for all their vaſt labour and application, by the intellectual joys that ſpring from learning?

'Tis probable that *Homer* had ſomething like this natural propenſity in view, when he compoſed his fiction of the Sirens*: for

* The Sirens were a kind of fabulous beings, with the face of a woman, and the tail of a fiſh, according to *Ovid*; but others have deck'd them with a plumage of various colours. They are ſuppoſed to have been the three daughters of the river *Achelous*, and were called *Parthenope*, *Ligea*, and *Leucoſia*. *Homer* makes mention only of two Sirens; but others reckon five. *Virgil* places them on rocks where veſſels are in danger of ſplitting.

it

it was not ſo much the melody of their voice, or the novelty and variety of their notes, as their pretenſions to an extraordinary knowledge, which attracted and charmed thoſe who ſailed that way; whoſe deſire of learning kept them, as it were, fixed to the rocks. This is their invitation to *Ulyſſes*; for among other paſſages of *Homer*, I tranſlated the very place that mentions it.

Thou ornament of Greece, Ulyſſes, *ſtay!*
Why from our tuneful ſongs thus haſte away?
None ever ſail'd along this beach before,
But with our muſic charm'd, made for the ſhore.
When ſtor'd with learning, homeward they proceed;
And bleſs their friends with knowledge, they much need.
O ſtay! the Trojan *war we fully know!*
Stay! We'll inform you of all things below!

Homer was ſenſible, that if he had ſuffered his hero to have been detained by the charms

charms of muſic only, the fiction could not have paſſed; but they promiſe him knowledge, and 'twas no wonder that the deſire of wiſdom ſhould get the better of that of his native country.

Now * the ancient philoſophers repreſent to us, what the life of wiſe-men will be in the iſlands † of the bleſſed, by ſuppoſing that they ſhall be freed from all anxious care; and having no occaſion to make any kind of proviſion for their ſubſiſtence, ſhall ſpend their whole time in the delightful employment of ſtudying and ſearching into the knowledge of nature.

Had ‖ I not been fully perſuaded, as well from the books I have read, as by the precepts I received in my youth from many great men, that nothing in human life is truly deſirable but honour and virtue; and that neither bodily torture, nor

* Ibid. cap. 19.

† Nothing can come up to the deſcription *Muret* gives of theſe iſlands; not all the colours of painters, or figures of poets, are able to add the leaſt improvement to it. *Var. Lect.* V. 1.

‖ Pro Archia, cap. 6.

the

the moſt formidable dangers, even thoſe of death and baniſhment, ought to have any weight with us, when put in competition with the purſuit of them; I had never ſuſtained ſo many and ſo great conflicts in defence of your ſafety, or have expoſed myſelf to continual inſults from the moſt profligate of mankind. But all the books, as well as diſcourſes, of the ſages, are full of ſuch precepts; and antiquity lays before us innumerable examples to that purpoſe, which would have been all buried in darkneſs, had not the light of learning been called to their aſſiſtance. How many portraitures of great men have been drawn by the *Greek* and *Latin* writers, and tranſmitted down to us, not ſolely to feaſt our eyes, but to ſerve as patterns for our imitation? By keeping theſe always in view, during the whole of my adminiſtration of public affairs, I endeavoured to bring myſelf, both in courage and prudence, to a conformity with the ſentiments of ſuch illuſtrious men *.

* *Cicero* ſpeaks here of what he had done with regard to *Catiline*'s conſpiracy, during his own conſulſhip. The reſolution he took to put the principal conſpirators to death, was no leſs dan-

Should

Should any one aſk me, What, were all theſe great men, whoſe virtues are celebrated in hiſtory, eminently ſkilled in the literature you ſo highly praiſe? It is a difficult matter to make this appear of them all. My anſwer, however, to the above queſtion, is this; that I confeſs there have been many men of the greateſt courage and virtue, who, by the natural force of their almoſt divine genius, and without the aſſiſtance of learning, have behaved themſelves with moderation and gravity: nay, I will add too, that nature excluſive of learning is often more prevalent, than learning without the aid of nature, to excite mankind to the purſuit of virtue and honour. But this I ſteadily maintain, that where learning is ſuperadded to a mind naturally endowed with great talents, there reſults from ſuch a combination, I know not what ſurprizing excellence, and peculiar beauty of character. Of this number was that divine man

gerous to himſelf, than neceſſary for preſerving the ſtate. He acted the part of a politician, as well as in conformity to the dictates of the moſt refined virtue; and happy had it been for the *Romans*, had the like conduct of *Brutus* and *Caſſius* been attended with the ſame ſucceſs.

Africanus,

Africanus *, who adorned the days of our fathers; alſo *C. Lælius* and *M. Furius*, the perfect patterns of moderation and continency; with theſe likewiſe *M. Cato* † the elder is to be ranked, a man of true bravery, and, for the times in which he lived, well-ſkill'd in every part of learning. Now it is a thing paſt all doubt, that theſe great men would never have applied themſelves to the ſtudy of letters, had they found no aſſiſtance from them, as to the knowledge or practice of virtue.

But admitting that letters did not produce ſuch advantage, and that pleaſure was the only benefit ariſing from the ſtudy of them; it will notwithſtanding be allowed, I ſuppoſe, to be an amuſement of the nobleſt kind, and every way beſt ſuited to the nature of man. Other relaxations are peculiar to certain times, places, and ſtages of life; but the ſtudy of letters is the nouriſhment of our youth, and the joy

* *Africanus* the ſecond, ſon of *Paulus Æmilius*, is here meant. He was adopted by the ſon of the firſt *Scipio*, to whom the ſurname of *Africanus* had been given: we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of him hereafter.

† See *Cicero*'s dialogue on old age.

of

of our old age; they throw an additional luſtre on proſperity, and are the reſource and conſolation of adverſity; they delight at home, and are no embarraſſment to us when abroad; in ſhort, they are company to us at night, our fellow-travellers on a journey, and attendants in our rural receſſes.

What * then are the pleaſures of a luxurious table, of games, ſhows, and ſenſuality, when compared with thoſe reſulting from the ſtudy of letters? A ſtudy, that in men of ſenſe and good education, ſtill increaſes in charms with their years: whence that commendable ſaying of *Solon*, in a certain verſe † of his, that in growing old he daily learned a great deal. Now this pleaſure of the mind is one of the moſt refined enjoyments we are capable of.

In ‖ this no leſs natural, than truly com-

* De Senect. cap. 14.

† *Plutarch*, in his life of *Solon*, has preſerved this verſe:

Γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Which may be rendered in *Engliſh* as follows,

Life's eve I ſpend in learning what is new.

‖ Offic. I. 6.

mendable,

mendable, diſpoſition of mind, there are two inconveniencies to be avoided: one is*, not to confound what we are ignorant of, with thoſe things we know; or raſhly build our opinion on ſuch precarious principles. Whoever is deſirous to eſcape this miſtake, and certainly it is the duty of every man, will ſpare neither time, nor pains, in the ſtudy of truth. Another error is, when people ſpend too much ſtudy and labour upon ſubjects, not only obſcure and intricate, but likewiſe unneceſſary. Let us but keep free of theſe inconveniencies; and whatever diligence and application we beſtow on things in them-

* We ſhall here inſert a ſhort extract of the ſpeech of M. *d'Agueſſeau*, at the opening of the parliament of *Paris*, in 1704, who was then advocate-general, and is now chancellor of *France*; as being very pertinent to the ſubject here treated of. "To think "little, talk of every thing, doubt of nothing, uſe only the ex- "ternal parts of the ſoul, and cultivate the ſurface, as it were, "of the judgment; to be happy in expreſſion, to have an agree- "able fancy, an eaſy and refined converſation, and to be able to "pleaſe without acquiring eſteem; to be born with the equivocal "talent of a ready apprehenſion, and on that account to think "one's ſelf above reflexion; to fly from object to object without "gaining the perfect knowledge of any; to gather haſtily all the "flowers, and never allow the fruit time to arrive at maturity: "All theſe put together form a faint picture of what the preſent "age has been pleaſed to honour with the name of wit."

ſelves

ſelves laudable, and worthy our knowledge, merits the higheſt commendation.

'Tis * an excellent ſaying of *Plato*, that happy is the man, who, even in his old age, has the good fortune to attain the poſſeſſion of wiſdom, and ſentiments agreeable to truth.

* De Finib. V. 21.

VI.

On PROBITY.

PROFIT* and honeſty ſometimes appear to interfere with one another. But the caſe is otherwiſe; for the rule of both is the ſame. Whoever is not fully convinced of this, muſt be an arrant knave and villain. By ſuch a train of thought he will be led to ſay, *this indeed is equitable, but that advantageous*, by ſuch a fatal miſtake disjoining things in their own nature inſeparable; which is the ſource of all manner of treachery, injuſtice, and wickedneſs. A virtuous man, therefore, though poſſeſſed of a ſecret to get his name inſerted into the laſt wills of people of fortune, ſo eaſily as with a knack of his fingers†, would never put it in practice

* Offic. III. 18 & 19.

† A proverbial expreſſion, that ſignifies, to do a thing with the greateſt eaſe in the world, and which entirely depends on our own pleaſure.

even

even though he certainly knew it could never be in the leaſt ſuſpected. A juſt man, or one who anſwers to our notion of a good man, will take nothing from another to be applied to his own uſe. Whoever is ſurprized at this aſſertion, tacitly confeſſes that he is ignorant of what conſtitutes the character of a good man. But would any one take the pains to revolve this complicated idea in his own breaſt, he will find that the good man is one, who does good to all he can, and hurts no body, unleſs firſt provoked by ill uſage*. What ſhall we ſay then? Is he not an injurious perſon, who, as it were by the power of ſome drug, has the addreſs to diſinherit the true heirs, in order to ſuc-

* It would be an injuſtice to *Cicero*, to believe that he here approves of revenge. Nothing is more clearly eſtabliſhed in the writings of the heathen philoſophers, than the pardon of injuries. For a proof of this we need only look at *Plato*'s *Criton* and *Gorgias*. And as for inſtances that their practice correſponded to their principles, they are innumerable. All that *Cicero* would ſay is, that the law of nature allows us to repel an unjuſt aggreſſor, provided that we keep within the bounds preſcribed by the ſame law: with this exception, it is never allowable to offer an injury to any one, nor conſequently to return one injury for another. It is a piece of praiſe full of flattery, which *Cicero* gave to *Cæſar*, when he ſaid, *Obliviſci nihil ſoles, niſi injurias*, that is, you are wont to forget nothing but injuries.

ceed in their place? Shall a man then, ſome may object, forbear to purſue what is profitable and advantageous? I would have ſuch a one know, that nothing unjuſt in itſelf can tend either to our advantage or profit. He that has not learnt this leſſon, can have no pretenſion to the character of a good man.

There * are often caſes, wherein profit ſeems to claſh with honeſty; but then we ſhould examine whether this ſuppoſition be real, or if both be conſiſtent together. The following queſtions may ſerve as inſtances of this: whether, for example, a man of probity, who had brought a large quantity of grain from *Alexandria* † to *Rhodes*, at a time when the *Rhodians* laboured under great ſcarcity, and an exceſſive dearth of proviſions; but who knew that a great many merchants had ſailed from *Alexandria*, and had likewiſe

* Offic. III. 12.

† *Alexandria* was a town built by *Alexander* the Great, on the banks of the *Nile*. The diſtance from which to *Rhodes*, a famous iſland in the Mediterranean, is about an hundred and forty leagues.

ſeen

ſeen ſeveral ſhips laden with grain, all bound for *Rhodes*; whether, I ſay, he would inform the *Rhodians* of what he knew, or, by keeping ſilence, ſell his own at as high a price as he could?

We put the caſe that he is a wiſe and virtuous man, who would conceal nothing from them, if he thought ſuch a conduct inconſiſtent with virtue; but being uncertain whether it be ſo or not, it is required what the reſult of his deliberation on ſuch a conjuncture would be.

In queſtions of this nature, *Diogenes* * the *Babylonian*, a Stoic of the firſt claſs, is of different ſentiments from thoſe of his diſciple *Antipater*, a man of very bright parts. This laſt thinks every thing ſhould be diſcovered, and not the leaſt circumſtance concealed from the buyer that the ſeller knows. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, is of opinion, that the ſeller ought to declare the imperfections of his commodities, only ſo far as the civil law ordains;

* Several philoſophers have bore this name. The moſt famous of whom is *Diogenes* the Cynic, a native of *Sinopis*. The perſon meant here was one of the three deputies whom the *Athenians* ſent to *Rome*, in the conſulſhip of *Scipio* and *Marcellus*, as we learn in *Cicero*'s *Lucullus*, chap. 45.

and to act in other reſpects without fraud; but as ſelling is his buſineſs, he may endeavour to do it on the moſt profitable terms he can. I have, ſays he, imported my corn, ſet it to ſale, and here I ſell it for no more than others; nay, perhaps for leſs, becauſe there is greater plenty of the commodity. Where is the injuſtice of all this?

Antipater, on the contrary, makes anſwer thus: What, though it be your duty to conſult the welfare of mankind, though you are born to promote the intereſt of ſociety, and, notwithſtanding the very inſtincts of nature, the direction of which ought conſtantly to be followed, teach you that your private advantage and that of the public ſhould mutually promote each other; ought you then to conceal from theſe men, what plentiful ſupplies of proviſions are coming?

Diogenes, perhaps, will anſwer to this effect; that there is a wide difference between concealing a thing, and being ſilent on it. Nor can I be ſaid to conceal any thing from you, though I don't inform you concerning the nature of the Gods, or what

what will be the end of good men; which it much more concerns you to know, than the ſmall advantage* ariſing from the wheat: but the truth is, I am not obliged to tell you every thing, that it might be for your profit to hear. Yes truly, replies *Antipater*, you are certainly obliged to do it: this you muſt allow, would you but reflect that all mankind are by nature united in one ſociety. I acknowledge it, anſwers *Diogenes*; but is the nature of this ſociety ſuch, that no man can have any property of his own? If this be the caſe, nothing ought to be ſold, but rather given by way of preſent.

Again †, ſuppoſe an honeſt man was to diſpoſe of his houſe, for ſome inconveniencies known only to himſelf: every body thinks it is ſound, though it be really infected by the plague: no body knows that all the rooms in the houſe are infeſted with

* All the editions have *Utilitas*, which, being generally received, I would not take upon me to alter. But I am fully convinced that *Vilitas*, a correction propoſed in the Dauphin's *Cicero*, is what we ought to read. Very little logic will ſhow the juſtneſs, or rather the neceſſity of this correction.

† Offic. III. 31.

ſerpents: the materials are worth nothing, and the whole fabric in a ruinous condition: all this, however, is known to none but the maſter himſelf. Now ſhould this man, without acquainting his purchaſers with the bad ſtate of the houſe, ſell it for much more than he expected; I would gladly know, whether this action of his be conſiſtent with juſtice and honeſty, or not?

He certainly acts a diſhoneſt part, anſwers *Antipater*, for to ſuffer the purchaſer to fall into a miſtake, that will be of the higheſt prejudice to him; is not this the very ſame with not ſhowing the right road to one that has loſt his way; a crime which the *Athenians* puniſhed with public execrations*? Nay, it is more than not ſhowing the way, it is a wilful and deliberate deſign to deceive our neighbour. *Diogenes*, on the other hand, replies: Did

* 'Tis not certainly known what the *Athenian public execrations* were. But, in general, it is evident that there were certain edicts read, or fixed up, in a public manner; the obſervance of which was enforced under the ſevereſt penalties. As to the preſent queſtion, it is a ſhame that men ſhould need to be put in mind of ſo plain a duty: and this precaution of the *Athenian* magiſtrates lets us ſee, how extenſive the humanity of this polite people was.

he force you to buy, who did not ſo much as adviſe you to it? He only expoſed to ſale what did not pleaſe him, and you bought what was agreeable to you. Now if thoſe who poſt up a bill to this effect, "*A houſe to be ſold, well-built, and in good* "*repair*," ſhall not be eſteemed guilty of any fraud, though the condition of the houſe be quite the reverſe of this character; much leſs ſhould thoſe be cenſured, who ſay nothing in commendation of it; becauſe where the buyer is at liberty to judge for himſelf, what room can there be for the ſeller to impoſe on him? If we are not obliged to make good every thing we ſay, how can you imagine we ought to perform what we never ſaid? Can any thing be more ridiculous, than for a merchant to decry his own commodities? Or can any thing be imagined more abſurd, than for a public cryer, by the owner's command, to make proclamation to this effect, "*An infected houſe to ſell?*"

We come now to the deciſion of theſe caſes: for it was not our intention to narrate them, by way of propoſed difficulties, but in order to reſolve them. In a

word then, 'tis my opinion, * that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed from the *Rhodians*, nor the ſeller of the houſe from his purchaſers, what each of them knew. To be merely ſilent on a thing, cannot indeed be called a wicked concealment of it; for this only takes place, when for the ſake of private advantage you deſignedly conceal what you know from others, whoſe intereſt it concerns, that they ſhould be informed of it.

But † if thoſe are blameable who are guilty of a deſign'd concealment, what ſhall we think of them who likewiſe uſe falſe commendations?

* Grotius, *de jure belli & pacis*, l. 2. c. 12. differs from the deciſion of *Cicero* concerning the corn-merchant. Indeed, ſays he, the merchant would have done a very commendable thing, if he had diſcovered all he knew: and in ſome caſes one cannot, without breach of charity, avoid doing ſo. But there is no neceſſity, adds *Grotius*, to lay down for a general maxim, as *Cicero* does, that ſilence is always blameable, when for ſome private advantage we conceal a thing from thoſe who are intereſted to know it. This can only happen in certain reſpects and circumſtances, which are neceſſarily connected with the thing in queſtion. The whole difference then between theſe two caſuiſts is, that *Grotius* aſcribes to charity what *Cicero* attributes to juſtice. As for my part, I willingly pardon *Cicero*, for having almoſt confounded theſe two virtues with one another.

† Offic. III. 14.

C. Canius,

C. Canius, a *Roman* knight, who wanted neither wit nor learning, having gone to *Syracuſe*, not, as he himſelf uſed to expreſs it, on account of buſineſs, but for retirement, gave out that he wanted to buy ſome gardens, where he might enjoy himſelf and the company of his friends, without being interrupted by intruding viſitants. When this came to be publickly known, one *Pythius*, a banker of that town, told *Canius* that he had certain gardens, which h did not indeed care abſolutely to diſpoſe of, but that *Canius* was very welcome to uſe them as if they were his own; and at the ſame time invited him to ſup with him in the gardens next day: to which *Canius* having conſented, *Pythius* immediately ſends for the fiſhermen; for by virtue of his buſineſs he had a great deal to ſay with all ranks of people: on theſe he prevails to fiſh next day before his gardens, and gives them proper inſtructions how to behave. At the time appointed, *Canius* comes to ſupper; an elegant entertainment is provided by *Pythius*; and a multitude of fiſhing-boats made a fine proſpect. Every one ſtrives which

ſhall be moſt diligent in bringing their draught, and throwing what fiſh they had caught at *Pythius*'s feet. Hey! ſays *Canius*, what is the meaning of this? Whence ſuch numbers of boats, and all this fiſh? To which *Pythius* replies, Does this cauſe your ſurprize? All the fiſh in *Syracuſe* are caught here; 'tis from this place they have all their water; and as for theſe fiſhermen, they could not live without it. On this *Canius*, being mighty deſirous to make the purchaſe, begs of *Pythius* to ſell him the gardens. At firſt he appears very unwilling, but, in ſhort, condeſcends to it. *Canius*, being fond of his bargain, and likewiſe a man of ſubſtance, buys them ready furniſh'd, and gives him his own price: in ſhort, the writings are drawn, and the whole affair concluded. He invites his friends againſt next day; but coming rather before the time, and ſeeing not ſo much as a ſingle boat, he aſks one of his neighbours, whether it was a holiday with the fiſhermen, becauſe none of them were to be ſeen? None that I know of, replies the other: but the truth is, they never uſed to fiſh here; which made

made me the more ſurpriſed at what happen'd yeſterday. *Canius* is vex'd, but what can he help himſelf? For my friend and colleague, *Aquilius*, had not then publiſhed his *formulas* concerning fraud; in which he makes anſwer to one aſking a definition of it, *that it was to pretend one thing, and act another*. And, indeed, this is a very clear deſcription, and ſuch as might be expected from a man of his learning. Whence it follows, that *Pythius*, and all who do one thing and pretend another, are without honour, faith, or probity.

Revolve * and carefully examine your underſtanding, in order to ſee what notion, idea, or repreſentation of a good man you find there. Is it conſiſtent with the character of ſuch a perſon, to lye for his own advantage; to calumniate, ſupplant, and cheat? Certainly by no means. Is there any thing then ſo valuable, or any profit ſo deſireable, as to make amends for the loſs of honour and reputation in a

* Offic. III. 20.

man

man of probity? Can that which we call profit, if it robs us of honour, juſtice, and the character of a good man, give us any thing ſo valuable in their ſtead? For where, pray, is the difference whether one be actually transformed from a man into a brute; or if, under the external figure of a man, he carry with him all the ferocity of the brute?

It * is an eaſy matter to reſolve caſes of profit and loſs. But ſhould one's life be in danger, ſo that it was abſolutely neceſſary, either to take the advantage of another, or to periſh himſelf; how ought he to behave? The ſuppoſition is poſſible, as in a ſhipwreck, ſhould one find a weak perſon ſitting on a plank; or in the rout of an army, ſhould he come up with one of the wounded on horſeback: would this man, in order to ſave himſelf, turn the one off the plank, or pull the other from his horſe? Was juſtice the rule of his conduct, he certainly would do neither †.

* Fragm. lib. de Rep. III.

† Some will think *Cicero* very ſcrupulous. But let us here remember the fundamental maxim, the GOLDEN RULE, of all

M. Attilius

M. Attilius Regulus,* in his ſecond conſulſhip, being ſurprized and taken priſoner in *Africa* by *Xantippus* the *Lacedæmonian* general, was ſent to the ſenate; after having firſt taken an oath to return to *Carthage*, unleſs certain priſoners of noble extract were reſtored to the *Carthaginians*. On his arrival at *Rome*, an appearance of advantage preſented itſelf to his view; which, as appears from the event, he judged entirely void of reality. The advantage was this, to remain in his native country, to ſtay at home with his wife and children, and, by regarding his misfortune as the common chance of war, to retain the rank of the conſular dignity: and will any one deny that theſe are profitable? But what ſhall we ſay? True fortitude and greatneſs of ſoul deny it. Now what greater authority would you require? For it is the peculiar property of theſe two

morality, that forbids to do to others, what we would not have them do to us. *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.* And ſure this is enough to ſupport *Cicero*'s deciſion; at leaſt, if people would not, by groundleſs ſubtilties, make juſtice and charity to be eſſentially different from each other.

* Offic. III. 26, & 27.

virtues,

virtues, to fear nothing, to look down on all human enjoyments, and to think nothing intolerable that can poſſibly befal a man. How then did he behave himſelf? He came into the ſenate, laid before them his commiſſion, but refuſed to give his ſentiments, as having no title to the character of a ſenator, while he continued under the ſacred obligation of an oath to the enemy; and (though ſome will certainly call him fool, thus to oppoſe his own intereſt!) declared that it was not for the good of the ſtate to reſtore the priſoners; for that they were excellent officers, and in the flower of their age; whereas he himſelf was worn out with years. In ſhort, his authority prevailed, the priſoners were detained, and he returned to *Carthage:* neither the affection he bore his native country, nor that of his family and friends, being able to hinder him; and notwithſtanding he was ſenſible, that he was going to put himſelf into the hands of the cruelleſt of enemies, and to ſuffer the moſt exquiſite tortures: but to balance all this, he was perſuaded that the obligation of an oath ought to be kept

kept inviolable. Wherefore even then, when undergoing the moſt tormenting of all deaths*, his hard fate was more tolerable, than if he had grown old in his own houſe, cover'd with the ſhame of having ſullied his conſular dignity by captivity and perjury.

Although † king *Pyrrhus* had made war on the *Romans* without any provocation, and though the diſpute with this magnanimous and powerful king was for no leſs a prize than empire itſelf; yet when a deſerter from him came into *Fabricius*'s

* In the original it is *vigilando necabatur*, which was very intelligible to thoſe of *Cicero*'s time, who knew in what manner *Regulus* had ended his days. M. *Rollin*'s account of it, taken from his hiſtory of the *Carthaginians*, is as follows:

"They (the *Carthaginians*) kept him a long time ſhut up in "a dark dungeon, whence, having firſt cut off his eye-lids, "they dragg'd him, in order to be expoſed to the brighteſt and "hotteſt ſun-ſhine. They next ſhut him up in a kind of cheſt, "all beſet with ſharp-pointed nails, that allowed him not one "moment's reſt either day or night. At laſt, after having long "tormented him with cruel watching, they diſpatched him by "crucifixion; which was an ordinary death among the *Carthaginians*."

I quote M. *Rollin* preferably to the ancients, from whom he has taken this account, only to have an opportunity to recommend the reading of his works. None have wrote for the benefit of youth, either with better intention, or with greater ſucceſs.

† Offic. III. 22.

camp,

camp, and promiſed, if he would give him a reward, to return ſecretly into *Pyrrhus*'s camp in the ſame manner he had come, and diſpatch the king by poiſon, *Fabricius* ordered him to be carried back to *Pyrrhus*; which action of his had the approbation of the ſenate. But if we regard only what has the appearance of advantage, and what commonly paſſes for ſuch; this one deſerter might have put an end to a very dangerous war, and taken off a very formidable rival for empire: but as the conteſt was for glory, it would have been a laſting infamy and reproach to have got the better of him, not by valour, but by vile treachery.

I would * aſk what can be the meaning

* Tuſcul. V. 17. *Critolaus* was a Peripatetic philoſopher. To the above account of probity from *Cicero*, I beg leave to ſubjoin the following beautiful paſſage of *Muſonius*; which, for its excellence, may be called the GOLDEN MAXIM. Ἂν τὶ πράξῃς καλὸν μετὰ πόνου, ὁ μὲν πόνος οἴχεται, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μένει. Ἂν τὶ ποιήσῃς αἰσχρὸν μετὰ ἡδονῆς, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ οἴχεται, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν μένει. *Si quid pulchri feceris cum labore; labor quidem abit, ſed pulchrum manet: ſin turpe quid feceris cum voluptate; voluptas abit, at turpe manet.* In *Engliſh* thus: "Allowing the performance of an honourable action "to be attended with labour; the labour is ſoon over, but the

of

of the famous balance of *Critolaus*; who is of opinion, that if the goods of the mind be caſt into one ſcale, and thoſe of the body, with all external advantages, into the other, nay though the whole earth and ſeas were added to the latter, yet the former would preponderate.

" honour immortal: whereas, ſhould even pleaſure wait on the ' commiſſion of what is diſhonourable; the pleaſure is ſoon " gone, but the diſhonour eternal."

VII.

On ELOQUENCE.

THERE * is nothing, I think, more truly excellent, than for a man to be able to attract, by his eloquence, the attention of a whole aſſembly; to charm their underſtandings; and to direct, or reſtrain, their inclinations at pleaſure. This ſingle art hath always, among free people, and eſpecially in times of public peace and tranquillity, not only met with the higheſt encouragement, but reigned, as it were, paramount. Now is there any thing ſo deſerving our admiration, as that amidſt an infinite number of men, there ſhould be found only one, or at leaſt but few, who are able to exerciſe thoſe talents, which nature has beſtowed on all? Or, can any thing convey ſo ſincere a pleaſure to our underſtanding or ear, as a diſcourſe, which, to the wiſeſt ſentiments, adds the

* De Orat. I. 8.

luſtre

luſtre and embelliſhment of expreſſion? What greatneſs, what power, can compare with his, who, by a ſingle ſpeech, can direct the caprices of the people, the conſciences of judges, and even the majeſtic gravity of the ſenate? Beſides, can any thing be more generous, more like a king, or more truly denote a great ſoul, than to lend aſſiſtance to thoſe who deſire it, relieve the oppreſſed, communicate happineſs, protect from dangers, and preſerve citizens from exile? What, on the other hand, ſo neceſſary, as to have arms always about us to annoy the malefactor, protect us from being inſulted, and avenge ourſelves when we are injured?

But not to dwell on the forum *, the bar, the roſtrum, and the ſenate; what is more agreeeble to human nature, or ſo delightful an amuſement in our receſſes from buſineſs, as the graceful ſprightlineſs of polite converſation? In this conſiſts our characteriſtic preheminence over the reſt of

* *Forum* was the place where the Prætors diſtributed juſtice; *Subſellia*, the benches, or ſeats, where the judges ſat; *Roſtra*, the tribunals, whence they harangued the people; and *Curia* the place where the ſenate aſſembled.

the

the animal world, that we converſe together; and, by language, are able to expreſs our latent ideas. Wherefore, to endeavour to excel other men in that very thing whence they derive their ſuperiority over brutes; who would not be charmed with the thought, and think no pains too much, in order to attain the dear accompliſhment?

But let us come to the principal advantage of eloquence. What power, but hers, could have collected the ſcattered individuals of mankind, or have made them change their ſavage and wild manner of living, for the poliſhed and civilized life of ſociety? For* there was a time, when men, like ſo many wild beaſts, wandered up and down in the fields, and ſupported themſelves with the ſame food that theſe did: nor had reaſon and contrivance any part in their actions, as being almoſt wholly performed by main ſtrength of body. In thoſe days, neither the ſtudy of divine religion, nor that of moral duties, was cultivated: legal marriages were not heard

* De Invent. I. 2.

of:

of: none could be ſure which were their own children: nor had they learned the many advantages reſulting from the law of equity. Whence the paſſions, by reaſon of ignorance and error, maintained a blind and tyrannic ſway, abuſing the powers of the body, thoſe dangerous partizans, for their own purpoſes. In this period, ſome great man of ſuperior penetration diſcovered, that the human mind was poſſeſſed of talents ſufficient for executing the greateſt enterprize, could any one find a method to ſet them on work, or improve them by inſtruction. In order to this, he, by ſome contrivance, convened and brought mankind together; who had been diſperſed in the fields, or lurking in the wild receſſes of the foreſt. Upon his endeavouring to make them ſenſible of whatever was uſeful or honourable, they at firſt proved refractory, as being unaccuſtomed to ſuch truths; afterwards, moved by reaſon and eloquence, they heard with greater attention; till at laſt, from fierce and ſavage monſters, he brought them to be gentle and good-natured.

And,

And, indeed, it appears evident to me, that without the aid of eloquence, it was not in the power of wiſdom itſelf to induce men to change, all of a ſudden, their manner of life, for what was juſt the reverſe of it. Nay, even when cities were built, what but the powerful perſuaſion of eloquence could enforce the dictates of reaſon, eſtabliſh the obſervance of good faith, maintain juſtice, bring mankind to pay a willing obedience to their magiſtrates, and perſuade them that it was their duty to ſpare no labour, and even to lay down their life, for the public good? Certainly no man of great power, if not prevailed on by ſome elegant and convincing ſpeech, would condeſcend to ſubmit his affairs to the determination of law, without being compelled to it; would put himſelf on an equal footing with thoſe over whom it was eaſy to keep up his ſuperiority; or willingly recede from a cuſtom, of all others the moſt delightful; eſpecially, ſince by reaſon of its long continuance, it had acquired a force equal to that of nature itſelf.

It is * ſaid that orators, like poets, are of different kinds. But the caſe is otherwiſe; for of theſe laſt there are ſeveral ſorts, diſtinct from each other, as the Tragic, Comic, Epic, and Lyric. Whence in tragedy, the leaſt mixture of the comic is inſufferable; and 'tis no leſs blameable to mix any thing tragic with comedy: and ſo in the reſt, each has its proper tone, which is eaſily diſtinguiſhed by people of taſte. But ſhould any perſon thus enumerate different kinds of orators, as the ſublime, the grave, and the copious; the low, the ſubtile, and the conciſe; or imagine others holding a middle rank between theſe: all this he may affirm of orators, but not of the art itſelf †. For with re-

* Ibid. cap. 21.

† *Ariſtotle* defines rhetoric, or the art of oratory, to be the *faculty of diſcovering, on every occaſion, what is proper to perſuade.* It conſiſts of four parts, 1. *Invention*, called by the *Greeks* Εὕρεσις, is the finding out, or ſelecting, ſuch arguments as are moſt conducive to prove the queſtion in hand, or work upon the auditory. 2. *Diſpoſition*, in *Greek* Τάξις or οἰκονομία, is the marſhalling, or properly diſpoſing the ſeveral parts of a diſcourſe; by which means, the things propoſed are heard with greater attention, better underſtood, and longer remembered. Theſe parts are commonly reckoned four, the *Exordium*, the *Narration*, the *Confirmation*, and the *Peroration* or concluſion. 3. *Elocution*, called by

gard

gard to the latter, we look for it in its utmoſt perfection; but with reſpect to orators, we declare what they really are.

He * is the moſt compleat orator, who inſtructs, delights, and ſenſibly touches the hearts of his auditory. To inſtruct is indiſpenſable; to delight, deſirable; and to touch, neceſſary. It muſt be confeſſed that ſome perform theſe better than others; but then this inequality conſiſts not in the kind, but degree. Every orator, therefore, is reputed good, bad, or indifferent, in proportion as theſe qualifications unite in him: yet all are called by the name of orators, as painters, however bad, are ſtill called painters. 'Tis by different abilities, and not by different arts, they are diſtinguiſhed from one another. None therefore can deſerve the name of orator, who has not the ambition to vie even with *Demoſthenes*.

the *Greeks* Λέξις or Ἑρμηνεία, is the uſing ſuch terms and expreſſions as are ſuitable to the ſubject to be diſcuſſed; and differs nothing from propriety of diction. 4. *Pronunciation*, called in *Greek* Ὑπόκρισις, is the regulating and adapting the voice and geſture agreeably to the matter. It is otherwiſe called *Action*. See *Voſſii Rhetorica*.

* De opt. gen. orat. cap. 1.

Menander

Menander *, on the contrary, would not aſpire to the perfection of *Homer* for this reaſon, becauſe he employed himſelf in a quite different kind of poetry. But this takes no place with reſpect to orators; or allowing that one ſhould uſe a ſtrong pathetic ſtile, free from obſcure ſubtilties; another delight more in argument and witticiſms, than purity and beauty of expreſſion: yet ſuch peculiarities, though they may be found in an indifferent orator, cannot certainly enter the character of a compleat one, in whom all good qualities muſt unite.

Upon † a review of the greateſt and moſt able men, it has often indeed appeared a queſtion with me, why fewer have diſtinguiſhed themſelves for eloquence, than in any other art. Turn your attention which way you pleaſe, you will find many who have excelled, not only in inferior arts, but in thoſe too of the greateſt conſequence. Now what perſon, if he

* *Menander*, the *Athenian*, wrote nothing but comedies, at which he excelled.

† De Orat. I. 2, 3, 4, 5.

eſtimates the abilities of great men by their extenſive uſefulneſs, but would prefer the general to the orator? And yet who will call in queſtion, that in this one city we have had almoſt innumerable inſtances of great and excellent generals; while ſcarce any can be mentioned that have excelled in oratory? There have been many in our days, and more in the time of our fathers and anceſtors, who, by their prudence and wiſdom, were well qualified to govern the ſtate: whereas for many ages*, there were none at all that could be called great orators; and indeed, it would be difficult to inſtance a tolerable one for every age.

Now that none may think the compariſon unfair, between eloquence and the renown of a general, or the prudence of a good ſenator; and that eloquence ought rather to be compared with thoſe ſtudies which have ſome connection with the ſciences, and other branches of literature;

* *Cicero*, in his book *de claris oratoribus*, chap. 15. goes no farther back than *Cethegus*, who was conſul in the year of *Rome* 559.

let

let us take a view of theſe very ſciences, and obſerve what great numbers of eminent men have flouriſhed in each of them, and then we ſhall be able to judge how inconſiderable the number of orators has been in former times, or is at preſent.

You are not ignorant, that what the *Greeks* call philoſophy, is eſteemed by men of the greateſt learning to be, as it were, the parent and mother of all the liberal arts: and yet it is a difficult matter to enumerate, how many of its profeſſors have been remarkable for their great learning, and the variety and copiouſneſs of their ſtudies; who have not confined their reſearches to one ſingle branch of knowledge, but by an indefatigable application to ſtudy, and the ſound deductions of reaſon, have extended their views to every thing. None, ſure, is ignorant, how abſtruſe, intricate, ſubtile, and perplexing, the ſtudy of mathematics is; and yet ſo many have been eminent for their knowledge in this ſcience, that it ſhould ſeem, no man ever heartily applied himſelf to attain it, who did not gain what he propoſed. Who ever ſet himſelf ſe-

riouſly to ſtudy muſic, or thoſe branches of literature called grammar *, and did not acquire a thorough knowledge of the almoſt infinite number of things, whereof theſe arts conſiſt?

This, I think, I may truly affirm; that there have been fewer who have excelled in poetry, than in any other ſcience within the whole compaſs of liberal arts. But however ſcanty the number of good poets is, yet if you carefully reckon up thoſe that *Greece* and *Rome* have produced, you will find them far more numerous than the good orators.

What makes this appear ſtill more extraordinary is, that the knowledge of the other ſciences is deduced, for the moſt part, from abſtruſe, and not commonly known, principles; whereas eloquence lies open to the views of every body, and employs only ſuch reaſons and expreſſions as are made uſe of in common life. In other arts, what is moſt raiſed above the

* By the word *Grammarian*, the ancients underſtood a learned man; or one who was perfectly well ſkilled in all thoſe branches of literature, that, among the *French*, go by the general name of *Belles Lettres*.

compre-

comprehenſion and underſtanding of the ignorant, is eſteemed moſt excellent; but in oratory, it is a fault of the higheſt kind, to depart from the uſual forms of ſpeech, or the received maxims of common ſenſe*.

Now it cannot be ſaid, with any appearance of truth, that more people apply themſelves to the cultivation of the other ſciences, or that they are encouraged in the purſuit of them by more exalted pleaſures, greater hopes, or more ample rewards. For not to mention *Greece*, which has always been deſirous to excel other nations in point of eloquence; or *Athens*, that parent of all learning, where the art of oratory was firſt practiſed and brought

* Mr. *Locke*, *Eſſay on Hum. Underſtand.* B. III. chap. 10. Sect. 34, paſſes a ſevere judgment on the whole art of oratory, as founded on the very fault here condemned. Would we ſpeak of things as they are, ſays he, we muſt allow, that all the art of rhetoric, beſides order and clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong ideas, move the paſſions, and thereby miſlead the judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addreſſes, they are certainly, in all diſcourſes that pretend to inform or inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or perſon that makes uſe of them.

to perfection; certainly no ſtudy ever flouriſhed ſo much in this city, as that of eloquence. For after an univerſal empire was obtained, and the continuance of peace had afforded leiſure, every youth, who was any wiſe ambitious of glory, thought no pains too much, in order to acquire the art of ſpeaking. At firſt, indeed, being wholly ignorant of method, unacquainted with the great advantage of exerciſe, and not imagining there were any rules belonging to this art; the progreſs they made in it, was entirely owing to the ſtrength of their own genius and reaſon. But how ſoon they had heard the *Greek* orators, read their books, and taken maſters to inſtruct them, 'tis incredible with what vehemence our countrymen thirſted after eloquence. The importance, the variety, and great number of cauſes afforded every man an opportunity of adding frequent practice, which far exceeds all maſters, to what he had learned by ſtudy. Beſides, the greateſt rewards, as public favour, riches, and honour, were then, as well as at preſent, annexed to this profeſſion. And as to genius, it is evident from many conſiderations,

ſiderations, that the *Romans* were much ſuperior in this reſpect to all other nations.

All this being taken into the account, is there not great reaſon to admire, that the number of orators have at all times and places of the world been ſo very few? But in truth, the art of oratory is more noble, and requires the knowledge of more arts and ſciences, than is commonly imagined. For what other reaſon, but the greatneſs and difficulty of the undertaking, can be aſſigned, why in ſuch vaſt numbers of ſtudents, endowed with excellent natural parts, ſo few ſucceed; though there be no want of able maſters, an infinite variety of cauſes, and the greateſt rewards annexed to the attainment?

To form an orator then, beſides an extenſive knowledge, without which the eaſieſt flow of language will appear trifling and ridiculous; I ſay, beſides this, the ſtile muſt likewiſe be embelliſhed by the juſteſt arrangement, as well as choice of words; a perfect knowledge of all the affections *, which nature has beſtowed on

* Affections are either public or private, benevolent or ſelfiſh; the former are excited by ſhewing, that the thing in queſtion has a manifeſt tendency to promote the happineſs of others; and the

mankind, is alſo neceſſary; becauſe the whole power of eloquence ought to be exerted, in order to calm and rouſe the minds of the auditory. To this muſt be added, a certain gracefulneſs, an enlivening raillery, a gentleman-like learning, and a ready talent for repartee, and attacking an adverſary in a delicate and polite manner. One muſt likewiſe be acquainted with antiquity, and have a great many examples to produce: nor is the ſtudy of laws and juriſprudence to be neglected. What occaſion for me to enlarge on action itſelf, which muſt be regulated by the motion of the body, the geſture, the countenance, with a due command, and ſuitable changes, of voice*? The great difficulty of this

latter, by proving that an object or event would occaſion the greateſt quantity of pleaſure to the individual. The exciting truths about means, would be only thoſe which pointed out ſome means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with leſs pain or trouble to the agent. See *Hutcheſon* on the Paſſions, p. 224.

* *Horace*, in his Art of poetry, v. 101. & ſeq. obſerves what ſurprizing influence this has on an auditory.

> With thoſe who laugh, our ſocial joy appears;
> With thoſe who mourn, we ſympathize in tears:
> If you would have me weep, begin the ſtrain;
> Then I ſhall feel your ſorrows, feel your pain.
>
> *Francis's Hor.*

alone,

alone, plainly appears from the frivolous art of comedians, and repreſentations on the ſtage; where, though every one ſtrives to regulate his countenance, voice, and geſtures in a becoming manner; yet who is ignorant, how few there are, or have been, whom we can behold with patience? Need I to mention memory, that treaſury of all knowledge; to whoſe keeping unleſs the inventions, reflections, and expreſſions of the orator are committed, they muſt, however excellent in themſelves, be infallibly loſt?

Wherefore, ſince eloquence conſiſts of all theſe accompliſhments put together, the ſtudy of each whereof ſingly is a matter of the greateſt difficulty; let us ceaſe to wonder, why good orators are ſo few in number.

VIII.

On FRIENDSHIP.

IF we except Wiſdom, I know not if the immortal Gods have beſtowed ſo excellent a gift on mankind, as Friendſhip. Some give the preference to riches, ſome to health, ſome to power, others to honours, and not a few to pleaſures. This laſt, indeed, conſtitutes the happineſs of brutes; and even the former are frail and uncertain, depending, not ſo much on our prudence, as on the caprice of fortune.

Thoſe, on the other hand, who place their chief happineſs in virtue, act an excellent part: but then this virtue begets and maintains friendſhip, which, without it, could by no means ſubſiſt.

We take virtue in the meaning put upon it in common life, and our own language; nor, with ſome learned men*, do we meaſure it by ſuperb epithets: we like-

* The Stoics. For the idea they give of their wiſe men, ſee page 59.

wiſe

wiſe look upon thoſe as good men, who are commonly eſteemed ſuch; as the *Paulus*'s, the *Cato*'s, the *Gallus*'s, the *Scipio*'s, the *Philus*'s. Greater models of virtue than theſe are not required in common life: whence we make no mention of characters, that are no where to be found.

Now the advantages ariſing from friendſhip among men of this caſt, are greater than I can well expreſs. And firſt, who can have any reliſh for life*, as *Ennius* expreſſes it, that cannot repoſe himſelf on the mutual benevolence of a friend? What pleaſure ſo exquiſite, as to have one you can talk with as freely as with yourſelf? Where would be the boaſted advantages of proſperity, had we not a friend to ſhare it with us? And as for adverſity, it would be almoſt inſupportable, without one to eaſe us of the greater part of the grief attending our misfortune.

In ſhort, every other object of man's deſire is uſeful only for ſome particular purpoſe; riches, to be uſed; power, to command reſpect; honours, to be the ſub-

* The expreſſion of *Ennius* is, *vita vitalis*, which cannot be rendered literally in *French*, or *Engliſh*.

ject

ject of applauſe; pleaſures, to be enjoyed; health, to be free from pain, and in condition to diſcharge ſuch duties as depend on the body. But as for friendſhip, its advantages are innumerable; which way ſoever you turn, it is preſent; it is admitted every where, is never unſeaſonable, never troubleſome. Whence, as the ſaying is, we can no more be without friendſhip, than without water and fire.

I am not now ſpeaking of common and ordinary friendſhip, though that too has its pleaſure and uſe; but of that which is real and perfect, ſuch as exiſted between thoſe few great men mentioned above. For it not only adds new charms to proſperity, but, by communicating and ſharing it, renders even adverſity itſelf leſs intolerable. Now among the many and great advantages of friendſhip, I take this to be the moſt eſſential, that it gives us good hopes of what is to come, and ſuffers not our minds to be dejected, much leſs to ſuccumb under afflictions *.

* *Cicero* had experience of this, during his baniſhment, from *Atticus*: whence it is plain, that his deſign here was to teſtify his remembrance and gratitude, by dedicating a dialogue on friendſhip to him.

Beſides,

Beſides, he that takes a view of a friend, beholds, as it were, the perfect reſemblance of himſelf. So that abſence cannot ſeparate, want impoveriſh, ſickneſs weaken, or, what is ſtill more aſtoniſhing, death put an end to their life. So conſtant is the remembrance, ſo ſincere the affection, and ſo elevated the eſteem which are entertained for the deceaſed by their ſurviving friends, that the death of the former ſeems a happineſs, and the life of the latter a merit.

In my frequent meditations on friendſhip, there is one thing appears chiefly to deſerve conſideration; and that is, whether it be courted merely to ſupply the weakneſs and wants of mankind; that, by a mutual exchange of good offices, every one may receive from his friend, what is wanting in himſelf; and make up, in his turn, the defects of his friend? Or, allowing this to be, indeed, a property of friendſhip, whether it has no other cauſe, that is more ancient, more refined, and nearer allied to nature itſelf?

'Tis

'Tis love (whence, in *Latin*, the word friendſhip is derived) that chiefly conciliates benevolence. Favours, indeed, may be obtained even of thoſe for whom friendſhip is only pretended, and who are courted merely to ſerve a preſent intereſt. But in true friendſhip, there can be no impoſition, or deceit: whatever makes a part of it, muſt be ſincere, and from the heart. On this account, therefore, friendſhip appears to me, to be derived rather from nature, than the indigence of mankind; and to be owing rather to the benevolent affections of our mind, than to any conſideration of the great utility attending it.

As to the nature of this ſenſation, we may obſerve a reſemblance of it even in ſome beaſts; which love their offſpring, and are beloved by them, with ſo ſincere a regard, for ſome time at leaſt, that it manifeſtly appears to be the dictate of nature. This inſtinct is ſtill more viſible in man. As firſt, from the ſtrong affection which ſubſiſts between children and their parents; that cannot be diſſolved, without incurring the guilt of the moſt odious

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of all crimes*. Again, when we meet with one whoſe nature and manners tally exactly with our own, we are affected with a ſimilar ſenſation of benevolence towards him; becauſe in ſuch a one we ſeem to diſcover the bright effluence, as it were, of virtue and goodneſs. For there is nothing more amiable than virtue, or a ſtronger incitement to love: inſomuch that on account of their virtue and probity, we in a manner love thoſe whom we never ſaw. Who is there but has a peculiar reſpect and veneration for the memory of *C. Fabricius* †, and *M. Curius* ‖; though he never had any perſonal know-

* However general a truth this may be, there are particular exceptions to it, as in the caſe of *Abraham*'s deſigning to ſacrifice his ſon *Iſaac*; and that of *Brutus*, the firſt conſul of *Rome*; who, when his two ſons had engaged in a conſpiracy to reſtore the *Tarquins*, ordered them both to be beheaded. But then private ties of blood are of no force to ſuperſede the divine command, in the former caſe; nor to cancel a crime againſt the commonwealth, in the latter.

† We have mentioned *Fabricius*, and *Pyrrhus* king of *Epire*, already. See p. 87.

‖ *M. Curius Dentatus* is equally famous for his frugality, valour, and victories. 'Tis of him *Juvenal* ſpeaks, in the well-known verſe againſt hypocrites,

Qui Curios *ſimulant, & Bacchanalia vivunt.*
At diſtance, they like *Curius* appear;
But are true Bacchanals, when you come near.

ledge

ledge of them? And who, on the contrary, but deteſts *Tarquin the Proud*, *Sp. Caſſius**, and *Sp. Mælius*†? There have been two generals, *Pyrrhus* and *Annibal*, who contended with us for empire in the heart of *Italy*: one of theſe, by reaſon of his generoſity, was never greatly the object of our averſion; whereas the cruelty of the other has rendered him obnoxious to the conſtant abhorrence of this ſtate. Now if the power of virtue is ſo very great, that we love it even in thoſe whom we never ſaw; or, what is ſtill more, in one who is our profeſſed enemy; is it any wonder, that the affections of mankind are ſtrongly wrought on, when virtue and goodneſs are diſcovered in thoſe, with whom a ſocial intercourſe may be enjoyed?

True affection, however, is much confirmed by good offices, by marks of e-

* *Sp. Caſſius Viſcellinus*, after having been three times conſul, and twice honoured with a triumph, was impeached for aſpiring to be king: in conſequence of which, he was thrown headlong from the *Tarpeian* rock, in the year of *Rome* 270.

† *Sp. Mælius*, accuſed likewiſe of aſpiring to be king, was killed by *Servilius Ahala*, general of the horſe, in the year of *Rome* 315.

ſteem, and intimate acquaintance; and if theſe concur with inclination, that firſt movement of the heart, there reſults, from ſuch a conjunction, a height of benevolence not to be expreſſed. Should any one imagine, that all this is the effect of the natural weakneſs of mankind, in order to ſupply their mutual wants and indigence; this would be to debaſe friendſhip, and to aſſign its origin to a principle, which, I may venture to ſay, is far from being generous. If this was the caſe, he who is moſt ſenſible of his own imperfections, would be beſt qualified for friendſhip; but, in fact, 'tis quite the reverſe: for in proportion as every man is confident of his own ability, and has ſuch a ſtock of virtue and wiſdom, with every other neceſſary qualification, within himſelf, as to need no foreign aſſiſtance; ſo much keener will his deſires be for friendſhip, and his care the greater in cultivating it. Did *Africanus** ſtand in any need of me? By no means. Nor, indeed, had I any occaſion for his aid. However, being charmed

* *Lælius* ſays this of *Scipio Africanus*, who has been mentioned above. See p. 68.

with

with his virtues, I loved him; and he, on the other hand, had an affection for me, occaſioned, perhaps, by the good opinion he had conceived of my manners. Our mutual benevolence increaſed as we became better acquainted. Now though many and great advantages reſulted from our friendſhip, yet certainly it was not the proſpect of them that gave riſe to it.

For as we do acts of kindneſs and generoſity, not with any proſpect to have a return, ſuch a conduct being inconſiſtent with the nature of a favour, but from our natural propenſity to beneficence; in the ſame manner, friendſhip, in my opinion, ought not to be cultivated for mercenary views; but becauſe the cordial affection whereon it is founded, is, of itſelf, advantage enough. We are of quite different ſentiments from thoſe who refer every thing to pleaſure*: and no wonder,

* The Epicurean doctrine, which makes the happineſs of mankind to conſiſt in pleaſure, has been greatly miſtaken by ancient and modern philoſophers: and the reaſon is, becauſe they have given the name of happineſs, not to the thing itſelf, but to its efficient cauſe. Hence as the fancy took them, they placed it in riches, knowledge, honour, reputation, virtue, *&c. Epicurus*, on the other hand, conſiders the formal cauſe of happineſs, or the ſtate of one who is actually happy. He examines wherein the

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for they whoſe thoughts are wholly taken up with ſo groveling and contemptible an object, can never have any taſte for what is ſublime, excellent, and divine. Therefore let us make no further mention of them. But as to ourſelves, it is fit we ſhould know, that the endearing affections of love and benevolence naturally ariſe from a diſcovery of virtue. Thoſe who are affected in this way, draw near, and unite themſelves, in order to enjoy the company and ſocial virtues of the perſon beloved; they aim at an equality of friendſhip; and are more ſolicitous to do good offices, than about a return. Whence ariſes a laudable emulation between them. Thus the advantages of friendſhip will be very conſiderable; and its origin, deduced from nature, not only more agreeable to truth, but likewiſe more ſolid and durable, than that from the indigence of man-

thing itſelf conſiſts; and finds it to be in the ſenſation of pleaſure, or the ſentiment of a mind that is pleaſed, ſatisfied, and contented. It cannot be hence inferred, that *Epicurus* made human happineſs to conſiſt in good cheer, or ſenſuality; for theſe are only efficient cauſes, and conſequently foreign to his enquiry. Mr. *Bayle* thinks ſuch a method of conſidering happineſs the moſt exact and philoſophical of all others. See his Dict. Hiſt. Crit. article EPICURUS, Remark (H).

kind:

kind: for was intereſt the only bond of friendſhip, a change in the former could not fail to diſſolve the latter. But ſince nature cannot be changed, true friendſhip muſt of conſequence be eternal.

Some * men, who in *Greece* are ranked, as I am informed †, among the wiſeſt ſages, have taken up very extraordinary notions on this ſubject; but then there is nothing can eſcape their ſophiſtry. They maintain, that too extenſive friendſhips ought not to be entered into, leſt one man involve himſelf in the diſquietudes of a multitude; that every one has buſineſs enough, and perhaps too much, of his own; that it is extremely troubleſome to be too deeply intereſted in the affairs of other people; and that it is moſt eligible to hold the reins of friendſhip in ſuch an unconfined manner, as to have it always in our power to ſtreighten or ſlacken them, as

* *De Amicitia*, cap. 13.

† In the time of *Lælius*, whom *Cicero* introduces ſpeaking in this place, the *Grecian* literature was not become common at *Rome*; which is the reaſon that *Cicero*, to keep up the *decorum* of the dialogue, makes *Lælius* ſay, that he had only *been informed* concerning the opinions that prevailed among their philoſophers.

we

we ſhall ſee occaſion. For tranquillity, with theſe men, makes the principal ingredient of a happy life; and this the mind can never enjoy, while one perſon is in labour, if the expreſſion may be allowed, with the concerns of many.

Others are ſaid to affirm, what is ſtill more unworthy of a man, and has been ſlightly touched on above, that friendſhip ought to be contracted for ſelf-defence and mutual aid, and not out of affection and benevolence. Hence it is, ſay they, that the deſires of friendſhip in every man are greater, in proportion as his ability and ſtrength is leſs; alſo, that women court the aid of friendſhip more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the afflicted more than thoſe who are eſteemed happy.

Excellent wiſdom! They might as well take the ſun out of the world, as deprive mankind of friendſhip; which is the beſt, the moſt delightful, gift of heaven.

Should * men intoxicated with pleaſure take upon them to reaſon about friendſhip,

* De Amicitia, cap. 15.

which

which they neither know by experience or theory, they don't merit our attention; for who, in the name of goodneſs! would chuſe to live in the greateſt affluence and plenty, on condition neither to love, or be beloved by any one? This is the life of a tyrant, utterly inconſiſtent with fidelity, ſincere affection, and all ſolid aſſurance of benevolence; in which every thing gives ſuſpicion, cauſes anxiety, and baniſhes friendſhip: for who can love a man whom he is afraid of, or one by whom he imagines himſelf dreaded? An hypocritical regard is only paid them for a time; but ſhould fortune frown on them, as is often the caſe, it will then appear, how deſtitute of friends they were.

Tarquin is reported to have ſaid, that it was only in his exile he underſtood who where his faithful, and who his treacherous, friends, when he could reward neither of them according to their merits: though I ſhould be greatly ſurpriſed, if a man of his haughty and imperious temper could find a real friend in the world. And as a man of his character could not make friends, ſo the power of many great men

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is an inſuperable obſtacle to true friendſhip: for fortune is not only blind herſelf, but for the moſt part makes thoſe likewiſe ſo, to whom ſhe is favourable. Hence it is, they are commonly puffed up with arrogance, and ſelf-conceit: and, indeed, nothing can be more inſufferable than a fortunate fool. Inſtances alſo may be ſeen of thoſe, who formerly were of an obliging and courteous behaviour, that on being promoted to power and authority, or better circumſtances, have deſpiſed their old friends, and courted new ones.

Now what can be more unreaſonable, than for thoſe who are poſſeſſed of all the affluence of a great fortune, to provide themſelves with whatever can be got for money, as horſes, ſlaves, fine cloaths, and coſtly plate; but make no friends, who, if the expreſſion may be allowed, are the beſt, the moſt ſplendid, furniture in life? As to other things, they are ignorant for whoſe ſake they take ſo much pains to get them, ſince they fall to the ſhare of whoever is ſtrongeſt; but the poſſeſſion of friendſhip is laſting and ſure. Beſides, allowing

lowing all the enjoyments in the diſpoſal of fortune to be durable, yet life without friends to adorn it, could yield little ſatisfaction.

One * point to be ſettled is, what limits, what bounds ought to be preſcribed to friendſhip and benevolence. Concerning this, I know there are three different opinions, none of which has my approbation. One is, that we ſhould love our friend as ourſelves: another, that our benevolence to our friends ſhould exactly correſpond to theirs for us: and the third, that we ought to eſteem our friends according to the value they ſet on themſelves. To none of the three can I thoroughly aſſent.

As to the firſt, that every man ſhould be affected in the ſame manner towards his friend as to himſelf, it is very remote from truth; for how many things do we for them, which we would never do for ourſelves? Thus, to turn ſuppliant, and petition a man of no worth; alſo, to attack any one with bitter expreſſions of reproach,

* De Amicitia, cap. 16, 17.

and

and rail at him immoderately; are what cannot be done with a good grace in our own caſe, but with regard to our friends are highly commendable. There are likewiſe many caſes, wherein good men detract much from their own intereſts, or ſuffer it to be done, in order to promote the welfare of their friends.

The next poſition defines friendſhip to be an equality of good offices, and benevolent affections. But thus to balance the kindneſſes on both ſides, is to make too mean, too particular an eſtimate of it. True friendſhip appears to me more noble and generous; and is not over ſcrupulous, leſt more favours be returned, than have been received. For there is no occaſion to fear that any part of our good offices ſhould be loſt, or fall to the ground; or that more than what is reaſonable be expended on friendſhip.

But the third opinion, that the value which every man ſets on himſelf ought to be the ſtandard of the eſteem paid him by his friends, is worſt of all: for it is a frequent caſe to find ſome of too humble a ſpirit, whoſe hopes of bettering their

circumſtances are too languid. It cannot therefore be the part of a friend, to regulate his behaviour by the notions which a man of this character has of himſelf. He ought rather to raiſe the drooping mind of his friend, and make him entertain more elevated proſpects, and better thoughts of himſelf.

We muſt therefore find ſome other definition of friendſhip: but let us firſt premiſe, what *Scipio* uſed highly to condemn; which was, that no tenet could be more oppoſite to true friendſhip, than the ſentiments of him who affirmed, *that a man ought to love, as if he was ſure he ſhould one day hate.* He could not be perſuaded that this was an apophthegm of *Bias*, one of the ſeven wiſe-men, as was commonly thought; but rather the maxim of ſome debauchee, a perſon fired with ambition, or one who makes every thing ſubſervient to his own intereſt. For how can any man be a true friend, that ſuppoſes it poſſible he may become an enemy? Beſides, at this rate, we muſt wiſh that our friend may fall into frequent miſtakes, in order to give us the more opportunities of reproving

reproving him: and, on the other hand, one muſt be vexed and grieved at the virtuous behaviour of his friends, and envy their good ſucceſs. This maxim therefore, whoever is its author, ſtrikes at the very root of friendſhip. The following precept ought rather to have been given, "that we ought to uſe ſuch caution in "contracting friendſhips, as never to al-"low our affections to ſettle on one who "afterwards may incur our hatred." But farther, ſhould we even prove unfortunate in our friendſhips, 'tis *Scipio*'s opinion, that we ought to bear our misfortune with patience, rather than entertain a ſingle thought of a rupture.

The bounds then which, in my opinion, ought to be preſcribed, are theſe; that among friends of refined morals, all things ſhould be in common, and their ſeveral deſires and intentions imparted without reſerve: alſo allowing that the purſuits of our friends may happen to claſh a little with ſtrict juſtice*, yet, if their life or

* It is evident from ſeveral paſſages of *Cicero*, that all he means here is only that an orator may undertake the defence of his friend, though he be perſuaded in his own breaſt that his

reputation be at ſtake, they ought to be ſupported, though we ſhould ſtrain a point for their ſervice, provided the baſeſt diſhoneſty be not the conſequence: for friendſhip itſelf will excuſe us only to a certain degree.

Men * of reſolution, conſtancy, and a ſteady temper, ſhould be choſen for friends: but thoſe of this character are few in number; and it is a difficult matter to form a true judgment in this reſpect, till experience has proved them. Friendſhip, however, muſt be commenced, before this can be done; for which reaſon, all previous opportunities of trying them are impoſſible to be obtained.

friend is not altogether innocent. This he practiſed himſelf in the affair of *Milo*. To be convinced that he allows of no greater liberty to depart from the path of juſtice, one needs only read his Offices, lib. III. cap. 10. "A good man will neither be "guilty of an offence againſt the ſtate, or break his oath or "promiſe, even to ſerve his friend, and though he were ap"pointed his judge: for at the time he puts on the character "of a judge, he lays aſide that of a friend. He owes, indeed, "ſo much to friendſhip, as to wiſh that his friend's cauſe was "juſt; and to allow him as much time as the laws permit, for "pleading it."

* De Amicitia, cap. 21.

It therefore becomes a prudent man, like an able charioteer, to reſtrain the impetuoſity of his benevolence *; that friendſhip, to uſe the expreſſion, may be proved in the ſame way as horſes of manege, by putting the morals of our friends to the teſt in ſome particular point. Some will diſcover their inconſtancy on account of a ſmall ſum of money; others, who cannot be wrought on by a ſmall ſum, will ſhow themſelves for a greater. But admitting that ſome ſhould be found, who think it baſe to prefer money to friendſhip; yet where ſhall we meet with any, who do not prefer honours, magiſtracies, power, dignity, and riches, to it; or, if all theſe be propoſed on the one hand, and the duties of friendſhip on the other, that do not readily give the preference to the former? For our nature is too weak to reſiſt the temptation of power; and men think themſelves very excuſable, though they acquire it even at the expence of friendſhip; becauſe 'tis not without great cauſe they do ſo. Whence it is next to impoſ-

* An alluſion to a verſe quoted in his letters to *Atticus*, XIII. 21.

ſible to find true friendſhip among the votaries of ambition, and miniſters of ſtate. For where is the man to be found, that takes more concern for the preferment of his friend than that of himſelf?

There * is likewiſe a cruel neceſſity ſometimes for dropping friendſhip; for I am now ſpeaking of that in ordinary life, and not ſuch as takes place among wiſe men. Our friends are frequently guilty of offences both againſt ourſelves and others, the ſcandal whereof chiefly lights on us. Such as theſe, therefore, muſt be dropped, by neglecting all friendly intercourſe; and rather by little and little, as I have heard *Cato* ſay, than abruptly: unleſs ſome very heinous crime be committed, ſo that it is neither right, honourable, or even poſſible, for us to defer one moment to break with the guilty perſon.

Moſt † people are ſo unreaſonable, not to ſay ſhameleſs, as to deſire their friends ſhould be what they themſelves cannot at-

* De Amicitia, cap. 21. † Ibid. cap. 22.

tain

tain to; and expect more from them than they are willing to give in return. In juſtice, however, one ſhould firſt be a good man himſelf, and then cultivate friendſhip with thoſe of his own character. Among ſuch as theſe, the friendſhip we have been recommending may be eſtabliſhed on a ſolid baſis; becauſe men united by benevolence will not only triumph over thoſe paſſions which enſlave the reſt of mankind, but likewiſe take a pleaſure in juſtice and equity, and readily do all kind of good offices for one another: nor will they ever require any thing, but what is juſt and honourable; and, beſides love and eſteem, will have a mutual reverence for each other. To deprive friendſhip of this reverence, is to rob it of its greateſt ornament; and for any to ſuppoſe, that all manner of licentiouſneſs and offences are allowable among friends, is a pernicious error. Friendſhip was given by nature, not to favour vice, but to be an aid to virtue.

Friendſhip * is the only thing in the world, concerning the uſefulneſs of which all mankind are agreed. Even virtue itſelf is deſpiſed by many, and called a ſort of vanity and oſtentation. Many, who are content with little, and pleaſed with frugality in meat and dreſs, look down on riches with contempt. And as to honours, which are ſo earneſtly deſired by ſome, there are others, and they not a few, who have ſo low an opinion of them as to think nothing ſo inſignificant and empty. Thus it is likewiſe in other caſes; what raiſes the admiration of ſome, is by many others reckon'd good for nothing. But the whole world is, to a man, of the ſame ſentiments about friendſhip: ſtateſmen and philoſophers, the men of buſineſs, and thoſe who are entirely devoted to pleaſures, all are agreed that there is no living without friendſhip, at leaſt in ſuch a way as is not altogether unbecoming a gentleman.

* De Amicitia, cap. 23.

Friendſhip inſinuates itſelf, I know not how, among all ranks of men; nor is there any condition of life free from its influence: nay, could we ſuppoſe a man of ſo ſurly and ſavage a diſpoſition, as to hate and avoid human ſociety, like a certain fellow of *Athens* called *Timon*; yet even one of this complexion cannot live at eaſe, till he has found a perſon on whom he may vent his ſpleen and ill humour.

Of this we would be more fully convinced, ſhould ſome God, if the ſuppoſition may be allowed, tranſport us from the ſociety of mankind; and placing us in a deſart, there ſupply us with all the neceſſaries of life in great abundance, but make it impoſſible for us to ſee the face of a man. Who could be ſo hard-hearted, as to be able to endure this way of life; and whoſe pleaſures of every kind would not be rendered inſipid by ſuch a ſolitude?

Nothing therefore is more true, than the ſaying of, I think, *Archytas* of *Tarentum*, as I have heard it told by our fa-

thers*, who had it from theirs; *that could a man aſcend into heaven, and there obſerve the ſtructure of the univerſe, and the beauty of the ſtars; yet, if he has no friend to relate it to, that which otherwiſe would have been moſt delightful, will prove inſipid to him.* Hence it appears, that nature has an invincible averſion to ſolitude, and always leans, as it were, againſt ſome prop; which ſupport yields us moſt pleaſure, when proceeding from our beſt friends.

The † caſe of that man is certainly deſperate, whoſe ears are ſhut againſt truth, ſo that he cannot endure to hear it even from the mouth of his friend. For it is wiſely remarked by *Cato, that ſome men are more beholden to their bittereſt enemies, than to friends who appear to be ſweetneſs itſelf. The former frequently tell the truth,*

* Between *Archytas* and *Lælius*, who ſpeaks here, there was about the ſpace of two centuries; for *Archytas* was co-temporary with *Plato*. See *De Senectute*, chap. 12. But, as we have already obſerved, 'tis to keep up the *decorum* of the dialogue, that *Cicero* does not make *Lælius* ſpeak with more exactneſs, which would diſcover too much knowledge.

† De Amicitia, cap. 27.

but

but the latter never. It is certainly a great abſurdity in thoſe, who being put in mind of their duty, give themſelves no trouble about what they ought chiefly to lay to heart, and are vexed where there is no ſufficient cauſe. They are not grieved at the commiſſion of a fault, but at being reproved for it: whereas they ought to be ſorry on account of the fault, and well pleaſed with the admonition.

Wherefore, as it is a peculiar property of true friendſhip, both to give and take advice*; and as the one ought to be done

* It is an eaſy matter to lay down a beautiful theory of friendſhip, ſet forth its uſefulneſs, and preſcribe rules to thoſe who enter into it. The deſcription charms our fancy, and fills us with a kind of enthuſiaſtic warmth. All pay homage to the inchanting idea of friendſhip, acknowledge its uſefulneſs, and are raviſhed with the thoughts of its refined pleaſures. But where is the thing itſelf to be found? Is there ſuch a thing as perfect friendſhip in the world? Or, allowing there is, how few are qualified to act the part of a true friend? What delicacy is neceſſary to form ſuch a character? Nothing is more difficult than to comply with the precept here mentioned, of giving and taking advice. However, as this muſt be allowed to be an eſſential part of friendſhip, I ſhall ſubjoin the *Spectator*'s advice concerning it, as the moſt proper that can be followed.

" The moſt difficult province in friendſhip is the letting a " man ſee his faults and errors, which ſhould, if poſſible, be " ſo contrived, that he may perceive our advice is given him

with

with freedom, not ill-nature; the other received patiently, and not with reluctance: ſo it ſhould be laid down for a maxim, that nothing can happen in friendſhip ſo pernicious as flattery, and a complaiſant cajoling behaviour. For though ſeveral names are neceſſary to expreſs the vice of thoſe trifling deceivers, whoſe whole converſation is in order to pleaſe, and not to be ſubſervient to truth; yet as diſſimulation is, in every caſe, faulty, becauſe it corrupts and hinders us from diſcerning truth, ſo it is in a ſingular manner repugnant to friendſhip: for it deſtroys truth, without which the bare name of friendſhip will ſignify little.

Now ſince the power of friendſhip conſiſts in forming, as it were, ſeveral minds into one; how can this be done, where

" not ſo much to pleaſe ourſelves, as for his own advantage. " The reproaches therefore of a friend ſhould always be ſtrictly " juſt, and not too frequent. The violent deſire of pleaſing, " in the perſon reproved, may otherwiſe change into a deſpair " of doing it, while he finds himſelf cenſured for faults he is " not conſcious of. A mind that is ſoftened and humanized by " friendſhip cannot bear frequent reproaches; either it muſt " quite ſink under the oppreſſion, or abate conſiderably of the " value and eſteem it had for him who beſtows them."

every

every particular perſon has not always one and the ſame mind, but is fickle, inconſtant, and double*? For can any thing be ſo wavering and unnaturally pliant, as the mind of one who conforms not only to the ſentiments and deſires, but even the leaſt look and nod, of another?

Does he affirm a thing, or it deny?
I do the ſame; and ſtill, you're right, I cry.

As *Terence* † has it: but this he puts into the mouth of *Gnatho*, a paraſite; which kind of friends it would be the height of imprudence to have any connexion with. There are many, however, not unlike *Gnatho* in manners, though they may be much ſuperior to him in birth, fortune, and reputation. The flattering complaiſance of ſuch men is the more troubleſome, as their vanity is ſupported by the

* *Martial* has given us a fine deſcription of a friend of this ſtamp, in the following epigram:

Difficilis, facilis, jucundus, acerbus es idem,
Nec tecum poſſum vivere, nec ſine te.

† Eunuch, Act II. Sc. 2.

authority

authority due to their rank. But the cajoling friend may, with a little attention, be as eaſily diſtinguiſhed from a true one, as things counterfeit and painted from thoſe that are true and natural.

IX.

On OLD AGE.

EVERY* ſtage of life is a burthen to thoſe who have no fund of happineſs within themſelves: but they who derive all their felicity from this ſource, cannot poſſibly think any thing grievous, that proceeds from the ſtated order of nature. In which claſs old age may, in a ſpecial manner, be ranked: the attainment whereof is the univerſal wiſh of mankind; who make it no leſs the ſubject of complaint, when obtained. So great is the mutability of their folly and perverſeneſs. It has ſtolen upon us, ſay they, ſooner than we could have imagined. But then who obliged them to make a falſe computation? For what faſter, pray, does old age creep upon youth, than youth upon infancy? Again, what leſs burthenſome would old

* De Senectute, cap. 2.

age

age be, ſhould they live to eight hundred years, than it is at eighty? For the paſt part of life, however long that may be, can afford no ſatisfaction to comfort an old age ridiculous in itſelf.

Now * if it be true that you are charmed with my wiſdom, (and I wiſh it may be anſwerable to your good opinion, and the ſurname I bear!) it conſiſts in this, that I have followed nature, the beſt of guides; and obeyed her precepts, as I would thoſe of a God: nor is it probable, that after having acted the former parts of my life as I ought, nature ſhould, like a bad poet, quite neglect the laſt act of the piece. In a word, like the fruits of the earth arrived at full maturity, 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be a laſt period of life, that withers, as it were, and drops down of itſelf; which a wiſe man ought to bear with patience: for what elſe is it to wage war with the Gods, after the manner of the giants †, if it be not to reſiſt nature?

* He who ſpeaks here, and through the whole of this article, is *Cato* the elder: whoſe life is written by *Plutarch*.

† The giants are feigned by the poets to have been men of a monſtrous ſize. *Typhon*, the chief of them, according to *He-*

Upon

Upon ‖ ſerious examination, then, I find four cauſes why old age appears miſerable. The firſt is, that it diſqualifies us for buſineſs; the ſecond, that it enfeebles our bodies; the third, that it deprives us of all pleaſure; and the fourth, that it borders upon death. Let us examine then, if you pleaſe, what juſtice and weight there is in each of them.

Does * old age render us unfit for buſineſs? For what buſineſs, pray? Is it ſuch as requires the ſtrength and vigour of youth? Are there then no occupations proper for old age, that may be managed by the rational part of man, even though the body be weakly?

ſiod, was the ſon of *Tartarus* and *Terra:* But *Homer* will have him to be the ſon of *Juno* alone. His ſtature was ſo prodigious that he reached the eaſt with one hand, the weſt with the other, and the ſtars with his head. By this fable, the poets repreſent the winds: for as they blow from all parts of heaven, ſo in a ſtorm they agitate and drive the clouds with extreme violence; which gave riſe to the fable of the giants making war upon heaven.

‖ De Senectute, cap. 5.

* De Senectute, cap. 6.

To

To affirm that old age is incapable of buſineſs, is the ſame as to maintain that a pilot is of no uſe in navigation; becauſe, whilſt ſome mount the ſhrowds, others run on the deck, or work at the pump, he ſits quietly at the helm. An old man, indeed, cannot perform ſuch actions as requires youth; but he does what is much greater, as well as better. It is neither by ſtrength, ſwiftneſs, or agility of body, that affairs of great importance are tranſacted; but by prudence, authority, and good advice; which, far from being loſt, are even much improved, for the moſt part, by age. Unleſs, perhaps, you think that I, who have acted the part of a ſoldier, a tribune, a lieutenant-general, and a conſul, am now become wholly uſeleſs, becauſe I can no longer bear a part in all manner of warlike expeditions, as formerly. But then I inform the ſenate what is fit to be done, and after what manner.

Would you but conſult the accounts left us of foreign tranſactions, you will find that the greateſt ſtates have been ruined by young men; but ſupported and reſtored by

by the old. Thus, in a play of the poet *Nævius*, it is ſaid,

Sudden the fall of your once mighty ſtate!
Unfold, I pray, the cauſe of its dire fate.

The anſwer to which is chiefly what follows;

Its counſellors were men of no repute;
Or unfledg'd ſtriplings, that were fools to boot.

For raſhneſs is the true characteriſtic of youth, as prudence is of old age.

But memory decays. This may indeed be the caſe, if it is neglected, or naturally a bad one.

I * never heard, however, of an old man, that forgot where he had hid his treaſure. They eaſily remember all that nearly concerns them, as obligations entered into, their own debtors, or thoſe to whom they themſelves are indebted.

What ſhall we ſay of lawyers, prieſts, augurs, and philoſophers, who, though

* De Senectute, cap. 7.

advanced

advanced in years, have remembered a vaſt multiplicity of things? Old men never loſe their abilities, if diligence and application to ſtudy be not wanting: nor ſpeak I this of men of fame and renown only, but likewiſe of thoſe who live in a private and undiſturbed retirement. *Sophocles* continued to write plays to an extreme old age; and becauſe he ſeemed, for the ſake of ſtudy, to throw off all regards for his domeſtic affairs, he was ſued at law by his ſons; that, according to our own uſage of removing from the management of an eſtate ſuch fathers as are unfit for diſcharging that truſt to advantage, the judges might reſtrain him in the ſame manner, as being turned a dotard. On which the old man is ſaid to have read to his judges the play of *Oedipus Coloneus**, which happened to be in his hand, and had been but lately finiſhed: this done, he aſked his judges if that poem could be

* *Oedipus Coloneus*, or more clearly, *Oedipus retired to a hill.* There are two tragedies, written by *Sophocles*, called *Oedipus*; to diſtinguiſh which, the title of this one, here mentioned, comprehends the place where the ſcene is laid.

the

the work of one that had loſt his ſenſes; who unanimouſly ſtopped any farther proſecution againſt him.

I * could name old country gentlemen † in the *Sabine* territories, who are my friends and neighbours, and our own fellow-citizens, that were never abſent from their farms when any work of conſequence was to be done, as ſowing, reaping, and gathering the corn into barns. This, however, is no wiſe ſurprizing in them: for there are none ſo old, but think they may live a year. Nay, theſe very men take a great deal of pains about what they very well know can never be of any ſervice to themſelves.

His trees he plants, the future age to ſerve.

As our countryman *Statius* has it, in his *Synephebi* ‖. Now ſhould any one aſk an

* De Senectute, cap. 8.

† In the *French* it is *in the country*, in general: but the original has it, *in the country of the Sabines*. It was here that *Cato*, though born at *Tuſculum*, uſed to reſide and paſs his time, before he went to ſerve in the army, on ſome lands and poſſeſſions, which his father, according to *Plutarch* of *Amyot*, had left him.

‖ *Synephebi*, or *The young Companions*, was a *Greek* comedy of *Menander*, tranſlated, or rather imitated in *Latin* by *Cæci-*

old

old farmer for whom he plants, he will make no ſcruple to anſwer, for the immortal Gods, whoſe pleaſure it is that I ſhould not only receive theſe from my anceſtors, but likewiſe perpetuate them to poſterity.

At * preſent, indeed, I no more deſire the ſtrength of a young man, for that is the ſecond objection to old age, than I deſired that of a bull or elephant when young. Whatever ability a man poſſeſſes, he ought to make a good uſe of it, and in all his actions exert himſelf accordingly.

The want of bodily ſtrength, however, is more frequently owing to the vices of youth, than to old age itſelf. For intemperance and debauchery in the former render the body exhauſted and feeble before the latter arrives.

You † have heard, *Scipio*, I dare ſay,

lius, who is called *Statius* in the original. *Statius* is the name of a ſlave, and was a kind of nick-name given him on account of his former ſlavery.

* De Senectute, cap. 9.

† Ibid. cap. 10.

how

how *Maſiniſſa*, the dear friend of your anceſtors *, paſſes his time, who is now ninety years of age: if he begins a journey on foot, he can by no means be prevailed on to make uſe of a horſe; and if he ſets out on horſeback, he never alights: rain and cold, however tempeſtuous, cannot hinder him from going bare-headed: his body is abſolutely firm, and free from humours: in a word, he diſcharges all the duties and buſineſs incumbent on a king. Hence we ſee that exerciſe and temperance may tranſmit ſomething of our former vigour to old age.

I could never approve of the old proverb, ſo much in repute, that adviſes, if we would live to be old, to begin early to be ſo. As for my part, I had rather my

* We ſhall ſee hereafter, in *Scipio*'s dream, how intimate a friendſhip ſubſiſted between *Maſiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, and the family of the *Scipio's*. At the beginning of the ſecond Punic war, he had joined the *Carthaginians*; but one of his nephews being made priſoner, and ſet at liberty by *Scipio* the elder without any ranſom, he was ſo ſenſibly touched with this generoſity, that he declared himſelf wholly for the *Romans*. He was far from being uſeleſs to them, and for a reward of his ſervices they not only confirmed him in his own kingdom, but gave him ſome other lands, which they had taken from the *Carthaginians*.

old

old age be the ſhorter, than to act the old man before I really was ſo.

We * ought to hold out againſt old age with courage, and compenſate, by our diligence, for its inconveniencies. We ſhould ſtruggle with old age, as with a diſeaſe. The preſervation of health demands our utmoſt attention. In order to which, we ſhould uſe moderate exerciſe, and take ſo much meat and drink as is neceſſary to refreſh and recruit, and not to oppreſs, our ſtrength. Nor is the body alone to be cared for; much more concern ought to be taken about our mind, and rational part. For even theſe will be extinguiſhed by old age, unleſs, like a lamp, you feed them with oil. As to thoſe whom *Cæcilius* calls *old comic fools*, he means ſuch as were credulous, forgetful, and indolent; which are not properly the vices of old age, but rather the effects of lazineſs, inactivity, and ſluggiſhneſs.

As I approve of a youth that has ſomething of the old man in him, ſo I am no

* De Senectute, cap. 11.

leſs

leſs pleaſed with the old man that has ſomething of the youth. He that follows this rule may be old in body, but can never be ſo in mind.

Next * follows the third objection to old age, *viz.* that it has no reliſh for pleaſures. Excellent advantage of age, ſince it frees us from what is moſt blameable in youth!

For attend, ye beſt of youths, to what *Archytas* of *Tarentum* has ſaid on this ſubject, who was one of the greateſt and moſt renowned men that ever lived. I had it related to me when a young man at *Tarentum* with *Q. Fabius Maximus* †. Senſual pleaſure, ſaid he, is the moſt pernicious endowment that nature has beſtowed on mankind; for in order to gratify it, we give a looſe to our moſt inordinate paſſions, which carry all before them. Hence proceed treaſons againſt our

* De Senectute, cap. 12.

† *Cato*, in this dialogue on old age, chap. 5. tells on what occaſion, and character, he was at *Tarentum* with *Fabius* the Great, who was ſurnamed the *Temporiſer*.

country, the ſubverſion of ſtates, and clandeſtine conferences with the public enemy*: in ſhort, there is no crime ſo heinous, no villainy ſo baſe, which the luſt of pleaſure will not make people commit: as for rapes, adulteries, and ſuch-like baſe actions, it is to the inſinuating blandiſhments of pleaſure they are entirely owing. Again, though reaſon be the moſt excellent gift that nature, or rather ſome God, has beſtowed on man; yet nothing is ſuch an enemy to this divine preſent, this bleſſing of the Gods, as pleaſure: for there can be no room for temperance, where luſt bears an uncontrouled ſway; nor is it poſſible for virtue to have any reſidence, where pleaſure reigns. And in order to make this ſtill better underſtood, he bids us figure to ourſelves a man under the influence of as exquiſite pleaſure as the imagination can poſſibly conceive: there are none, he thinks, but will allow, that while this tranſport laſts, ſuch a man could not

* This is a ſatirical touch on what likewiſe happen'd at the ſiege of *Tarentum*, where *Fabius* had the addreſs to carry on an intrigue of gallantry, in order to ſerve his own purpoſes.

do

do one ſingle action with judgment, reaſon, or reflection. Wherefore nothing is ſo deteſtable and hurtful as pleaſure; becauſe, ſhould it prevail in any high degree, or conſiderable length of time, it would quite extinguiſh every ſpark of intellectual light in the ſoul *.

It † was admirably well anſwered by *Sophocles*, when aſked if he had any commerce with women now in his old days: *Heaven forbid*, ſays he. *No, I have with*

* Pleaſure, no leſs than our ideas, may be diſtinguiſh'd into that which is apprehended by means of our bodily ſenſes, and that which proceeds from reflexion. The former comprehends whatever is pleaſing to animal nature; the latter, whatever is agreeable to right reaſon. The one is limited to the correſpondence between external objects and our organs of ſenſation, the other unbounded as the univerſe. They differ alſo in degree; for on comparing the pleaſures of the palate and ſmell, or even thoſe ariſing from a fine proſpect or concert of muſic, with that we feel from the reflexion of having diſcharged the duties of an affectionate parent, of a grateful child, of a ſincere friend, of a generous patriot, in ſhort, of one who has acted as he ought both towards God and man; what a diſparity ſhall we find between them! How low and groveling the one! How exalted and rational the other! Beſides, ſenſual pleaſure is fleeting and momentary, but that of reflexion durable and laſting as our exiſtence. Now though old men loſe, in a great meaſure, the pleaſures of the former; yet they enjoy thoſe of the latter in a ſuperior degree to the young. So that, by remembring this diſtinction, the objection vaniſhes of courſe.

† De Senectute, cap. 14.

pleaſure made my eſcape from all deſires of this kind, as from a ſavage and furious tyrant.

There * remains a fourth objection, that renders our advanced ſtate of life full of anxiety and concern, *viz.* the approach of death; which cannot, in the nature of things, be far removed from old age. How wretched is the old man, who, in the whole courſe of his long life, has not learned that death is to be deſpiſed!

Beſides, who is there, though in the very flower of his youth, ſo infatuated, as to promiſe himſelf one ſingle day's exiſtence? And, indeed, this age is much more ſubject to mortal accidents, than ours. Young men fall into diſtempers more eaſily, are ſicker under them, and cured with greater difficulty. Hence few arrive at old age; which is one reaſon why mankind live not better and more prudently: for good ſenſe, underſtanding, and prudence, are only to be found in old men.

* De Senectute, cap. 19.

Ay,

Ay, but a youth may hope to live for a conſiderable time, which an old man cannot. Such hopes are folly: for what is more inconſiſtent with reaſon, than to hold uncertainties for certain, and falſehoods for truth? An old man, indeed, has nothing to hope for. But even in this reſpect he has the advantage of a young man, as having already obtained what the other only hopes to arrive at. The latter wiſhes to live long, the former hath actually done ſo.

However ſhort the duration of life, 'tis abundantly long if ſpent agreeably to the dictates of virtue and honour. But ſhould it be ſpun out longer, there is no more reaſon to be grieved on that account, than the huſbandmen have, when after the ſweet ſeaſon of ſpring is paſt, they ſee the ſummer and autumn advance. For the ſpring is a kind of emblem of youth, and expoſes to our view the buds of the future fruit; for the reaping and in-gathering of which the other ſeaſons are accommodated. Now the fruit of old age, as I have often obſerved, is the remembrance of our ma-

ny brave and virtuous actions in the former part of life.

All * men, however, cannot be *Scipio's* or *Maximus's*, to have their memories filled with ſieges of cities taken, with land and ſea engagements, with wars they had happily finiſhed, or triumphs they had been honoured with. But if life is ſpent in an eaſy, innocent, and genteel manner, old age will not fail to be calm and ſerene. Such was that of *Plato*, who, though he lived to be eighty-one years old, yet continued his ſtudies to the laſt. Such alſo was that of *Iſocrates*, who is ſaid to have writ the treatiſe called *Panathenaicon* † in the ninety-fourth year of his age, and to have lived five years afterwards. His preceptor *Leontinus Gorgias* lived no leſs than an hundred and ſeven, and yet never gave over his ſtudy and occupation. Being aſked, what pleaſure he could take in life at thoſe years: *I have no reaſon*, ſays he, *to complain of old age.*

* De Senectute, cap. 5.

† This is the title of a long diſcourſe in praiſe of the *Athenians*.

An

An anſwer truly excellent, and worthy of a learned man: for it is ignorant fools alone, who throw the blame of their own vices, and bad conduct, on old age. *Ennius* acted in another manner, who compares his own old age to that of a victorious race-horſe.

As the brave ſteed, who oft th'Olympic prize
has won,
Reſts from the glorious toil when feeble age
comes on.

X.

On DEATH.

WE * eſteem nothing to be an evil, that is the appointment of the immortal Gods, or of nature the common parent of all things. For we were not created and formed by chance, or at random: no, there certainly was ſome powerful being, that took care of the intereſts of mankind, and would never have given them exiſtence, or furniſhed them with the means of life, if, after having ſtruggled with the various misfortunes attending it, they were at laſt to be ſwallowed up by, that worſt of evils, everlaſting death †.

* Tuſcul. I. 49.

† According to the idea which the natural reaſon of the Pagans formed of a ſupreme being, they looked upon his character to be made up of infinite goodneſs alone. But religion teaches us, that the goodneſs of God is inſeparable from his juſtice; and as there are eternal rewards for good men, ſo there are eternal puniſhments for the wicked. Whence the certainty of a future ſtate is proved to a demonſtration; becauſe neceſſarily connected with the exiſtence of a good and juſt God, who will reward the virtuous, and puniſh the wicked. See p. 15.

Let

Let us rather account it a haven, or place of refuge, prepared for us; and oh that we could fly thither with full ſpread ſails! But ſhould we be detained by contrary winds, 'tis abſolutely certain, however, that we ſhall arrive at it, only ſomewhat later. Now how can that be a hardſhip to any one perſon, which all muſt neceſſarily undergo?

In * *India*, where a plurality of wives is allowed, when a huſband happens to die, they all make their appearance in a court of juſtice, and have a hot diſpute, which of them was moſt beloved by the deceaſed. She that gets the better is eſcorted thence by her friends, and joyfully mounts the funeral pile, to be placed beſide her huſband: whereas ſhe that is caſt, departs quite overwhelmed with grief. No cuſtom ſure could thus brave nature, which always maintains its ſuperiority.

Hence † then with theſe womaniſh complaints, that it is a great misfortune to die

* Tuſcul. V. 27. † Ibid I. 39.

before our time. I would aſk what time? Is it that of nature? But ſhe, indeed, has lent us life, as we do a ſum of money, only no certain day is fixed for the payment. What reaſon then to complain, if ſhe demands it at pleaſure; ſince it was on this condition you received it?

Such men as theſe think the death of a young boy ought to be born with patience; but ſhould an infant in the cradle happen to die, there is not the leaſt ground of complaint. And yet, in this laſt caſe, nature exacts her loan more rigorouſly than in the other. Ay, but ſay they, the latter had not as yet taſted the ſweetneſs of life; whereas the other had entertained very great expectations, and had even begun to enjoy them. In other matters, however, 'tis thought much preferable to receive a part, rather than none at all; and why not ſo with regard to life? Though it is a true enough obſervation of *Callimachus, that* Priam *wept much oftener than* Troïlus*.

* *Priam* having lived to be an old man, and ſuffered ſuch a number of misfortunes, muſt certainly have had many more occaſions to weep than *Troïlus* his ſon, who was ſlain by *Achilles* in the flower of his age.

On

On the other hand, the good fortune of thoſe who die of old age, is highly celebrated. For what reaſon? 'Tis my opinion, indeed, that was the life of old men protracted longer, it would be the moſt agreeable of all others: for certainly there is nothing yields a man more ſatisfaction than prudence; and though old age deprives us of other comforts, yet it is ſure to bring this one along with it.

But what age deſerves to be called long? Or is there any thing at all, which concerns man, that merits to be called ſo? Are we not hurried on from infancy to youth, and from youth to old age, which, purſuing inviſibly, overtakes us in the middle of our career, and before we are aware? But becauſe we have nothing beyond, we account it long. All theſe ſtages of life, in every individual, are ſaid to be either long or ſhort, only in regard to their ſtated and uſual length. *Ariſtotle* tells us, that on the banks of the river *Hypanis* *,

* A river of ancient *Sarmatia*, now called the *Bog*; which running through the eaſt part of *Poland*, falls into the *Pontus Euxinus*, or Black-Sea, to the north of the *Nieſter*.

which

which on the ſide of *Europe* falls into the Black-Sea, there are found certain inſects, which live but the ſpace of one day. Such of theſe therefore as die at the eighth hour *, arrive to a conſiderable age; but thoſe which die at ſun-ſet live to be decrepid; and the more ſo, if it happens to be one of the longeſt days in ſummer. Now our longeſt life, if compared with eternity, will be found to differ almoſt nothing from the ſhort duration of theſe inſects.

Though † death, by reaſon of many unforeſeen accidents, daily hangs over us; and cannot, conſidering the ſhortneſs of human life, be far remote; yet it never deters a wiſe man from conſulting the future welfare of his country and family, and intereſting himſelf for poſterity, of whom

* The eighth hour of the *Romans* anſwered nearly to our two o'clock in the afternoon: for they divided the day, *viz.* from ſun-riſing to ſun-ſet, into twelve hours; which though always equal among themſelves, yet varied in length according to the different ſeaſons of the year; and therefore could not correſpond exactly to our hours, except at the two equinoxes. Their night was divided after the ſame manner.

† Tuſcul. I. 38.

he

he ſhall have no knowledge. Wherefore ſhould one even believe the ſoul to be mortal, he may mind things of eternal conſequence, and that not from a deſire of glory, whereof he can have no ſenſe; but from a principle of virtue, which is neceſſarily attended by real glory, notwithſtanding he ſhould have no ſuch view.

But * certainly we ſuffer death with greateſt reſignation, when we can ſolace our dying minutes with reflections of ſelf-approbation. No man hath lived too ſhort a time, who has fully diſcharged the duties of an exalted virtue.

As † to the knowledge of the ſoul, if we be not perfectly ignorant of natural philoſophy, we cannot entertain a doubt, that it is abſolutely ſimple, free from all mixture, and no wiſe compounded, joined, or made up of different parts. Since this then is the caſe, ſurely it can neither be ſeparated nor divided, and conſequently

* Tuſcul. I. 45. † Ibid. 29.

muſt

muſt be immortal. For death is, as it were, the ſeparation, diviſion, and diſunion of thoſe parts, that formerly were ſome how united.

Induced by theſe, and the like reaſons, *Socrates* neither deſired an advocate to plead his cauſe, nor turned ſupplicant to his judges: but ſhewed a free and generous boldneſs, that proceeded from true greatneſs of ſoul, and not from pride. On the day of his death, he held a long diſcourſe on this very ſubject. Though he might have been eaſily reſcued from priſon ſome days before this happened, he refuſed to comply. Nay, when he was juſt going to lay hold of the deadly cup, he talked in ſuch a manner, as if he was not about to ſuffer a violent death, but to aſcend into heaven.

For thus he thought, and conſtantly maintained, that there are two different ways, and two oppoſite courſes, taken by ſouls at their departure from the body. Such as have polluted themſelves with the common vices of mankind, devoted their whole powers to the gratification of their luſts,

luſts, and ſtained their characters with private crimes, or been guilty of irreparable injuſtice againſt the ſtate, follow a by-path, directly oppoſite to that which leads to the manſions of the Gods. But they, on the contrary, who have preſerved their innocence and purity entire, kept themſelves as free as poſſible from the contagion of bodies, acted always as diſtinct from them, and though united to human bodies, have imitated the life of the Gods; theſe, I ſay, have an eaſy return to the immortal beings, from whom they came.

I * can, by no means, aſſent to thoſe † who have lately attempted to prove that the ſoul periſhes with the body, and that the whole of man is abſorbed by death. The authority of the ancients, and of our own anceſtors, is of more weight with me, who have ordained ſacred rites to be performed for the dead; which certainly they

* De Amicitia, cap. 4.

† The *Epicureans*. *Cicero*, in his dialogue on *friendſhip*, makes *Lælius* ſpeak in this manner, in regard of whom *Epicurus* was only a modern. *Lælius* was born about thirty or forty years after the death of *Epicurus*.

would

would never have done, had they believed that the dead are no wiſe intereſted in them. I likewiſe prefer the opinion of thoſe, who formerly taught their doctrines in that part of our own country called the *Greater Greece* *, which though now deſtroyed, was then a flouriſhing ſtate: or the ſentiments of him †, who was declared the wiſeſt of men by the oracle of *Apollo*. However undetermined he might be in other matters, yet he never fail'd to aſſert, that our ſouls are of a divine nature; and that, on leaving the body, they return to heaven, and have a paſſage thither, ſo much the more expeditious as they themſelves have been good and upright.

The ‖ *whole life of philoſophers*, ſays *Socrates*, *is one continued meditation on death*. For what elſe do we, when we call off our attention from ſenſual pleaſure, and all do-

* They called that part of *Italy* the *Greater Greece*, which now makes the kingdom of *Naples*. It was in it that *Pythagoras*, the firſt who aſſumed the name of *Philoſopher*, taught his doctrine in the reign of *Tarquin* the proud.

† *Socrates.* ‖ Tuſcul. I. 31.

meſtic

meſtic concerns, thoſe ſervants of the body; when we detach our mind from public buſineſs, and every kind of embarraſſment? What is this, I ſay, but to call the ſoul home, to make it keep company with itſelf, and draw it off from the body as far as poſſible? Now to abſtract the ſoul from the body, is nothing elſe, but to learn to die.

We ought therefore, take my word upon it, ſeriouſly to conſider this, that by diſuniting ourſelves from bodies, we may render death familiar to us. By which means, we ſhall lead a heavenly life, even while on earth; and when the ſoul is freed from theſe fetters, her flight will be the more ſpeedy.

Whether * it be better to live or die, is only known to the immortal Gods: for no man, I verily believe, has any certain knowledge of the matter.

* Tuſcul. I. 41.

XI. SCIPIO's

XI.

SCIPIO's DREAM.

AS * ſoon as I arrived in *Africa*, in quality of tribune † of the fourth legion, as you know, to *M. Manilius* the conſul, I was above all things ſolicitous to wait upon king *Maſiniſſa* ‖; who, for very good reaſons, was moſt ſteadily attached to our family.

When I came into his preſence, the good old prince embraced me with ſuch tenderneſs as drew tears from his eyes; and after a ſhort pauſe, looking up to heaven, Sovereign ſun, ſays he, and all ye other

* Fragm. lib. vi. de rep. cap. 1. It is *Scipio* that ſpeaks; but as the whole diſcourſe concerns another *Scipio*, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them well from one another. They both had the ſurname of *Africanus*. He that ſpeaks here was the ſon of *Paulus Emilius*, and has been mentioned already.

† *Tribune*, an officer in the *Roman* army, who commanded a diviſion of a legion; and not unlike our *Colonel*, and the *French Meſtre de camp*. There were ſix of them in every legion.

‖ *Maſiniſſa* king of *Numidia*, of whom we have ſpoken already. See p. 143.

heavenly

heavenly powers, I thank you, that before departing this life, I here behold in my own kingdom, and under this roof, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, whoſe very name inſpires me with freſh vigour; ſo deeply rooted in my mind is the memory of that beſt and moſt invincible of men!

After this I enquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom: he, on the other hand, queſtioned me about the ſtate of our republic; and in this kind of converſation we paſſed away the day. Towards evening, being entertained in a manner worthy the magnificence of a king, we carried on our diſcourſe for a conſiderable part of the night: all which time the good old king ſpoke of nothing but *Africanus**,

* I ſay *Africanus* by way of diſtinction, that the *Scipio* here meant may not be confounded with another of that name, whom I ſhall mention by and by. This *Africanus*, after a great many other exploits, carried the war into *Africa*; where proving victorious againſt *Aſdrubal* and *Annibal*, he obliged *Carthage* to demand peace, on which account he was ſurnamed *Africanus*. He was the firſt of the *Romans*, that was honoured with a ſurname derived from his conqueſts. But afterwards a great many other generals had their pride flattered with the like titles, without having either the virtues, or ſucceſs, of *Scipio*. "In imitation "of him, ſays *Livy*, thoſe who were by no means comparable "to him for victories, tranſmitted titles of renown and honour-"able ſurnames to their family."

whoſe

whoſe actions, and even remarkable ſayings, he remembered diſtinctly. At laſt, when we retired to bed, I fell into a more profound ſleep than uſual, both on account of my journey, and becauſe I had ſat up a great part of the night.

Here I had the following dream, occaſioned, as I verily believe, by our preceding converſation; for it commonly happens that the thoughts and diſcourſe which employ us in the day time, produce in our ſleep a ſomewhat ſimilar effect to that which *Ennius* writes happened to him about *Homer*; of whom, in his waking hours, he uſed frequently to think and ſpeak. *Africanus*, I thought, appeared to me in a ſhape, with which I was better acquainted from his picture, than any perſonal knowledge of him *. When I perceived it was he, I confeſs I trembled with conſternation: but he addreſſed me, ſaying, Take courage, my *Scipio*, be not afraid,

* Though the original ſeems to ſay, *leſs for having ſeen himſelf, than for having ſeen his picture*; yet this muſt not be taken in a ſtrict ſenſe, for *Sigonius* aſſures us that the young *Scipio Africanus*, the perſon who ſpeaks in this place, was born the ſame year, and what is more, the ſame day, that the other died.

and

and carefully remember what I ſhall ſay to you.

Do † you ſee that city, (pointing to *Carthage* from a bright and glorious place of the firmament, that was all ſtudded with ſtars) which though brought under the *Roman* yoke by me, is now renewing the former wars, and cannot live in peace? 'Tis to attack it you are this day arrived, in a ſtation not much ſuperior to that of a private ſoldier. Before two years, however, are elapſed, you ſhall be conſul, and compleat its overthrow; whence you ſhall obtain, by your own merit, the ſurname of *Africanus*, which as yet belongs to you no otherwiſe than as derived from me.

After the deſtruction of *Carthage*, you ſhall receive the honour of a triumph, be advanced to the cenſorſhip, and, in quality of legate, viſit *Egypt*, *Syria*, *Aſia* and *Greece*: you ſhall be elected a ſecond time conſul, in your abſence*; and by utterly

† Fragm. lib. iv. de rep. cap. 2.

* In the text it is, *deligere iterum conſul abſens*. But the authority of *Valerius Maximus*, VIII. 15. does not permit the word *abſens* to be taken literally. It does not mean that *Scipio* was abſent from *Rome* the day on which the conſuls were to be elected;

deſtroy-

deſtroying *Numantia*, put an end to a moſt dangerous war.

But on entering the Capitol in your triumphal car, you ſhall find the republic all in a ferment through the intrigues of my grandſon *. 'Tis on this occaſion, my dear *Africanus*, that you muſt ſhow your country the greatneſs of your underſtanding, capacity, and prudence.

The deſtiny, however, of that time, appears uncertain, as it were, which way it ſhall take: for when your age ſhall have accompliſhed eight times ſeven revolutions of the ſun, and your fatal hours ſhall be marked out by the natural product of theſe two numbers †, each whereof is eſteemed a perfect one, but for different reaſons ‖;

but as he did not appear in the *Campus Martius*, dreſſed in a white robe, according to the cuſtom of thoſe that ſtood candidates for the conſulſhip, it was the ſame thing as if he had been really abſent.

* *Tiberius Gracchus*, who being tribune, excited the people to revolt againſt the ſenate. His mother, the illuſtrious *Cornelia*, was a daughter of the elder *Scipio*; and was the ornament of her age for wit, and the glory of her ſex for virtue.

† Fifty-ſix years. He actually died at this age; and not without the ſuſpicion of having been poiſon'd by his wife, who was the ſiſter of *Tiberius Gracchus*.

‖ What, pray, can theſe reaſons be? If they are thoſe mentioned by *Macrobius*, in his commentary on *Scipio*'s dream, they then

then ſhall the whole city have recourſe to you alone, and place their hopes in your auſpicious name; on you the ſenate, all good citizens, the allies, and people of *Latium*, ſhall caſt their eyes; on you the preſervation of the ſtate ſhall entirely depend; in a word, if you eſcape the impious machinations of your relations, you muſt, in quality of dictator, eſtabliſh order and tranquillity in the commonwealth.

Here *Lælius* * wept bitterly, and the reſt of the company gave vent to their ſorrow by deep groans; on which *Scipio*, with a gentle ſmile, ſays, "pray gentlemen don't wake me out of my dream, "have patience†, and hear the reſt.".

deſerve only to be conſidered as the chimeras of a wild imagination; and being of no manner of uſe to us, don't merit to be explained.

* *Lælius*, whoſe intimate connexion with *Scipio* is ſo well known from the dialogue on *Friendſhip*, was one of the interlocutors in the dialogue on a *Commonwealth*, of which *Scipio*'s dream is the concluſion. As to the other interlocutors, their names may be ſeen in the epiſtles to *Atticus*, IV. 16.

† It is plain that in the words, *& parum rebus*, there is ſomething either altered, or omitted. Concerning which the critics have propoſed different conjectures, none of which has all the evidence that could be wiſhed.

Now

Now * in order to encourage you, my dear *Africanus*, to defend the ſtate with the greater chearfulneſs, be aſſured, that for all thoſe who have any wiſe conduced to the preſervation, defence, or inlargement of their native country, there is a certain place in heaven, where they ſhall enjoy an eternity of happineſs: for nothing on earth is more agreeable to God, the ſupreme governor of the univerſe, than the aſſemblies and ſocieties of men united together by laws, which are called ſtates: it is from heaven their governors and defenders came, and thither they return.

Though at theſe words I was extremely troubled, not ſo much for fear of death, as at the perfidy of my own relations; yet I recollected myſelf enough to enquire, whether he himſelf, my father *Paulus*, and others, whom we looked upon as dead, really enjoyed life.

Yes truly, replied he, they alone enjoy life, who have eſcaped from the body, as from a priſon; but as to what we call life, 'tis no more than a ſtate of death. Nay

* Fragm. lib. iv. de rep. cap. 3.

ſee,

ſee, here comes your father *Paulus** towards you.

As ſoon as I obſerved him, my eyes burſt out into a flood of tears; but he took me into his arms, embraced me, and bid me not to weep. No ſooner were my firſt tranſports ſubſided, and I had regained the liberty of ſpeech, than I addreſſed my father thus, Thou beſt and moſt venerable of parents, ſince this, as I am informed by *Africanus*, is the only ſubſtantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haſte to come hither where you are?

That, replied he, is impoſſible: for unleſs the God, whoſe temple is all that vaſt expanſe you behold, ſhall free you from the fetters of the body, you can have no admiſſion into this place. Mankind have received their being on this very condition, that they ſhould labour for the preſervation of that globe, which is ſituate, as you ſee, in the middle of this temple †, and

* *Paulus Emilius*, ſurnamed *Macedonicus*, as having overcome *Perſeus* king of *Macedon*, and reduced his kingdom into the form of a *Roman* province.

† *Viz.* of the world. We have already remarked that *Cicero* follows the *Ptolemaic* ſyſtem of the world. See p. 7.

is called earth. They are likewiſe endowed with a ſoul, which is a portion of the eternal fires, that you call ſtars and conſtellations; and theſe being round ſpherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their revolutions with amazing rapidity. 'Tis therefore your duty, my *Publius*, and that of all who have any veneration for the Gods, to preſerve the union of your ſoul and body; nor without the expreſs command of him who gave you a ſoul, ſhould the leaſt thought be entertained of quitting human life, leſt you ſeem to deſert the poſt aſſigned you by God himſelf. Follow the examples of your grandfather here, and of me your father, in paying a ſtrict regard to juſtice and piety; the influence of which towards parents and relations is great indeed, but that to our country greateſt of all. Such a life as this is the true way to heaven, and to the company of thoſe, who after having lived on earth, and been diſunited from body, inhabit the place you now behold.

Now

Now * it was that ſhining circle or zone, whoſe remarkable brightneſs diſtinguiſhes it among the conſtellations; and which, after the *Greeks*, you call the *milky orb* †:

From which, as I took a view of the univerſe, every thing appeared beautiful and admirable: for there, not only thoſe ſtars were to be ſeen, that are never viſible from this globe ‡; but all of them of ſuch magnitude as we could not have imagined. The leaſt of all the ſtars was that removed fartheſt from the heavens, and ſituate neareſt the earth; which ſhone with a borrowed light. Now the globes of the ſtars far ſurpaſſed ‖ the magnitude of our earth;

* Here *Scipio* begins to ſpeak, and 'tis not known what became of his father afterwards.

† Hence its appellation, among us, of the *milky way*; which is a vaſt collection of ſtars, that by their nearneſs and arrangement, trace a kind of road in the heavens. See the different opinions of the ancients on this ſubject, in a work aſcribed to *Plutarch, de placit. philoſ.* III. 1.

‡ There are ſtars ſo remote, that 'tis impoſſible to diſcern them with the eye. As a proof hereof we need only mention the modern invention of teleſcopes, by the aſſiſtance of which a great many ſtars have been diſcovered, that were not known to the ancients.

‖ One cannot preciſely determine what the magnitude of a ſtar is. To judge of it by the help of optics, its exact diſtance from

which at that diſtance appeared ſo exceeding ſmall, that I could not but be ſenſibly affected on ſeeing our whole empire no larger, than if we only touched the earth, as it were, in a ſingle point.

As * I continued to obſerve the earth with ſtill greater attention, how long I pray, ſays *Africanus*, will your mind be fixed on that object? Why don't you rather take a view of the magnificent temples whither you are arrived? The univerſe is compoſed of nine circles, or rather ſpheres†, the uppermoſt of which is this celeſtial one, that comprehends all the reſt, and where the ſupreme God reſides, who bounds and contains the whole. In it are

the earth muſt be known. The learned Mr. *Huygens*, in his *Coſmotheoros*, pretends that a cannon-ball would be about 70,000 years in reaching the fixed ſtars; and he ſuppoſes that the ſaid ball, moving always with the ſame velocity, paſſes over about 100 fathoms in a ſecond of time. Whence it will move 360,000 fathoms in an hour; ſo that the whole diſtance of the fixed ſtars, according to the above ſuppoſition, will be 220,752,000,000,000 fathoms, or 250,854,545,454, and a half miles.

* Cap. 4.

† The beſt commentary to explain this paſſage, is to have an armillary ſphere to look at.

fixed

fixed thoſe ſtars, which revolve with never-varying courſes. Below this are ſeven other ſpheres, which move backwards, or with a contrary motion to that of the heavens: one of theſe is taken up by the globe, which the inhabitants of the earth call *Saturn*. Next to that is the ſtar of *Jupiter*, ſo benign and ſalutary to mankind. The third in order is that fiery and terrible planet, called *Mars*. Below this again, almoſt in the middle region, is the ſun, that leader, governor, and prince of the other luminaries, that mind and temperament of the world, whoſe bulk is ſo vaſtly great, that he fills and enlightens all things with his rays. Then follow *Venus* and *Mercury*, that attend, as it were, on the ſun. Laſtly, the moon, which ſhines only by the reflected rays of the ſun, moves in the loweſt ſphere of all: below which, if we except that gift of the Gods, human ſouls, every thing is mortal, and tends to diſſolution; but above it all is eternal*.

* It may be concluded from this paſſage, that *Cicero* was not for a plurality of peopled worlds; for if all things above the moon be free from corruption, there can be no generation, and conſequently no animals. As to the moon herſelf, ſeveral of the ancients believed ſhe was inhabited like the earth. See *Acad.* II. 39.

For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the centre, is immoveable, and to it all heavy bodies naturally tend, as being the loweſt place in the univerſe.

After * recovering myſelf from the amazement, occaſioned by ſuch a wonderful proſpect, I thus beſpoke *Africanus*. What, pray, is this ſound, that ſtrikes my ears in ſo loud and agreeable a manner? To which he replied, it is that produced by the impulſe and motion of the ſpheres; and being formed by unequal intervals †, (but

* Cap. 5.

† I am indebted, ſays the *Abbé d'Olivet*, for this and the following remark, to M. *Burette*; whom I have conſulted on this ſubject, as being better acquainted with the muſic of the ancients, than any other of our learned men.

" *Cicero*, agreeably to the imaginary ſyſtem of *Pythagoras*, compares in this place the motions of the ſeven planets, and the orb of the fixed ſtars, which makes up the number of eight, to the vibratory motions of eight ſtrings, which compoſed the ancient inſtrument called *Octachord*, that was formed of two ſeparate *Tetrachords*, or of eight ſtrings in all, which, in the Diatonic ſyſtem of muſic, gave the following eight ſounds of our muſic, *mi, fa, ſol, la, ſi, ut, re, mi*; ſo that the moon, as being the loweſt of the planets, correſponds to *mi*, the greateſt of the eight ſounds; *Mercury*, to *fa*; *Venus*, to *ſol*; the *Sun*, to *la*; *Mars*, to *ſi*; *Jupiter*, to *ut*; *Saturn*, to *re*; and the orb of the fixed ſtars, as being the higheſt of all, to *mi*, which is the acuteſt

ſuch,

ſuch, however, as are divided according to the juſteſt proportion) it produces, by duly tempering acute with grave ſounds, various concerts of muſic. For it is impoſſible that motions ſo great ſhould be performed without any noiſe; and it is agreeable to nature, that the extreams on the one ſide ſhould produce ſharp, and on the other flat, ſounds. For which reaſon the ſphere of the fixed ſtars being higheſt, and carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a ſhrill and acute ſound: whereas that of the moon being loweſt, moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes the ninth ſphere, it remains immoveably fixed in the middle or loweſt part of the world. Now the revolutions of theſe eight orbs, every two of which have the ſame force *, give ſeven diſtinct

" ſound, and makes an octave with the graveſt. Theſe eight " ſounds, then, are ſeparated by eight intervals, according to cer- " tain proportions; ſo that from *mi* to *fa*, is an hemitone; from " *mi* to *ſol*, a third minor; from *mi* to *la*, a fourth; from *mi* to *ſi*, " a fifth; from *mi* to *ut*, a ſixth minor; and from *mi* to *re*, a " ſeventh minor; which together with the octave make ſeven " conſonances in all."

* " *Cicero* ſays, *illi autem octo curſus, in quibus eadem vis eſt duo-* " *rum*, &c. On which we remark, that the two words, *eadem vis*,

ſounds; which number is the meaſure of almoſt all things in the world.

This celeſtial harmony has been imitated by learned muſicians*, both on ſtringed

" may be taken in two different ſenſes, either for the revolutions " of two ſtars, the inequality of which is ſo ſmall, that they may " well enough correſpond to the vibrations of two ſtrings of the " octachord tuned uniſons; or for the revolutions of two ſtars, one " of which is twice as rapid as the other, whereby it reſembles the " vibrations of the two extream ſtrings of the octachord, or thoſe " marked *mi*, that are at the interval of an octave from each " other. It is in this laſt ſenſe that the *Latin* phraſe *eadem vis* " *eſt duorum*, ought to be taken; and thus it is in the edition of " *Grævius*, agreeable to what is found in ſeveral manuſcripts. In " this caſe, all the principal conſonances are taken into the com- " pariſon; whereas if *Mercurii & Veneris* be added to the *eadem* " *vis eſt duorum*, as may be ſeen in ſome editions, ſupported like- " wiſe by the authority of ſome manuſcripts, we muſt give it the " firſt ſenſe, by cauſing the octave to make way for the uniſon, " which is not a conſonance. In fact, if this was the caſe, the " ſphere of the fixed ſtars would not be an octave to that of the " moon, but only a ſeventh to it; becauſe, ſay ſome interpreters, " *Mercury* and *Venus* being almoſt uniſons on account of the incon- " ſiderableneſs of the inequality of their revolutions, they muſt " both of them be only about a hemitone from the moon; and " conſequently the ſyſtem of the ſtars would anſwer, not to an " octachord, but to an heptachord, or an inſtrument with ſeven " ſtrings, compoſed of ſix conſonances, or intervals, and wholly " deſtitute of the octave, which nevertheleſs is one of the prin- " cipal conſonances, and the complement, as it were, of the " harmoniac ſyſtem. This has made ſome people conjecture, that " the words *Mercurii & Veneris* may be only a gloſs, which, tho' " at firſt only written in the margin, might afterwards have " crept into the text.".

* *Amphion, Linus, Orpheus*, &c.

inſtru-

inſtruments and with the voice; whereby they have opened themſelves a way to return hither: as have likewiſe many others, who have employed their ſublime genius, while on earth, in cultivating the divine ſciences.

By the ſtupifying noiſe of this ſound, the ears of mankind have been rendered deaf; and, indeed, hearing is the dulleſt of all the human ſenſes. Thus the people who inhabit near the cataracts of the *Nile*, are by the exceſſive roar which that river makes in precipitating itſelf from thoſe vaſtly high mountains, entirely deprived of the ſenſe of hearing. Now ſo inconceivably great is the ſound produced by the rapid motion of the whole univerſe, that the human ear is no more capable of receiving it, than the eye is able to look ſtedfaſtly and directly on the ſun, whoſe beams eaſily dazzle the ſtrongeſt ſight.

While * I was buſied in admiring this ſcene of wonders, I could not help caſting

* Cap. 6.

my eyes every now and then upon the earth. On which, ſays *Africanus*, I perceive you are ſtill taken up in contemplating the ſeat of mankind: now if it appears to you ſo ſmall as in fact it really is, deſpiſe its vanities, and fix your attention for ever on theſe heavenly objects. Is it poſſible you ſhould attain any human applauſe, or glory, that is worth the contending for? The earth, you ſee, is peopled but in very few places, and thoſe too of ſmall extent; ſo that they appear like ſo many ſpots, as it were, ſcattered through vaſt uncultivated deſarts: its inhabitants are not only ſo remote from each other, as to cut off all mutual correſpondence; but their ſituation being either oblique, on contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps diametrically oppoſite to yours, all expectations of univerſal fame muſt fall to the ground. You may likewiſe obſerve that the ſame globe of the earth is girt and ſurrounded, as it were, with certain zones; whereof thoſe two which are moſt remote from each other, and lie under the oppoſite poles of heaven, are congealed with froſt; but that one in the

the middle, which is by far the largeſt, is ſcorched with the intenſe heat of the ſun. The other two only are habitable*, one towards the ſouth, the inhabitants of which are your Antipodes, with whom you have no connexion: the other towards the north is that you inhabit, whereof a very ſmall part, as you may ſee, falls to your ſhare. For the whole extent of what you poſſeſs is but a ſmall iſland, narrow at both ends and wide towards the middle, which is ſurrounded by the ſea, called on earth the Atlantic, the Great Sea, and the Ocean. You cannot but remark how exceeding ſmall it is, notwithſtanding its pompous titles. Now I would aſk if it be poſſible for your fame, or that of any other *Roman*, to be carried from theſe known and cultivated parts of the earth, over mount

* Virgil, Georg. I. 233; Ovid, Metam. I. 49; Pliny, II. 69; in a word, all the ancients were perſuaded that only two of the five zones were inhabited, or even habitable. Their ignorance in this reſpect would ceaſe to occaſion our ſurpriſe, did we but reflect that even at this day, and notwithſtanding the great helps we draw from commerce and navigation, we are far from knowing all the countries that are inhabited. Diſcoveries of this ſort are the work of time and chance, and not of human wit. See *Remark*, p. 7.

Cauca-

*Caucaſus** yonder, or croſs the *Ganges*†? Who in the remoteſt places of the eaſt and weſt, or thoſe of the north and ſouth, ſhall hear your name ſo much as mentioned? And if theſe are left out of the account, you ſee within what ſcanty bounds your ambition would exert itſelf.

Now ‖ as to thoſe very perſons who ſhall ſpeak of you, how long, pray, will they do it? Beſides, allowing that the ſucceeding generations of men were deſirous to tranſmit down to poſterity the fine things they have heard their fathers tell of us; yet by reaſon of inundations and conflagrations, which muſt unavoidably happen at certain periods, 'tis impoſſible our reputation ſhould be of any conſiderable, much leſs of an eternal duration.

Again, what great matter is it, to have your praiſe celebrated by thoſe who come after you; when they that preceded, whoſe

* *Caucaſus*, a mountain of *Colchis*, towards the mouth of the river *Phaſis*.

† *Ganges*, a river of the *Eaſt-Indies*.

‖ Cap. 7.

number

number was not perhaps leſs, and merit certainly greater, were not ſo much as acquainted with your name?

And the more ſo, that not one of thoſe who ſhall hear of us, is able to retain in his memory the tranſactions of one year. The bulk of mankind, indeed, meaſure their year by the return of the ſun, which is only one ſtar; but the true and compleat year is when all the ſtars ſhall have returned to the place whence they ſet out, and after long periods ſhall have again exhibited the ſame aſpect of the whole heavens: and, indeed, I ſcarcely dare attempt to enumerate the vaſt multitude of ages contained in it. For as the ſun was eclipſed, and ſeemed to be extinguiſhed, at the time when the ſoul of *Romulus* penetrated into theſe eternal manſions; ſo when all the conſtellations and ſtars ſhall revert to their primary poſition, and the ſun ſhall at the ſame point, and time, be again eclipſed, the grand year ſhall then be compleated. Be aſſured, however, that the twentieth * part of it is not yet elapſed.

* By ſuppoſing the date of this dream to be in the year of the conſulſhip of *Manilius*, and that *Romulus*, according to F. *Petau*,

Now

Now had you no hopes of returning to this place, where great and good men enjoy all that their ſouls could wiſh; of what, pray, would be the ſignification of all human glory, which can hardly endure for a ſmall portion of one year * ?

Wherefore if you deſire to entertain exalted expectations, and keep in view this eternal place of reſidence; let not the diſcourſe of the vulgar make any impreſſion upon you, nor place your utmoſt hopes in human rewards: virtue alone, by her own proper charms, ought to allure you to true honour. What others ſhall talk of you, for talk they will, is their concern. All diſcourſe, however, of this nature is confined within the narrow limits of the countries you now behold; with regard to every man they are but of ſhort duration, decreaſe in proportion as the preſent gene-

died in the 38th year of *Rome*, there are 568 years between them; and ſince this ſpace of time does not make the twentieth part of a grand year, it juſtifies what is reported of *Cicero* in the dialogue *de Cauſis corr. Eloq. cap.* 16. that according to him this grand year is not compleated till 12854 years.

* How agreeable are the ſentiments of this great philoſopher to the doctrines of Chriſtianity! The apoſtle *Peter* tells us, that

ration

ration die, and are quite forgotten by poſterity.

After * theſe words, I thus addreſſed *Africanus*. Though from my infancy I have cloſely followed my father's and your illuſtrious example, and never degenerated from it; yet ſince all thoſe who have deſerved well of their country have free admiſſion into heaven, I ſhall redouble my efforts, now that I have the proſpect of ſo ample a reward.

Do ſo, replied he, and be aſſured that nothing of you, except the body, is mortal. For it is not this external form, or figure, that falls under the notice of our ſenſes, which conſtitutes your being; 'tis the ſoul, and not the body, that makes the real man. Know then that you are a

all the glory of man is as the flower of graſs; and St. *Paul* deſires the *Coloſſians to ſet their affection on things above, not on things on the earth*. This is an ambition more than heroic. To aſpire after eternal happineſs, purifies the ſoul from every low paſſion, and exalts it to a pitch above the herd of mankind: and yet we ſee an heathen animated with this divine ambition. A thought which ſhould make worldlings bluſh, who aſſume to themſelves the ſacred title of Chriſtians!

† Cap. 8.

God,

God, if he can be ſaid to poſſeſs divinity, who has life, intelligence, memory, and foreſight in himſelf; and who rules, governs, and moves the body allotted him, as the ſupreme God does the univerſe: and as God, who is eternal, gives motion to the world, which is in part mortal*; ſo the immortal ſoul moves the body, that is ſubject to corruption.

For whatever is always in motion, is eternal; but that which communicates motion to another, and is itſelf impelled by ſome external agent, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe to live, when the motion ceaſes. That therefore alone, which moves itſelf, can never ceaſe to move, becauſe it is never deſerted by itſelf†. Beſides, ſuch a mo-

* All the ancients believed the univerſe incorruptible, as to its matter; that is, they were perſuaded that the matter of which it is compoſed could not be annihilated. But the greater part of them, and eſpecially the Stoics, were of opinion, that it was corruptible and periſhable, with regard to its form.

† All the natural arguments, adduced to prove the immortality of the ſoul, may be reduced to the two following heads, *viz.* 1. The nature of the ſoul itſelf, its deſires, paſſions, ſenſe of moral good and evil, increaſe in knowledge and perfection, principle of ſelf-motion, *&c.* 2. The nature of God, as a wiſe, juſt, and good creator and governor of the world.

tion

tion muſt be the ſource and principle of all others whatever.

Now a principle has no origin: for from it all things are derived; yet is itſelf derived from nothing, otherwiſe it would be no principle. And if it has no beginning, it conſequently muſt have no end; becauſe being once extinct, it could neither be reproduced by another, or of itſelf give birth to any thing, ſince all things muſt neceſſarily ſpring from ſome principle.

Cicero, we find, draws the moſt of his arguments from the former of theſe topics; which, to men of a philoſophical turn, will appear perfectly concluſive, becauſe nature, or rather the God of nature, does nothing in vain. But arguments drawn from the latter head, are not only better adapted to convince men unacquainted with abſtract reaſoning, but equally certain and concluſive with the former: *Shall not the judge of all the earth do right*, is a queſtion which all mankind will reſolve in the affirmative. And therefore arguments drawn from the manifeſt and conſtant proſperity of the wicked, and the frequent unhappineſs of good men in this life, muſt convince every candid and thinking perſon, that there is a future ſtate wherein all will be ſet right, and God's attributes of wiſdom, juſtice, and goodneſs fully vindicated. Had the virtuous no hope of a future ſtate, *they would be of all men moſt miſerable*; but as this is abſolutely inconſiſtent with the character of God, the certainty of ſuch a ſtate is clear to a demonſtration.

Hence

Hence it is, that the principle of motion is in that Being, which moves by an intrinſic power of its own, and can neither have a beginning or end; otherwiſe the whole heavens would go to wreck, and all nature be at a ſtand, without a poſſibility of recovering any power, whereby ſhe might be ſet in motion, as at firſt.

Since *, then it is manifeſt, that whatever moves of itſelf is eternal; who can deny that the human ſoul is endowed with this power? For whatever being is ſet in motion by external impulſe, is inanimate, or without a ſoul. But an animated being is moved by a proper intrinſic motion of its own; for this power is natural and peculiar to the ſoul. And ſince it alone, of all other beings, moves itſelf, we may fairly conclude that it never had a beginning, and that it will continue for ever.

Let it then have full employment in matters of the higheſt importance; and ſuch are all efforts in defence of our coun-

* Cap. 9.

try.

try. The ſoul that exerciſes and exerts itſelf, in actions of this kind, will have a more ſpeedy flight to this bleſſed abode, its true home.

This it will do with ſtill greater ſwiftneſs, if even while ſhut up in the body, it free and abſtract itſelf as much as poſſible from the body, in order to contemplate external objects.

For the ſouls of thoſe who have devoted themſelves to, and become the ſlaves of, ſenſual pleaſures; and by blindly following the impulſe of ſuch paſſions as are ſubſervient to ſenſuality, have violated all laws divine and humane; ſuch ſouls as theſe, I ſay, are toſſed to and fro about the earth; nor do they return to this place, till after they have been tormented in this manner for many ages.

On this he withdrew, and I awoke from ſleep.

XII.

MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS.

HAD * nature formed us in ſuch a manner, as to be able, at firſt ſight, to diſcover and fully comprehend herſelf, and, under her infallible conduct, to regulate the whole affairs of life, there would have been no need of reaſon and inſtruction. But in fact, ſhe has only endowed us with faint glimmering ſparks; which by our immorality and depraved opinions are ſo extinguiſhed, that the light of nature no where appears. The ſeeds of virtue, 'tis true, are blended with our very conſtitution; and were they ſuffered to grow up to maturity, nature could not fail to lead us to happineſs. But as the caſe now ſtands, from our very firſt appearance in the world, we are conſtantly engaged in all manner of wickedneſs, and entertain

* Tuſcul. III. 1.

the

the moſt groſsly abſurd notions that can be imagined; ſo that we may be ſaid to ſuck in error with our nurſe's milk. When brought home to our parents, and placed under the care of preceptors, then it is we imbibe ſuch a variety of erroneous ſentiments, that truth gives place to falſhood, and nature herſelf yields to confirmed prejudice. To theſe the poets may be added; who, carrying a great ſhew of learning and wiſdom, are liſtened to, read, ſtudied, and imprinted, as it were, on our minds. Now if we add to all this the populace, which, though a multitude univerſally agreed in every thing that is wrong, is notwithſtanding the greateſt of all other directors of opinion; when this, I ſay, is taken into the account, no wonder if we loſe ſight of nature, and are quite bewildered in the moſt pernicious errors.

Be a pattern to others *, and then all will go well; for as a whole city is infected by

* De Legib. III. 13, 14. 'Tis to *Atticus Cicero* addreſſes himſelf.

the

the licentious paſſions and vices of great men, ſo it is likewiſe reformed by their moderation. *L. Lucullus*, a man of the firſt rank, being rallied for the magnificence of his ſeat at *Tuſculum*, is ſaid to have made the following extremely ſuitable anſwer; that he had two neighbours, the greater of whom was only a *Roman* knight*, and the other the ſon of one who had been once a ſlave: and as each of them had magnificent villa's, it could not be thought an extravagance in him, what was lawful for thoſe of inferior rank. Alas! *Lucullus*, you are not ſenſible, that it was you gave riſe to their ambition; were it not for your example, ſuch an action in them would be looked on as criminal. Who could bear that people of

* There were three orders, or ranks, of people among the *Romans*; the *Patrician*, which comprehends the Nobles; the *Equeſtrian*, that conſiſted only of Knights; and the *Plebeian*, or that of the Commons.

To be a knight, it was neceſſary they ſhould have a certain revenue, that their poverty might not diſgrace the order; and when they fell ſhort of the ſaid revenue, they were expunged out of the liſt of knights, and thruſt down among the Plebeians. Ten thouſand crowns is computed to have been the revenue required.

this

this ſort ſhould have their villa's crowded with ſtatues and pictures, relating either to public, or, what is more, to ſacred and religious ſubjects? Who would not join in demoliſhing the monuments of their vanity and pride, if thoſe who ought to exert themſelves on ſuch an occaſion, were not guilty of the ſame extravagance? For the miſchief neceſſarily attending the vices of the great, though that muſt be allowed to be very conſiderable, is but ſmall when compared with the ill conſequences, which ariſe from the multitude of thoſe who will certainly follow their example.

Would you but look into the hiſtory of former ages, you might plainly ſee, that the manners of the people were always regulated by thoſe of the leading men of a ſtate; and that whatever change took place in the latter, the ſame always happened in the former. Now this obſervation is much more certain than that of *Plato*, who pretends that a change in the ſongs of muſicians is able to alter the manners of a nation: whereas my opinion is, that the manners of mankind change with

with thoſe of their ſuperiors. Whence great men of a vicious life are doubly pernicious to the ſtate, as being not only guilty of immoral practices themſelves, but likewiſe the authors of ſpreading them among their fellow-citizens. The miſchief they do, is owing not only to their being debauched themſelves; but alſo to their debauching of others. In a word, they do more harm by their example, than by the crimes they commit.

Plato *, that prince of genius and learning, was of opinion that ſtates would never be happy, till either wiſe and learned men took the government upon them; or thoſe who governed applied themſelves to the ſtudy of wiſdom and knowledge. Such a conjunction of power and wiſdom, was, in his mind, abundantly capable of promoting the happineſs of public communities.

The † queſtion being put to *Socrates*, whether *Archelaus* the ſon of *Perdiccas*,

* Ad Q. Frat. I. ep. I. cap. 10.
† Tuſcul. V. 12.

who

who in the eſtimation of the world paſſed for the happieſt man alive, was, in his opinion, really ſo, or not. He replied, *I know nothing of the matter, for I never had any converſation with him.* What? Is there no other way of coming at the knowledge of it? *None at all.* Cannot you then poſitively ſay, whether the great king of *Perſia* himſelf be happy? *How ſhould I, who am ignorant how learned and virtuous he is?* Is it in this then you imagine the happineſs of life conſiſts? *Yes truly, it is my opinion, that the good only are happy, and the wicked miſerable.* Is *Archelaus* then unhappy? *Certainly, if he is unjuſt.*

What * greatly detracts from the magnificence and ſumptuouſneſs of entertainments is, that nature loves ſimplicity and plainneſs: for who does not perceive, that all things of this nature owe their reliſh to appetite? *Darius*, in his flight, being obliged to drink water, which was not

* Tuſcul. V. 34.

only muddy, but likewiſe ſtained with dead bodies, affirmed he never before had drank with ſuch pleaſure: for this plain reaſon, becauſe he never had done ſo when thirſty. Nor had *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, ever eaten with an appetite; but being on a progreſs through his dominions without his ordinary retinue about him, he happened to go into a cottage, where he met with no other entertainment than plain houſhold bread; which proved the ſweeteſt refreſhment he ever taſted.

Though * every branch of knowledge be attended with many difficulties, though ſuch the obſcurity which envelopes things themſelves, and ſo great the uncertainty of our determinations concerning them, that it was not without reaſon the moſt learned men of antiquity had little hopes of finding out the great object of their reſearches; yet they were not wanting on their part, nor ſhall we ſo far loſe courage, as to give

* Academic. II. 3. *Cicero* ſpeaks here of the Academics oppoſed to the Dogmatiſts; and were there nothing elſe, this paſſage alone is ſufficient to overturn the ſentiments of ſome moderns, who take the Academics for Pyrrhoniſts.

up

up our enquiries. Now the only deſign of theſe diſquiſitions, is by arguing on both ſides of the queſtion, to force, as it were, a diſcovery of the truth, or ſomething as near it as poſſible: nor is there any difference between us and thoſe who imagine they poſſeſs the knowledge of things, unleſs it be, that they are fully perſuaded of the truth of their opinions: whereas we hold many things to be only probable; which may very well ſerve to regulate our conduct, though we cannot poſitively ſay they are certain.

In this however we have greatly the advantage of them, as being more diſengaged, more unbiaſſed, and at full liberty to determine as our judgment ſhall direct. We lie under no obligation to maintain whatever ſentiments are preſcribed, and in a manner commanded.

As for others, they engage themſelves to one ſide, before they are able to judge which is beſt: and either take up with the opinions of a friend, at an age capable of nothing, or, charmed with the diſcourſe of the firſt perſon they hear, pretend to judge

of matters far above their knowledge; and to whatever ſect chance unites them, they embrace it as a man in a ſtorm would do the firſt rock he is thrown upon.

They reply, indeed, that they put ſuch an entire confidence in none but one they know to be a wiſe man; and this conduct of theirs ſhould have my approbation, were it poſſible for perſons void of all learning and education, to form ſuch a judgment: for it is certainly the chief characteriſtic of a wiſe man, to be able to determine who are ſo. But in order to this, they ought not only to have examined every circumſtance, but likewiſe to know the opinions of others; whereas they have given their judgment on a ſingle hearing, and ſheltered themſelves under the authority of one man. But the generality of mankind, I know not how, are fond of error, and rather ſtrenuouſly defend the opinion they have once embraced, than with candour and impartiality examine what ſentiments are moſt agreeable to truth.*.

* How ſimilar, alas! are the preſent times to thoſe of *Cicero!* We pretend, 'tis true, to have many advantages over former

* As the laws are above magiſtrates, ſo are the magiſtrates above the people: and it may truly be ſaid, that the magiſtrate is a ſpeaking law, and the law a ſilent magiſtrate.

There † are three things neceſſary to form a good ſenator: that he be always preſent; for when an aſſembly is numerous, it adds weight to their deliberations: that he ſpeak in his turn, that is, when the queſtion is put to him: that he do it in a becoming manner, and know when to leave off; for brevity is not only a merit in a ſenator, but even in an orator.

The ‡ more virtuous any man is, the more difficult is it for him to harbour a ſuſpicion that others are wicked.

ages; but where does this appear? If we know human nature better, how comes it that the ſame abſurd cuſtoms, and that with ſome aggravating circumſtances, ſtill prevail?

* De Legib. III. 1.

† De Legib. III. 18.

‡ Ad Q. Frat. I. ep. I. cap. 4.

It * is certainly no ſmall ſuperiority of nature and underſtanding, that, of all the animal world, man alone has any idea of order, decency, and a due mean neceſſary to be obſerved both in his words and actions. Hence with regard to the objects of ſight, he is the only animal which is ſenſible of their beauty, gracefulneſs, and ſymmetry of parts; and this ſimilitude of viſible things being by reaſon applied to the mind, he is convinced that beauty, conſtancy, and order ought much more to take place in our deſigns and actions: he is likewiſe careful to do nothing in an unbecoming and unmanly way: alſo, that his ſentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be free from the influence of all unruly paſſions.

Sp. † *Carvilius* being much lamed by a wound he had received in the ſervice of the commonwealth, was on that account aſhamed to appear in public: *My* Spurius,

* Offic. I. 4.

† De Orat. II. 62.

ſaid

ſaid his mother to him, *why don't you appear abroad, that every ſtep you take may remind you of your virtues?*

Cato * has left it on record, that the elder *Scipio*, who firſt had the ſurname of *Africanus*, was wont to ſay, *he was never leſs at leiſure, than when at leiſure; nor leſs alone, than when alone.* This excellent ſaying, and truly worthy of a great and wiſe man, plainly ſhews that he ſpent even the uſual times of relaxation in ſome valuable employment; and, in his retirement, uſed to converſe with himſelf; ſo that he was never idle, nor had always occaſion to be entertained by the converſation of others. Solitude, therefore, and leiſure, two things which render other men indolent, gave him new life and activity.

I † never accounted treaſures, ſplendid palaces, poſts of dignity and power, nor even the pleaſures of ſenſe, to which ſome

* Offic. III. 1.
† Parad. I. 1.

men are entirely devoted, among the number of things really good in themſelves, and worthy our purſuit; becauſe I obſerved, that they who poſſeſſed the largeſt ſhare of them, had by far the moſt craving appetite for more: for the thirſt of avarice is never quenched or ſatisfied; nor are perſons of this complexion only tormented with the pain of acquiring, but likewiſe that of loſing, their wealth. Tho' our anceſtors were, in this reſpect, men of the greateſt temperance, yet I am frequently at a loſs to account for their prudence, in giving the name of *Goods* to inſignificant and periſhing riches; when, in fact, they had very different ſentiments of them, as appears from their actions. Can a wicked man poſſeſs any thing that is good? Or, is it poſſible for one to have great plenty of things really good, and not be good himſelf? And yet we ſee all ſuch pretended goods preſſed into the ſervice of wicked men, to the prejudice of the good. Let therefore any perſon ridicule me that pleaſes, I ſhall always pay a greater regard to the dictates of right reaſon, than

to vulgar prejudices: I ſhall never ſay of one who has loſt his cattle or furniture, that he has loſt his goods; nor ſhall I be ſparing in my praiſes of *Bias*, one of the ſeven wiſe men; who, when his native country *Priene* * was taken by the enemy, being admoniſhed to imitate others that were betaking themſelves to flight, and carrying off a conſiderable part of their effects; *I do ſo*, replied he, *for I carry every thing that is mine about me.* He looked on whatever is the ſport of fortune, as no wiſe belonging to him; and yet we call them goods. Some will aſk, what then is good? I anſwer, that, in my opinion, nothing is good but what is agreeable to juſtice, honour, and virtue.

Firſt † of all, we ought to determine under what character, and in what ſtation, we are to appear in the world. To fix this point, is a matter of the utmoſt difficulty: for at our firſt entrance upon youth, a time when we are the leaſt capable of forming

* A city of *Ionia*, near the mouth of the river *Mæander*.
† Offic. I. 32.

a judgment with propriety, every one makes his choice according as fancy directs him; ſo that he is actually engaged in ſome particular courſe of life, before he is able to judge which is beſt. It is related indeed by *Xenephon*, that *Hercules* of *Prodicus* * being arrived at manhood, a ſeaſon when it is natural for every one to chuſe what courſe of life he ſhall purſue, retired into a deſart, where ſitting himſelf down, he continued for a long time much perplexed which way he ſhould take, there being two paths then in his view, one leading to pleaſure, and the other to virtue. This might poſſibly do well enough for *Hercules*, the ſon of *Jupiter*; but not ſo for us, who imitate ſuch perſons as hit our ſeveral taſtes, to whoſe ſtudies and manner of life we naturally attach ourſelves.

Since then our natural diſpoſition has the greateſt influence on our way of living, and, next to it, the ſituation of our fortune; we ought, by all means, to have regard to both theſe in determining this af-

* That is to ſay, according to what is related of *Hercules* by *Prodicus* the Sophiſt.

fair;

fair; but principally to our natural genius, as being far more certain, and leſs liable to change.

Philip * king of *Macedon*, 'tis true, was inferior to his ſon in glory and military atchievements; but in humanity and courteous behaviour, his ſuperior. Hence the one was always great, the other frequently brutal to the higheſt degree. So that it is an excellent advice, that the more elevated our ſituation, the more ſubmiſſive ſhould be our demeanour.

We † ought to reſpect all men, not only the virtuous, but others too; for to have no concern what the world thinks of us, beſides its being extremely arrogant, is the ſure characteriſtic of a perſon loſt to all virtue.

Tho' ‖ *Xerxes* enjoyed all that fortune could beſtow; yet, not ſatisfied with be-

* Offic. I. 26.
† Offic. I. 28.
‖ Tuſcul. V. 7.

ing

ing maſter of powerful armies, numerous fleets, and immenſe treaſures, he offered a reward to the man who ſhould invent ſome new delight. Nor did even that content him; for thirſt of pleaſure is inſatiable. As for me, I ſhould be glad we could, at any price, engage ſome perſon to find out a new reaſon, which ſhould more ſtrongly convince us, that virtue alone is ſufficient to make us live happy.

What * means, I pray, this extravagant vanity in recounting your riches? Are you the only rich man in the world? O heavens! What do I hear? Shall I not rejoice at every addition to my knowledge? Are you alone then rich? But what if you are not? Nay what if you be even poor? For whom, I would aſk, do we call rich; or, to whom does this epithet properly belong? I ſuppoſe 'tis one who has enough to make him live genteelly; and being ſatisfied with this, neither deſires or wiſhes for any more. 'Tis not your poſſeſſions, or what

* Parad. VI. 1. 'Tis thought by ſome, that *Craſſus* is here meant, who was the richeſt man of his time.

man-

mankind may ſay of you, but your mind alone, that can determine whether you are rich or not. Are you fully ſatisfied with what you have; ſupplied with every thing your heart could wiſh; and even content with your preſent ſupply of caſh? Then you are a rich man, I allow. But, on the contrary, if you are ſuch a ſlave to avarice, as to think no ſort of gain diſhonourable; whereas every kind of it, in a man of your rank*, muſt be ſo; if you are every day guilty of fraud, deceit, exaction, diſhoneſt bargains, theft, or robbery; if you plunder the allies, or rob the public treaſury; if you expect great things from the wills of your friends, and not only ſo, but even forge them yourſelf: are theſe, I pray, the ſigns of a rich, or poor, man? 'Tis the mind, not the coffer, of a man that can be ſaid to be rich. Though the latter ſhould be ever ſo full; yet, if empty yourſelf, I ſhall never think you a rich man. Wealth is meaſured by the neceſſities of mankind. Have you a daughter?

* A ſenator was not allowed to deal in any kind of traffic.

Then

Then doubtleſs you have occaſion for money. Have you two? You need a greater ſum? Have you ſeveral of them? Then a ſtill greater. And if you have fifty of them, as *Danaus* is ſaid to have had, ſo many portions require a large eſtate: for, as I ſaid before, the ſtandard of riches is regulated according to every man's neceſſity. Can he, therefore, be called rich, who, inſtead of many daughters, has appetites without number, capable of ſoon exhauſting the greateſt eſtate? No, he himſelf is ſenſible of his poverty.

Let * our converſation, like that in which the followers of *Socrates* excel, be free from noiſy impertinence and obſtinacy; let it be graceful, and full of ſpirit; and let us by no means exclude others from their ſhare, as if it made part of our property: but as in other ſocial matters, ſo in converſation, let every one be contented to ſpeak in his turn †. The firſt

* Offic. I. 37.

† *Viciſſitude*, ſays the Earl of *Shaftſbury*, is a mighty law of diſcourſe, and mightily longed for by mankind.--To be obſtructed thing

thing to be conſidered, is the ſubject to be ſpoke to: if it be ſerious, it ſhould be handled with gravity; if of a merry and gay turn, with wit and pleaſantry; but above all things, we muſt be extremely cautious, that our diſcourſe betray no defect in our morals. This laſt chiefly happens, when the abſent are purpoſely defamed, ridiculed, and their character handled with ſeverity, contempt, and ill-nature. Now the topics of converſation are, for the moſt part, private and domeſtic concerns, the affairs of the public, or ſome point of learning. If therefore the diſcourſe happens to deviate from theſe to ſomething elſe, we ſhould by all means endeavour to bring it back: but whatever turn the converſation ſhall take, (for all men are not pleaſed with the ſame things, and in ſuch as they like, the degrees of ap-

therefore and manacled in conferences, and to be confined to hear orations on certain ſubjects, muſt needs give us a diſtaſte, and render the ſubjects ſo managed, as diſagreeable as the managers. Men had rather reaſon upon trifles, ſo they may reaſon freely, and without the impoſition of authority, than on the uſefulleſt and beſt ſubjects in the world, where they are held under a reſtraint and fear. See *Eſſay on Wit and Humour*.

probation

probation are very different, and not the ſame at all times) we ought to be particularly attentive, how far it may with pleaſure be perſiſted in; and as good ſenſe ſhould direct us when to ſpeak, ſo let moderation teach us when to leave off.

Themiſtocles * being aſked, whether he had rather marry his daughter to a poor man with an unblemiſhed reputation, or to a rich one whoſe character was not altogether ſo perfect: he replied, *I had rather have a man without money, than money without a man.*

It † is an admirable obſervation of *Socrates*, that the neareſt and moſt compendious way to glory, was for a man to be in reality what he would have others think him. But if there are any, who think to acquire ſolid glory by mere oſtentation and vain pretence, by a ſtudied ſpeech, or even a formal look, they are very much miſtaken. True glory takes deep root, and

* Offic. II. 20. † Ibid. c. 12.

is productive of fruit: whereas all fiction, like the bloſſom of trees, quickly falls to the ground, it being impoſſible for any thing of that nature to be laſting.

Philip *, in a letter to his ſon *Alexander*, takes an excellent method to reprove him, for endeavouring to gain the affections of the *Macedonians* by baſe prodigality. *On what grounds*, ſays he, *can you expect that they will prove faithful to you, whom you have corrupted by bribery? Is it your intention that the* Macedonians *ſhould look upon you, not as their king, but as their treaſurer or ſteward?*

Though † the laws of the twelve tables have made very few offences puniſhable by death; the following one, however, they thought proper to rank in that number, *viz. if any perſon ſung, or compoſed, a poem tending to defame or abuſe another:* And that with very good reaſon; for it is to courts of juſtice, and the

* Offic. II. 15.

† Frag. lib. VI. de Rep.

lawful

lawful proceedings of magiſtrates, not the fancies of poets, that we ought to be accountable for our behaviour: nor is it fit we ſhould hear ourſelves defamed, unleſs where we are allowed to anſwer to the charge, and defend our reputation by a fair trial.

To * deſire what is wrong, is of itſelf no ſmall unhappineſs; nor is it ſo great a misfortune, not to obtain our wiſhes, as to wiſh to obtain what is improper.

A † quarrel falling out between *Themiſtocles* and a man of the iſland *Seriphos* ‖, who had reproached him, that he owed his renown, not to his own virtues, but the glory of his country; the former replied, *I am ſenſible if I was a native of* Seriphos, *I ſhould not be noble*; *nor would you, though an* Athenian, *ever be illuſtrious.*

* Fragm. Hortenſ.

† De Senect. cap. 3.

‖ *Seriphos*, a ſmall iſland in the *Archipelago*, called at preſent *Serfino*.

Dionyſius

Dionyſius * having uſurped the throne of *Syracuſe* at the age of twenty-five, continued his tyrannic government for thirty-eight years. How beautiful, how opulent, the city thus enſlaved by him! Now it is related of him by authors of good credit, that he was a man of the greateſt temperance with regard to diet, and in managing buſineſs, active and bold; but withal naturally miſchievous and unjuſt. Whence in the eyes of all who ſee things in a true light, he muſt appear wretched to the higheſt degree.

Even when in poſſeſſion of the ſovereign power, he was far from enjoying the happineſs he had ſo paſſionately coveted: For though deſcended of virtuous parents and an honourable family, and bleſſed with an extenſive acquaintance among thoſe of his own rank, yet he put no confidence in any of them; but choſe foreigners, fierce barbarians, and a certain number of ſlaves ſelected from the moſt wealthy families of *Syracuſe*, for his life-guard. Thus he, in

* Tuſcul. V. 20, 21.

a man-

a manner, ſhut himſelf up in a priſon, for no other reaſon but the lawleſs thirſt of tyrannic power. Nay, what is ſtill more, that he might not truſt his throat to a barber, he taught his own daughters to ſhave; ſo that theſe young princeſſes, reduced to the moſt ſordid employment, were obliged to perform the office of barber to their father, by ſhaving his beard and hair. Notwithſtanding all this caution, he would not truſt a razor even with them, when grown up to years of maturity; but taught them to ſinge off his beard and hair with the burning coals of walnut-ſhells.

As he had two wives, *Ariſtomache* a native of *Syracuſe*, and *Doris* a *Locrian*, he never viſited either of them by night, without firſt having their apartments thoroughly ſearched. And as he had cauſed his bed-chamber to be ſurrounded with a broad moat, over which lay a ſmall wooden draw-bridge; this, on ſhutting the door, he drew up towards the chamber.

It was his cuſtom to harangue the people from a high tower; becauſe he durſt not

not truſt himſelf in the places commonly uſed for that purpoſe.

One day having a mind to play at Tennis, a game he was mighty fond of; and ſtripping for that purpoſe, he is ſaid to have delivered his ſword to a youth, who was greatly in favour with him. Upon which one of his intimate friends ſaid by way of jeſt, *Here then is one with whom you can truſt your life*; and the young gentleman having ſmiled, he commanded them both to be put to death: the one, becauſe he had pointed out a way of diſpatching him, and the other, for having by his ſmile approved of the hint. This action, however, gave him the moſt uneaſineſs he ever ſuffered in his life; for he had the moſt tender affection for the young gentleman, whom he had thus put to death. In this manner are weak men diſtracted between oppoſite paſſions. If you indulge the one, you muſt offer violence to the other.

Was this tyrant happy? Hear his own judgment of the matter: for one of his paraſites, called *Damocles*, having launched out

out in praiſe of his forces, power, ſovereign majeſty, riches of all kinds, and the magnificence of his palaces, and affirming that never man was ſo happy; *Will you then*, ſays the Tyrant to *Damocles*, *taſte this life you are ſo much delighted with, and take a trial of my lot?* Upon his replying that nothing could be more to his wiſh, he ordered him to be placed on a ſopha of gold with moſt ſplendid coverings, that were beautified with magnificent works of embroidery; he likewiſe cauſed ſeveral buffets to be furniſhed with gold and ſilver plate of curious workmanſhip. Some young ſlaves, of incomparable beauty, were appointed to wait at table; who had orders to watch his very looks, and ſerve him at a nod. Nor were the choiceſt ointments and garlands wanting; the ſweeteſt perfumes were burnt; and his table covered with the moſt exquiſite viands. In a word, *Damocles* thought himſelf compleatly happy; when in the midſt of this entertainment, the tyrant commanded a drawn ſword, of the brighteſt poliſh, to be ſuſpended from the cieling, by a ſingle horſe-

horſe-hair, over the head of this happy man. From this inſtant the beautiful attendants, and curious plate, no more charmed his eyes; the delicacies on the table were no longer ſought after; the garlands fell down of themſelves; in fine, he begged leave of the tyrant to retire, for that now he had no mind to be happy.

Pompey * was wont to tell, how in his return from *Syria* having put into *Rhodes*, he had a great deſire to hear the lectures of *Poſidonius*; but being told that he was extremely bad of a fit of the gout, he thought he could do no leſs, however, than pay a viſit to ſo renowned a philoſopher. On being introduced, he ſaluted him in terms of the greateſt reſpect †, and expreſſed his concern, that he could not have the pleaſure of hearing him. *But you may*, replied the other, *for bodily pain*

* Tuſcul. II. 25.

† Pliny VIII. 30. relates the following circumſtance. When *Pompey* was about to enter the houſe of *Poſidonius*, a man renowned for his profeſſion of philoſophy, he forbad the lictor to ſtrike the door, according to cuſtom; and he to whom the Eaſt and Weſt had ſubmitted, lowered his faſces to the gate of letters.

ſhall

ſhall never be the cauſe, that a man of your rank ſhould wait on me to no purpoſe. So that, though confined to bed, he entered into a grave and copious diſcourſe on this very ſubject, *that nothing is good, but what is honeſt:* and when ſeized with moſt acute touches of pain, he often ſaid, *Pain, you but loſe your labour; though you be troubleſome, I ſhall never allow that you are an evil.*

Where * is there one philoſopher of a thouſand, whoſe manners, life, and diſpoſition, are agreeable to reaſon; who looks on his learning, not as a vain oſtentation of ſcience, but a rule of life; and maſter of his own actions, carries his doctrine into practice? Some of them are ſo vain and ſelf-conceited, that it had been better they had remained in ignorance; others are avaricious, ſome fond of glory, and many ſlaves to pleaſure: ſo that there is a ſtrange contrariety between their life and doctrine; than which, in my opinion, nothing can be more diſhonourable. For

* Tuſcul. II, 5.

ſhould

ſhould one, who profeſſes grammar, ſpeak with barbarous impropriety; or one, who would be eſteemed a muſician, ſing out of tune; ſuch blunders, in them, are ſo much the more groſs, as being committed againſt the very art they profeſs. In the ſame manner, a philoſopher who leads a vicious life, is the more contemptible, as being guilty of a breach of the morality he takes upon him to teach; and though he profeſſes the art of living virtuouſly, yet offends in that very reſpect.

Should * *I, my* Titus, *eaſe you of that pain,*
That anxious care, which fills your ſoul with grief:
Say, deareſt friend, would this not pleaſe you well?

For I may addreſs myſelf to you, *Atticus*, in the verſes ſpoken to *Flamininus*, by

That man † *of honour, though but ſmall eſtate.*

* De Senect. cap. 1. This is the *exordium*, or preface, of the dialogue on old age.

† *Ennius* is the perſon here meant. As to the application of theſe verſes, it is founded on this, that *Titus* was a prænomen

Although I know for a certain truth, that you are not, like *Flamininus*,

Both night and day harraſs'd with new alarms.

For I am well acquainted with your moderation, and evenneſs of temper. I am ſenſible, that it is not a ſurname only you have brought from *Athens*, but alſo humanity and prudence; and yet I cannot help ſuſpecting, that you are ſometimes not a little affected with the ſame events as myſelf*. But to offer any conſolation on this head being a matter of great difficulty, it ſhall be deferred to another time. At preſent, I have thought proper to write you my Sentiments on old age. For as it, in a manner, hangs over us, or at leaſt is faſt approaching, I am deſirous to alleviate its burthen, common to us both: although I know for certain, that you not only bear it, as you do every thing elſe, with prudence and moderation; but will

common to *Flamininus* and *Pomponius*; the latter of whom was ſurnamed *Atticus*, becauſe of the long ſtay he had made at *Athens*.

*. The troubles of the commonwealth, during the civil wars between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*.

con-

continue to do ſo. However, as I determined to write on old age, none ſeemed ſo proper as you, to whom a work, which might be of common ſervice to us both, could be offered.

So great was the pleaſure I received in compoſing this treatiſe *, as not only freed old age of all its ailments, but even rendered it eaſy and agreeable. Philoſophy, then, can never be extolled enough; ſince the man, who obeys its dictates, may live happily in every ſtage of life. As to its other advantages, I have already ſaid, and ſhall hereafter ſay, a great deal. The book, which I have at preſent ſent you, treats of old age.

I have not, indeed, like *Ariſto* † of *Chius*, put what I had to offer on my ſubject into the mouth of *Tithonus*; (for there is little credit to be given to a fable) but into that of *M. Cato* the elder, thereby to add au-

* Hence it is evident that *Cicero* practiſed what he recommended to others, *viz.* not to compoſe the *exordium*, till the body of the work was finiſhed.

† A Stoic philoſopher, who muſt not be confounded with another *Ariſto*; who was a Peripatetic, and a native of the iſle of *Cos*. For *Cicero*'s thoughts on old age, ſee above, p. 135, & ſeq.

thority to it. I introduce him making anſwer to *Lælius* and *Scipio*, who had expreſſed their admiration that he bore his age with ſuch chearfulneſs. If he ſhall appear to reaſon more learnedly than is uſual in his own works, let it be aſcribed to his knowledge of the *Grecian* literature, which he ſtudied with cloſe application in his old age. But what occaſion for a longer preamble? *Cato*'s diſcourſe will ſufficiently explain my ſentiments on old age.

Any * man may be guilty of an overſight; but to perſiſt in error, is the ſure characteriſtick of a fool.

What † is liberty? The power of living as you pleaſe. Now who can be ſaid to live in this manner, if it is not one who acts agreeably to right reaſon; who takes pleaſure in his duty, and lives according to a plan founded on reflection; who obeys the laws not out of fear, but willingly and with reſpect, as being ſenſible that it is

* Philippic. XII. 2.
† Paradox. V. 1.

moſt

moſt conducive to his happineſs; who ſays nothing, does nothing, and thinks nothing, but with the utmoſt freedom and chearfulneſs? All his deliberations, and every thing he undertakes, begin and terminate in himſelf; nor is there any thing has ſo much weight with him, as his will * and judgment; even fortune itſelf, whoſe influence is ſaid to be very great, yields to him: for as the poet wiſely obſerves, *every man's fortune depends on his manners.* On the whole then, 'tis the wiſe man alone, who does nothing by force, or with regret.

We † ſay very properly that angry men are beſides themſelves, that is, are void of prudence, reaſon, reflection; which ought to give laws to all the other powers of the mind. Now it is neceſſary, either to remove out of their ſight the perſons againſt whom their fury is levelled, till they re-

* Will, in the language of the Stoics, is only meant of the will when enlightened, and guided by reaſon: for if paſſion takes place, it is not the man, but rather ſomething foreign to him, that wills. See Tuſcul. IV. 6.

† Tuſcul. IV. 36.

collect themſelves; (but what is this recollection of one's ſelf, if it be not the reſtoring the diſturbed parts of the ſoul to their natural ſtate?) or they are to be intreated and conjured to ſuſpend their vengeance to another time, when their anger ſhall have ſubſided. But this muſt certainly imply a violent perturbation raiſed in the mind in oppoſition to reaſon. Hence it is, that the ſaying of *Archytas** is much cried up; who being highly offended at his ſteward, addreſſed him thus: *How ſeverely ſhould I have handled you, had I not been angry!*

Hippias † having arrived at *Olympia*, during the celebration of thoſe famous games, which are held every fifth year, made his boaſt, in the preſence of almoſt

* *Archytas* having gone from *Tarentum*, the place of his birth, to *Metapontum*, where *Pythagoras* taught his philoſophy, thought of nothing during his long ſtay there, but to profit under ſo great a maſter. At his return he found his lands in a pitiful condition, occaſioned by the negligence of his ſteward: and it was this made him uſe the expreſſion above-mentioned. On this head, ſee *Valerius Maximus*, lib. IV. cap. 1. Ext. 1.

† De Orat. III. 32.

all

all *Greece*, that there was no part of any art with which he was not perfectly acquainted. Nor was it the learned and liberal arts only, as geometry, muſic, grammar, poetry, natural hiſtory, morality, and politics; but that the ring on his finger, the cloak on his back, and the ſhoes on his feet, were all his own workmanſhip.

Themiſtocles *, the famous *Athenian*, whom the *Greeks* eſteemed a prodigy of good ſenſe and prudence, was accoſted by a learned man of the firſt rate; who proffered to teach him the art of memory †, then firſt reduced to a ſcience. *Themiſtocles* having aſked him, what that art could do? The profeſſor anſwered, it would teach him to remember every thing. On which the other replied, that he would do him a much greater favour, could he teach him to forget, rather than remember, whatever he pleaſed.

* De Orat. II. 74.

† See Quintilian, XI. 2.

Theo-

Theophraſtus *, on his death bed, is ſaid to have reproached nature, that ſhe had beſtowed a long life on ſtags and crows, who could have no occaſion for it; but to mankind had given a very ſhort one, notwithſtanding that it much concerned them: for had their life been longer, they might have attained the knowledge of every ſcience, and a perfect maſtery in every art. He complained, therefore, that he was ſnatched away by death, when theſe things were but juſt opening to his view.

All † mankind hate an ungrateful perſon. They look on themſelves as perſonally injured, in the diſcouragement of munificence; and eſteem the guilty perſon, the common enemy of the needy.

Pythagoras ‡ having gone to *Phlius* ‖, is ſaid to have held a learned and eloquent

* Tuſcul. III. 28.
† Offic. II. 18.
‡ Tuſcul. V. 3.
‖ A city of *Peloponneſus*.

diſcourſe

diſcourſe with *Leon*, king of that place; who being much taken with his wit and eloquence, aſked him what trade he profeſſed? He anſwered that he underſtood no trade at all, but was a *Philoſopher*. *Leon* ſtruck with the novelty of the term, aſked what Philoſophers were, and wherein conſiſted the difference between them and the reſt of mankind? *Pythagoras* made anſwer, that in his opinion, human life reſembled that great concourſe of people convened from every part of *Greece* to celebrate the ſolemn games: for as in them, ſome, by bodily exerciſe, contend for the glory and renown of gaining the crown of victory; the only inducement of others, was to make profit by buying and ſelling: but beſides theſe, there was a third ſort, more noble than either of the former, who came there neither in queſt of gain or popular applauſe, but merely out of curioſity to ſee what paſſed, and how things were managed. Thus it is with mankind, they come from another life, and another ſtate of exiſtence*, into this world, as it were

* Here we have the famous dogma of *Pythagoras*, concerning the *metempſychoſis*, or tranſmigration of ſouls.

from

from a foreign city to ſome feſtival ſolemnity. Some mind glory; others riches; and a few there are, who, contemning every purſuit beſides, carefully ſtudy the nature of things. Theſe call themſelves *Philoſophers*, that is to ſay, lovers of wiſdom. And as in the public games, 'tis moſt honourable to be a ſpectator, free from mean ſelfiſh views; ſo, in life, the ſtudy of natural knowledge, is by far the moſt excellent of all other profeſſions.

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